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ABSTRACT
Background: Institutions face significant risks related to athletics compliance.
While risk assessment has been a standard part of compliance programs outside higher
education, it has not been among the tools of NCAA athletics compliance.
Purpose: To (a) identify the methods and steps of using risk assessment in
intercollegiate athletics compliance and (b) evaluate the effects of risk assessment on the
athletics compliance operation communication and decision making about compliance,
interactions with the NCAA, and compliance outcomes.
Research Design: The researched employed a nonexperimental descriptive case
study design.
Setting: The research site was a Division I institution. The institution was
purposively selected on the basis of its staff’s experience with both risk management and
NCAA athletics, as well as the representative size of its compliance staff (one full-time
professional and one administrative assistant).
Data Collection and Analysis: Two kinds of data were collected, interview data
and documents. Informants included (a) the president, (b) athletics staff members, (c) an
athletics council member, and (d) institutional and system-wide compliance staff
members, as well as (e) the conference compliance director and (f) two NCAA
enforcement staff members. The interviews were primarily one to one and face to face.
Relevant documents were collected and reviewed.
The risk-based compliance process was observed to include (a) risk assessment,
(b) risk management, and (c) risk assurance. Risk assessment included scanning the
environment and identifying, rating, prioritizing, and reporting risks. Risk management
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included identifying specific risks in high-priority risk areas, developing risk-mitigation
plans, and implementing the plans. Risk assurance included the review of compliance
activities by outside parties to verify the controls.
Findings: The findings indicated that risk management had been successfully
incorporated into athletics compliance and had positive effects on the compliance
function and on communication and decision making about compliance and other
athletics risks. No changes were observed in the program’s interactions with the NCAA.
The athletics compliance program was seen as well-functioning and effective.
Conclusion: The conclusion is that risk management was effective at this
institution, could be applied more widely in athletics compliance, and is a potentially
powerful and beneficial approach for protecting institutions against athletics risks.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Institutions face compliance risks in athletics (Bernard, 2003; Buckner, 2004).
Both in the 1980s and in the 1990s, more than half of Division I-A institutions were
censured, sanctioned, or put on probation (Knight Commission, 2001). The consequences
for athletics noncompliance have ranged from embarrassment to resignations, from loss
of scholarships to loss of postseason play, and from the return of actual athletics revenue
to lawsuits (Cohen, 2005; Independent Investigative Commission, 2004; Lederman,
2004; Suggs, 2005; “U. of Michigan is further penalized,” 2003; Wieman, 2004).
In addition to athletics noncompliance risks, institutions face concerns about lack
of integrity in college sports. Criticisms appear regularly in the popular media (Gup,
1989; Lipsyte, 2005; Rozin, 2005), and interest groups have called for reforms and
greater institutional control of athletics (Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletics [COIA],
2005; Knight Commission, 1991, 1992, 1993, 2001).
To ensure that athletics programs adhere to its rules, the NCAA requires each
institution to establish an athletics compliance program (Buckner, 2004; NCAA, 1996).
The NCAA has articulated principles of institutional control: (a) formal policies and
procedures, (b) monitoring and enforcement, (c) communication of procedures, (d)
alterations of systems as needed, (e) swift response to violations, (f) communication of
disciplinary consequences, (g) individual reporting without negative consequences, and
(h) compliance education (NCAA, 1996). The NCAA’s C.O.D.E. model outlines key
compliance program elements in the areas of (a) communication, (b) organization, (c)
documentation, and (d) evaluation (NCAA, 2005). The NCAA also requires an outside
review of each institution’s compliance program every four years.
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However, although risk assessment has been a standard part of compliance
programs outside higher education, risk assessment has not been a commonly used tool in
NCAA athletics compliance.
Influential models for compliance programs in the private sector have been the
U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (U.S.
Sentencing Commission, 1991) and the Committee of Sponsoring Organization’s Internal
Control--Integrated Framework (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations [COSO],
1992). The 1991 Sentencing Guidelines’ seven elements of effective compliance
programs are (a) standards and procedures, (b) oversight, (c) care in delegation and
hiring, (d) education, (e) monitoring, audit, and reporting systems, (f) response to
violations, and (g) corrective disciplinary action (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1991).
The Sentencing Guidelines were updated in 2004, adding as program elements (a) risk
assessment, (b) culture of compliance, (c) ethics, (d) incentives, (e) training for and
oversight by senior managers and directors, (f) resources and authority for compliance
officers, and (g) program audits (Desio, 2004; Kaplan, 2004; U.S. Sentencing
Commission, 2004). The COSO framework for compliance includes (a) control
environment, (b) risk assessment, (c) control activities, (d) information and
communication, and (e) monitoring (COSO, 1992). These models emphasize the
identification and assessment of risks and the creation of corresponding risk-mitigation
plans.
Risk assessment has been used at some higher education institutions as an
approach to compliance. Crawford, Chaffin, and Scarborough (2001) and Chaffin (2003)
described an approach in which (a) risks were identified and prioritized on the basis of
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magnitude of potential impact and probability of occurrence, (b) risks were categorized
into 15 risk areas (including athletics), and (c) critical institution-level risks were
identified.
The lack of risk assessment as a common and normal element of NCAA athletics
compliance programs can be seen as a gap. In the absence of risk assessment as an
accepted process, athletics compliance officers (presumably) make subjective decisions
about how to deploy compliance efforts within the constraints of their resources.
Statement of the Problem
Risk assessment is not part of the NCAA’s guidance on athletics compliance
programs. The terms risk assessment and risk analysis cannot be found on the NCAA
web site, in the NCAA Division I Manual (2005-2006), in NCAA compliance training
materials, or in NCAA compliance review materials.
NCAA rules, however, are numerous and extremely detailed. McDonald (2006)
described the number of rules in just 4 of the 33 sections in the NCAA Division I Manual:
The 491-page 2005-06 NCAA Manual includes 33 different sections of NCAA
rules. Those sections include 626 rules under recruiting, 577 under eligibility and
determination of eligibility, 511 under permissible benefits, and 1,311 concerning
playing seasons and off-season activities. Many of those rules are accompanied by
lengthy interpretations, and on the average more than 100 rules are added or
revised each year, according to NCAA records. (para. 10)
In the absence of discussion of risk assessment, the implicit message to athletics
compliance practitioners is that institutions must set up programs to protect against all
rules violations. Because compliance functions vary in budgets, staffing, and
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responsibilities, it can be assumed that compliance officers make individual judgments
about deploying finite compliance resources against risks. Plainly put, they do as much as
they can and hope for the best. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that universities do not
invest in rigorous athletics compliance programs until they experience a major
investigation (Buckner, personal communication, October 24, 2005). The probable
perception of presidents is that their athletics compliance programs protect against all
risks, but some compliance officers may be living with considerable program
compromises. The gap between the probable perception and the reality is cause for
concern.
Although it is culturally normal for a compliance officer outside athletics to
decide to accept (and not mitigate) a risk seen as low impact and low probability, this is
not culturally acceptable in athletics compliance. Thus, athletics compliance officers are
put in the problematic position of attempting to cover all compliance risks.
By understanding the benefits and procedures of risk assessment (as well as how
risk assessment could be reconciled with the cover-all-rules perspective of the NCAA),
compliance officers could make risk assessment a constructive part of their repertoires.
By adopting risk assessment, athletics compliance personnel would have objective means
of communicating and improving. Practitioners would have a clear-cut list of risks for
implementation planning and cost-versus-risk decisions. Researchers would have an
avenue for studying how risks vary and which elements cover which risks. Finally,
university presidents would have a clear window into the specific steps that are being
taken (or not taken) to mitigate risks in athletics.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to
1. Identify the methods and steps of using risk assessment in intercollegiate
athletics compliance.
2. Evaluate the influences of a risk-assessment approach in athletics compliance
on (a) the operation of the compliance function, (b) communication and
decision making about compliance at the institution, (c) interactions with the
NCAA, and (d) compliance outcomes.
Theoretical Frameworks
Two theoretical frameworks shaped the interviews and analysis. “Theory helps
you avoid opportunistic study of ‘everything’ by linking broader principles and
perspectives with your decisions to attend to some things but not others in the course of
your inquiry” (Schram, 2003, p. 42).
The first theoretical framework was the description of risk assessment procedures
in higher education settings provided by Crawford et al. (2001). This description of risk
assessment provided a conceptual lens for understanding procedures in place at the
research site. On the basis of the authors’ description, risk assessment steps should
include (a) identification, creating an inventory of compliance risks; (b) measurement,
rating the significance of each risk in terms of potential impact and probability of
occurrence; (c) prioritization, ranking the risks on the basis of their combined
measurement of probability and impact, (d) reporting, communicating the prioritized list
to university administrators, and (e) a risk management plan, a description of riskmitigation strategies and controls for the identified risks.

6

The second theoretical framework was the updated Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2004). The 2004 Sentencing Guidelines
provided a conceptual lens for observing the overall quality of the compliance program in
place at the research site. The 2004 Sentencing Guidelines indicated that an effective
compliance program must (a) seek to identify violations and (b) show evidence of a
culture of compliance, (c) educate senior managers and trustees, (d) have active senior
leadership, (e) prioritize issues on the basis of risk assessment, (f) establish compliance as
a behavioral norm, and (g) emphasize ethics (Desio, 2004). In addition, the 2004
Sentencing Guidelines included the original 1991 Sentencing Guidelines for compliance
programs: (a) standards and procedures; (b) high-level oversight; (c) careful hiring and
delegation; (d) training and education; (e) monitoring, audit, and nonretaliatory reporting;
(f) response to violations; and (g) disciplinary action (U.S. Sentencing Commission,
2004).
Research Questions
Lofland and Lofland (1995) described eight basic categories of questions that
social scientists can pose on a given research topic: (a) types, (b) frequencies, (c)
magnitudes, (d) structures, (e) processes, (f) causes, (g) consequences, and (h) agency. In
this study, the particular categories of interest were (a) the process of risk assessment in
athletics compliance, and (b) the perceived consequences of using risk assessment on the
compliance program.
Specifically, the research questions of the study were the following:
1. What are the specific methods and steps for incorporating risk assessment into
athletics compliance?
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2. What influence does a risk-assessment experience have on a compliance
function’s priorities, processes, and resource allocations?
3. What influence does a prioritized list of athletics compliance risks have on the
communication and decision-making dynamics among the compliance
function, athletics department, and university administration?
4. What influence does a risk-assessment approach have on an institution’s
interactions with the NCAA, which does not have a risk-assessment mindset?
5. What influence does a risk-assessment experience have on compliance
outcomes?
Design and Method
The researcher employed a grounded theory design at an institution that had
implemented risk assessment in its athletics compliance program. The institution, Carston
State University,1 was selected purposively on the basis of its several years of experience
in using a risk-based approach in athletics compliance. Carston State University is part of
the State University System, which has implemented institution-wide risk management at
all of its institutions. Carston State University is a Division I school with a compliance
staff of one professional and one full-time administrative assistant. Its athletics director
has been active at the national level, serving on several NCAA and conference
committees.
Informants at Carston State University included (a) the president, (b) the athletics
director, (c) the athletics compliance officer, (d) the senior woman administrator, (e) the
institution compliance officer, (f) a faculty member of the athletics council, and (g) the
head men’s basketball coach. Also, (a) three compliance staff members at the State
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University System level, (b) the external reviewer who conducted the institution’s most
recent compliance review, and (c) two NCAA enforcement staff members were
interviewed for outside perspectives.
Two kinds of data were collected: interview data and documents. The interviews
were primarily one to one and face to face. Documents related to risk assessments and
compliance plans were collected and reviewed.
Limitations and Delimitations
Limitations of the study included the following:
1. This study contained the limits of any qualitative study, in which the benefits
of objectivity, quantifiability, and generalizability are exchanged for the
benefit of rich understanding of detail and nuance. In this case, thick
description of complex procedural and organizational activities as well as
interpersonal and cultural reactions were beneficial and, thus, worth the
limitation. Future studies that are objective and quantified should be able to
use this descriptive study as a platform.
2. The informants at the State University System and at Carston State University
have invested substantial energy in their risk-management program and were
likely to be positively disposed toward it. (The researcher countered this to
some degree by asking devil’s advocate questions. In addition, a reviewer who
conducted CSU’s most recent external compliance review was interviewed to
provide a counterbalancing perspective to the CSU informants’ selfperceptions.)
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3. No institution serving as a nonexample or low use of risk assessment site was
included in the study. While such a subject would provide information about
the nonuse of risk assessment, the purpose of this study was to examine the
successful use of risk assessment in athletics.
The main delimitations of the study included the following:
1. Risk assessment at only one university in one state university system was
studied.
2. The State University System experienced major negative risk events in the
1990s, and in response its board and president mandated an institutional
compliance program at each institution. Not every Division I school can
expect such direct top-down support for compliance and risk management.
Nonetheless, the purpose of this study was to identify what risk assessment in
athletics compliance looks like when it is supported, implemented, and
accepted.
Preliminary Biases, Suppositions, and Expectations
The researcher’s personal experiences. My 10 years of experience in athletics
compliance has included several external compliance reviews, including one NCAA
second-cycle athletics certification and three external compliance reviews. I have
attended numerous conference meetings of athletics compliance officers and institutional
compliance officers and annual NCAA regional rules education seminars. I have served
as an NCAA peer reviewer for two Division I-A institutions’ athletics certifications.
I have had four major experiences that affect my personal perceptions about
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athletics compliance and risk assessment:
1. In 2005 I experienced a reduction (by half) in athletics compliance resources
with no change in expectations about how the compliance operation would
maintain coverage of rules compliance. This experience led me to observe that
athletics compliance risks were not rationally assessed and managed at my
own institution (nor, perhaps, at many others). In other words, in athletics
compliance the outcome is always held to be the same (that is, protect against
all compliance risks), but the efforts and resources put toward it vary
considerably.
2. Also in 2005 I experienced an organization change in which athletics
compliance no longer reported organizationally to the athletics department.
This change in supervision underlined the role of athletics compliance as that
of protecting the university from risk (in addition to helping teams to be
competitive under the rules).
3. In 2005 I hired an outside athletics compliance consultant to review the
compliance operation. The consultant identified many risks and increased my
awareness of compliance risks.
4. As a result of the consultant’s findings, an additional compliance professional
was provided to the athletics compliance staff. This raised the question of how
best to deploy additional energies. Once again, the concept of risk seemed
relevant in that the additional resources should be deployed against the
greatest risks.
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In addition to these experiences, reviewing the literature confirmed both the
magnitude of compliance risks and the lack of risk assessment in athletics. Risk
assessment is not mentioned on the NCAA web site or in its compliance documents or
training. The literature indicated a rise in legal and compliance risk in higher education
and some corresponding interest in institution-wide compliance. The State University
System arose in the literature as an early adopter in this area. Other than the State
University System’s self-description, its implementation had not been studied in depth. A
qualitative study of risk assessment in athletics compliance at a Division I institution
within the State University System appeared warranted.
The researcher’s expectations. I acknowledge that I anticipated these findings:
1. I expected that the Carston State University informants would describe risk
assessment as a positive element of both athletics and institutional
compliance.
2. I expected that the informants would share the procedural details of
implementing risk assessment.
3. I expected that, as a result of an emphasis on risk assessment, the informants
would discuss risk priorities, risk mitigation, and compliance resource
allocation in a more rational and above-board manner than is often observed
in other institutions. A risk-assessment tool and procedure would allow
athletics compliance practitioners to gather input on institution-level
compliance risks, prioritize the risks, and communicate openly to athletics
directors and university presidents about the risks and corresponding riskmitigation actions.
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4. I expected that the risk-based culture of the State University System had
facilitated the use of risk management in athletics compliance at Carston State
University and that implementing risk management at other Division I
institutions (without such cultural support) might be more challenging.
To provide a counterbalancing perspective to the CSU informants’ selfperceptions and my own biases, the external reviewer who conducted CSU’s most recent
NCAA-required external compliance review was included as an informant.
Significance of the Study
This study has the following significance.
1. The researcher attempted to cross the divide between compliance models
outside higher education, which greatly emphasize risk assessment, and
NCAA athletics compliance, which does not emphasize risk assessment. The
researcher sought ways in which these two perspectives could coexist.
2. The researcher intended to shine a light on a common frustration of athletics
compliance officers, which is that they are expected to protect against all
possible violations of all rules with finite resources. Neither overwhelmed
cynicism (“no way can we do all that”) nor groundless optimism (“we’re
probably OK”) is appropriate for a compliance officer. Thus, shedding light
on a process in which resource limitations are openly acknowledged, risks are
prioritized by consensus, and rational decisions are made about deploying the
resources against the priorities was beneficial.
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3. The study contains detailed descriptions of the steps in conducting risk
assessment in athletics compliance. Practitioners will be able to implement
risk assessment at their institutions on the basis of these descriptions.
4. The study serves as a description of risk assessment in athletics compliance
for future researchers. Researchers may wish to study which risks are
prioritized highly, the effectiveness of various risk-mitigation strategies, the
resources required to mitigate various risks, and the impact of choosing to
accept low-rated risks.
Chapter 2 is a review the two areas of the literature that were seen as relevant to
intercollegiate athletics compliance: (a) the area of athletics governance, including reform
efforts, presidential leadership, and management issues; and (b) the area of compliance
and risk management, both inside and outside higher education, as well as the NCAA’s
approach to compliance.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Two areas of literature are relevant to intercollegiate athletics compliance and
were reviewed in this study. First, the area of athletics governance was reviewed, in
particular, (a) concerns about the behavior of institutions regarding athletics, (b) historical
efforts at athletics reform, (c) recent calls for reform, (d) presidents’ leadership in
athletics, (e) issues in managing college athletics, and (f) research on presidents’
involvement in athletics. Second, the area of compliance and risk management was
reviewed, including (a) risk management in higher education, (b) risks associated with
athletics noncompliance, (c) approaches to and research on compliance outside higher
education, (d) the NCAA’s approach to compliance, and (e) the specific use of risk
management in higher education but outside athletics.
Athletics Governance
Concerns have long existed about college athletics, and efforts at reform have
occurred periodically in its history. In recent decades, calls for reform have intensified, the
university presidents’ role in athletics has been studied, and the management of athletics
has been the subject of debate.
Concerns about the Behavior of Institutions Regarding Athletics
Universities face significant risks associated with noncompliance with NCAA
rules at the institutional level. In the 1980s, 57 of 106 Division I-A institutions (54%)
were censured, sanctioned, or put on probation for major violations of NCAA rules. In the
1990s, 58 of 114 Division I-A institutions (52%) were similarly penalized (Knight
Commission, 2001).
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Bernard (2003), general counsel at the University of Florida, observed, “Major
college athletics programs, though, no longer enjoy the luxury of being just a cog in the
wheel of the college. They are highly visible, making it axiomatic that they have a small
margin for error” (p. 32).
The consequences of athletics noncompliance can be characterized as the
following:
Competitive consequences. Penalties for noncompliance can include loss of
scholarships or postseason play. In 2005 the NCAA placed the State University of New
York at Stony Brook on three years of probation and took away 12.5 scholarships over
two years because of violation of eligibility rules (Wills, 2005). Fresno State University
and the University of Georgia each ended their basketball seasons prematurely in 2003 as
a result of charges of wrongdoing in their programs (Lederman, 2004).
Revenue consequences. Loss of scholarships or postseason play can translate into
revenue loss. In 2003 the NCAA banned the University of Michigan basketball team from
postseason play in 2004 and removed one scholarship a year for four years because four
players had received money from a booster. The team had already voluntarily removed
itself from postseason play in 2002-03 and returned nearly $450,000 in NCAA postseason
revenue (“U. of Michigan is further penalized,” 2003). In 2004 the NCAA prohibited the
Mississippi State University football team from going to a bowl in 2004-05, removed four
scholarships, and placed the entire athletics department on probation for four years
because of recruiting violations (Engber, 2004). In 2002 the NCAA penalized the
University of Alabama football team with the loss of 21 scholarships over three years, a
two-year ban on postseason play, and five years of probation for recruiting violations,
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including a booster’s paying high school coaches $100,000 to steer a player to Alabama
(Suggs, 2005).
Expense consequences. The time and expense involved in lawsuits and
investigations related to rules violations can be enormous. Ohio State University was sued
for $3.5 million in back pay and benefits by its basketball coach who was fired for loaning
$6,000 to a recruit (Cohen, 2005). Buckner (2004) observed that an internal investigation
in preparation for an NCAA investigation of violations involves retaining an attorney,
establishing an internal investigation committee, and diverting personnel from other
academic, legal, or administrative commitments for what is probably a multi-year
commitment.
Reputation consequences. Scandals related to rules violations translate into
negative publicity. In 2003 the Fort Worth Star-Telegram published a transcript of a tape
recording of the men’s basketball coach’s instructing players and coaches to tell
investigators that a murdered player had been a drug dealer (Suggs, 2003). The lie was an
attempt to hide the fact that the coach had paid the student-athlete’s tuition.
Contribution consequences. Frank (2004) noted two studies that estimated the
effect of NCAA sanctions for rules violations regarding donor giving. Grimes and
Chressanthins (1994) estimated the effect of the NCAA sanction on Mississippi State
University as $1.6 million (in 1982 dollars) in lost donations. Rhoads and Gerking (2000)
estimated that NCAA probation for a violation in basketball reduces giving by $1.6
million (in 1987 dollars).
Internal conflict consequences. Athletics misconduct increases the divisiveness
between athletics and academics. University of Colorado distinguished professor of
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physics and 2001 Nobel Laureate Carl Wieman wrote, “I am not sure we can claim any
longer to be a ‘university.’ An ‘academic appendage to the football program’ would seem
to be a more honest description” (Wieman, 2004, para. 3).
Personal and professional consequences. Athletics scandals can cost presidents,
athletics administrators, and coaches their jobs. The president of St. Bonaventure
University was forced to resign in 2003 after he admitted a junior-college transfer student
who did not meet school or NCAA eligibility requirements (Lederman, 2004). The
chairman of St. Bonaventure University's board of trustees committed suicide in 2003 in
the wake of the scandal (Lieber, 2003).
Safety consequences. Athletics programs with insufficient controls can foster
situations in which crimes occur and the physical safety of students is at risk. An
independent commission appointed by the Board of Regents investigated football
recruiting at the University of Colorado. The commission questioned the fitness of the
school’s leaders and said that they “must be held accountable for systemic failings that
jeopardized students’ safety and allowed for ongoing misconduct” in the recruiting
program (Independent Investigative Commission, 2004, p. 6).
At the national level, the risk is that a negative image of intercollegiate athletics
will reach a tipping point and create a backlash. A Knight Commission telephone poll of
502 Americans, completed in December 2005, found that 56% said that college athletics
programs only care about whether athletes are eligible to play, 85% were concerned that
colleges accept athletes who have no reasonable chance of graduating, and 82% believed
that giving athletes who struggle academically unfair advantages causes them more harm
than good (Knight Commission, 2006).
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Although college sports are hugely popular entertainment, simultaneous images
exist of college sports as corrupt, exploitive, and out of control (Barlow, 2001; Farrell,
1985; Gee, 2005; Gerdy, 2006; Grant, 1979; Hanford, 2003; Lawry, 2005; Roach, 2004;
Sack, 2001; Thelin, 1996, 2002; Thelin & Wiseman, 1989). College sports are regularly
lampooned in the popular media as both exploiting and coddling players. In a Time
magazine article, Gup (1989) reported,
This is the season of “March madness.” It is a frenzied time when basketball rules
the tube, millions pour into college coffers, and lanky young giants seem anointed
with superhuman gifts of grace and courage. But beneath the pageantry of March
madness lies another, more disturbing kind of madness: an obsession with winning
and moneymaking that is perverting the noblest ideals of both sports and education
in America. . . .Some . . . got their degrees and found jobs. But for many the
promise of an education was a sham. They were betrayed by the good intentions of
others, by institutional self-interest and by their own blind love of the game.
Equally victimized are the colleges and universities that participate in an
educational travesty--a farce that devalues every degree and denigrates the mission
of higher education. (p. 54)
In an editorial appearing in USA Today, Lipsyte (2005) stated,
You rarely saw them [football and basketball players] out of uniform because they
ate separately at cordon bleu training tables, lived in designer jock dorms, and
studied together in special academic centers where they were able to pick the grad
students who wrote term papers for them. They rarely attended classes because
they were too busy traveling to games, playing them, practicing for them, resting
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up after them or lifting weights in shiny new work-out facilities paid for by your
extra student fees. When they did attend classes, it was often in jocks-only
seminars in such majors as criminal justice (they tended to have many brushes
with law enforcement) and communications (they needed to learn how to deal with
the media). (p. 11A)
In a Wall Street Journal editorial, Rozin (2005) expressed a similar view:
Big time college sports are a mess. While headlines hype the new football season
and speculate on an eventual champion, accounts surface daily of athletes’
stealing, assaulting women and getting busted on alcohol and drug charges. And
when a title game is played, shadowing the coverage will be news of woeful
graduation rates. . . . “The transgressions that universities commit in the name of
winning sports undermine the values of the institution,” says Derek Bok, former
president of Harvard. “In all too many cases, they tarnish the reputation of the
university by compromising its admissions standards, its grading practices, and the
academic integrity of its curriculum.”. . . To create winning teams, reformers
believe, universities break rules on training, on the allocation of funds to athletics,
and most frequently on athletes’ eligibility. Deception begins early, when schools
recruit sports prodigies who are ill-equipped--or uninterested--in academics. . . .
“The biggest problem is recruiting fine athletes who should not be in college,”
says Andy Geiger, who retired this summer as Ohio State’s athletic director after
11 years that included a national football championship and scandals in football
and basketball. “Do we really want a gifted athlete at our school for any reason
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other than our own gain? Are we only in it to use these kids and then spit them
out?” (p. D7)
The view that college athletes really are professionals--or should be--is never far
from the surface. Heuser (2005) quoted University of Michigan head football coach Lloyd
Carr’s comments on approved NCAA legislation that allows a 12th game in the college
football season: “This is a piece of legislation that, in my mind, treats the intercollegiate
football player like a professional. If we’re going to treat them like professionals, we
should pay ’em” (p. D7). Gerdy (2006), a professor in sports administration, expressed the
same view more sweepingly:
Division I scholarship athletes are professionals--and to claim otherwise is to
ignore reality.
Consider the essence of professional athletics: pay for play. Despite
[NCAA president Miles] Brand’s idealistic rhetoric, the contract between the
college athlete and the institution no longer represents the “amateur” ideal of “pay
(scholarship) for education” when it is plain to everyone--coaches, fans, faculty
members, media, and especially the athletes--that they are on the campus, first and
foremost, to play ball. That, by any definition, is “pay for play.”
The professional model is also about paying whatever you must for
coaches, staff members, facilities, scouting, travel, and anything else that coaches
believe might make the difference between winning and losing, regardless of how
outrageous or remote the actual impact. Professional sports is also about playing
anywhere at anytime to reap television revenues. And professional athletics is
about the expectation that athletes train year-round and sacrifice their bodies for
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“the program.” In short, Division I athletics, as currently structured and conducted,
operates on the same basic principles as professional sports teams.
Yet educational institutions have no business being in the business of
professional sports. It is time to dismantle the professional model of college
athletics and rebuild it in the image of an educational institution.
Specifically, the athletics scholarship must be eliminated in favor of institutional
need-based aid. The athletics scholarship at its foundation is the biggest barrier to
athletes’ getting a genuine educational opportunity. When you are paid to play,
regardless of the form of “payment,” everything takes a back seat to athletic
performance. (p. B6)
The conventional wisdom is that the money in college sports causes bad behavior.
The popular belief is that universities make big money on athletics. The top schools do. In
2004-05 the top five schools in terms of athletics revenue were Ohio State University,
with $89.7 million; the University of Texas, with just $50,000 less; the University of
Michigan, with $78.4 million; the University of Florida, with $77.4 million; and the
University of Wisconsin, with $75.3 million (“OSU athletics,” 2006).
However, the opposite is generally true. In 2002 the NCAA reported that in 2001,
just 40 of the 117 Division I-A programs had revenues that exceeded expenses. The
average surplus for the 40 programs in the black was a substantial $5.3 million, but the
average deficit for the other 77 schools was a burdensome $3.8 million (Pickle, 2002).
Between 2002-03 and 2004-05, athletic expenses at Division I-A schools rose about 8% a
year, whereas the increase in overall college spending was 3-4% a year during the same
time (Brady & Upton, 2005).
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Even the top athletics-revenue schools sometimes struggle. Although the
University of Michigan athletics program reported an operating surplus of $13.8 million
for the 2004-05 year (Madej, 2005), as recently as 2001 the Michigan athletics program
had an eight-million-dollar budget deficit (Henning, 2001).
Bond (2005) described the financial tension for Vanderbilt University on a
Vanderbilt athletics web site. Even though (or because) Vanderbilt is in a major
conference (the Southeastern Conference), it feels the pressure of keeping up with the
Joneses:
There are roughly 20 profitable athletic departments in the country, or only 1520% of all Division I athletic departments. Florida, Ohio State, Texas, Michigan,
Oklahoma, [and] LSU are just a few examples. Big state schools with a state-wide
following, sold-out 85,000 seat stadiums, student enrollments north of 20,000 and
nationwide apparel appeal enable the ultra-high costs of running an athletic
department to be offset by tremendous football revenue. . . .Vanderbilt is in an
entirely different situation than the aforementioned schools. We are a top-20
university with 6,000 students, many of whom leave Nashville after graduation to
pursue impressive careers throughout the world. We are not funded by taxpayers
and do not have a “state school” following. We have tuition costs in excess of
$30,000 per student-athlete. We are not able to pack 90,000 fans into a 90,000-seat
stadium and sell Vandy gear in Montana. This is true for 80% of all NCAA
Division 1 programs, and 100% of all programs below the 1-A level. (para. 16)
In light of the expense pressure, revenue from sports is seen as essential. And the
possibility of revenue definitely exists. Tickets for the 2005 Notre Dame vs. University of
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Southern California football game reached nearly $550 apiece (Walker, 2005). In football
and basketball, the additional revenue of postseason play can be significant. For example,
when the Atlantic Coast Conference planned to have a football championship game for the
first time in 2005, the estimated revenues were $7-10 million, to be split among the 12
schools in the conference (Heuser, 2004). As another example, the football Bowl
Championship Series (BCS), a coalition of top-tier Division I-A conferences, projected
that in 2005-06, each BCS conference would receive between $14.8 million and $22.8
million depending on the conference affiliations of the actual schools participating in the
BCS games (Bowl Championship Series, 2005).
Cash from playoff games is not the only perceived benefit of winning. The
athletics director of the University of Texas at El Paso stated that football success has
helped the school increase enrollment from 14,695 to 19,264 over the past 6 years
(Adams, 2005). Adams commented,
The pressure to win has never been greater. Getting a [football] program on track
produces national television and bowl-game appearances that alone can cover most
of an athletic department’s budget and increase the school’s enrollment. While the
Bowl Championship Series--which limits to six conferences and Notre Dame the
chance to compete for a national championship--further divides the haves and the
have-nots, the overall proliferation of bowl games and cable sports channels has
given even second- and third-tier schools a chance to get valuable national
exposure. (p. P9)
White (2005), athletics director at the University of Notre Dame, describing the
economic challenge faced by college athletics in the future, stated,
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The financial realities of college athletics are substantial. To that end, the arms
race, as it has been coined, has placed financial pressure on institutions to keep up.
In my view, there may be only five to 10 Division I-A (out of 117) institutions that
are really cash-flowing. Not unlike at other levels, many institutions are
subsidizing--to a great extent--their intercollegiate athletics programs, via some
form of financial mechanism (large student fees, internal transfers to cover tuition
and/or room and board expenses, targeted state appropriations). Over the next
decade, with expenses spiraling out of control, this may well become a crisis area
for all of us. (p. 18)
Historical Perspective on Athletics Reform
Institutions have struggled with the dilemma of balancing the core academic
mission of their institutions with the realities of Division I athletics programs ever since
universities first started fielding athletics teams (Newman & Miller, 1994). Eighteen
deaths resulting from violent plays in college football led President Theodore Roosevelt to
threaten to abolish the game nationwide (Rozin, 2005).
In 1905, two opposing factions, the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the
United States and the Intercollegiate Football Rules Committee, were in conflict over the
authority to establish and regulate rules (Newman & Miller, 1994). With President
Roosevelt’s mediation, the Intercollegiate Football Rules Committee recognized the
Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States. In 1906, the Association adopted
a constitution and by-laws. In 1910, the Association changed its name to the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).
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In 1929, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching conducted a
study of intercollegiate athletics and determined that recruiting had become corrupt,
professionals had replaced amateurs, education was being neglected, and commercialism
was rampant (Knight Commission, 1993). The Carnegie report noted that “the defense of
the intellectual integrity of the colleges and universities lies with the president and
faculty” (Newman & Miller, 1994).
In 1948, in response to concerns about gambling, aggressive recruiting, and the
rise of lucrative bowl games, the NCAA passed what became known as the “Sanity
Code.” The Sanity Code (Article 3 of the NCAA Constitution) defined amateurism,
required athletes to be held to the same academic standards as other students, required that
financial aid be awarded without consideration for athletic ability, and prohibited the
offering of financial aid as part of recruiting. Interestingly, the media considered the
Sanity Code unreasonable and dubbed it the “Purity Code” (Brown, 1999).
In the early 1950s, the American Council on Education conducted two studies on
college athletics and concluded that institutional presidential attention was needed
(Newman & Miller, 1994). The authors of the first study proposed eliminating bowl
games, spring practice, and the subsidization of athletes (Sack, 2001). The authors of the
second study advocated the need for athletic programs that enhanced the educational
mission and that were directed by clear institutional policies (Newman & Miller, 1994).
A 1974 American Council on Education study, done by George Hanford, raised
concerns about college sports’ siphoning dollars from academics, discrimination against
minorities and women, and recruiting violations (Hanford, 2003). Hanford noted later that
many university presidents grumbled “that I ought to mind my own business and keep my
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grubby hands out of matters I didn’t understand” (McGraw, 1997). In 1979, the ACE
released another study in which it called for reforms and specifically urged presidents and
athletic directors to bring sports programs “in line with the educational missions of
colleges” (McGraw, 1997).
Recent Calls for Reform of Intercollegiate Athletics
The Knight Foundation (of the Knight family of Knight-Ridder newspapers)
created the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics in 1989 as an independent
panel of leaders from education, business, and sports to study college sports. The Knight
Commission published four significant reports, in 1991, 1992, 1993, and 2001.
The Knight Commission’s first report (Knight Commission, 1991) recommended
reforms reflecting four fundamental principles. The first principle was presidential
control. Athletic departments, conferences, and the NCAA itself were governed in
inconsistent ways, and presidential authority was often nonexistent. The second principle
was academic integrity. This confronted the practice of admitting academically
unprepared student-athletes and putting them in marginal, nondegree courses. The third
principle was financial integrity. It was not uncommon for boosters to raise funds outside
the university and distribute them without university oversight. The fourth principle was
certification, similar to the accreditation system on the academic side. The Knight
Commission linked the principles in a one-plus-three model: presidential control,
academic integrity, financial integrity, and independent certification.
The Knight Commission’s second report (Knight Commission, 1992) concluded
that a solid start toward reform had been made, particularly in the areas of presidential
control and academic reform. Stronger rules related to degree requirements, grade point
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average, school year, coaches’ income, and official visits by prospective athletes had been
enacted. The Knight Commission praised the involvement and impact of the NCAA’s
advisory Presidents Commission. The Knight Commission expressed concerns about finetuning reforms out of existence through exceptions, federal and state legislation
overshadowing the NCAA’s authority, and presidents’ despairing over the complexity of
issues.
The Knight Commission’s third report (Knight Commission, 1993) expressed
optimism about the rising presidential leadership in the NCAA, increasing academic
standards, and the start of a certification program. The Knight Commission expressed
concerns about recruiting, boosters and the effects of television, as well as the need for
further strengthening academic standards and supporting minority student-athletes. The
commission identified two large issues: cost containment and gender equity.
The Knight Commission’s fourth report (Knight Commission, 2001) noted that the
problems of big-time college sports had grown rather than diminished since its original
1991 report. The Knight Commission identified the most glaring elements as academic
transgressions, a financial arms race (a spending competition to build facilities), and
commercialization. The commission proposed a new one-plus-three model: a Coalition of
Presidents, directed toward academic reform, de-escalation of the athletics arms race, and
de-emphasis of the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics. The Knight
Commission’s recommendations for academic reform included the following: (a) Athletes
should be mainstreamed through the same academic processes and requirements as are
other students; (b) athletic teams that do not graduate at least 50% of their players should
be barred from post-season play; (c) scholarships should be tied to specific athletes until
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they or their entering class graduate; (d) the lengths of practice seasons, playing seasons,
and postseasons should be reduced; and (e) the NBA and NFL should develop minor
leagues. Recommendations regarding the arms race included the following: (a)
Expenditures in football and basketball should be reduced; (b) coaches’ compensation
should be in line with prevailing norms at the institution; (c) coaches’ outside income
should be negotiated by the institution, not by the individual coach; and (d) television
revenue from the men’s Division I basketball championship should be reallocated.
Recommendations regarding commercialization included the following: (a) Institutions,
not broadcasting companies, should determine when games are played; (b) commercial
intrusions in stadiums should be minimized; (c) corporate logos on uniforms should be
prohibited; and (d) legislation banning legal gambling on college sports should be
supported.
A fifth report by the Knight Commission (Frank, 2004) reviewed studies on the
effects of successful college athletics programs on student applications and donor
contributions. Frank reviewed 6 studies on the effect of athletics success on the quantity
and quality of applications and 13 studies on the effect of athletics success on
contributions. Frank concluded that “if success in athletics does generate the indirect
benefits in question, the effects are almost surely very small” (p. 33).
Frank pointed to several psychological phenomena to explain high athletics
spending. One is the compelling nature of individual episodes, such as Boston College’s
12% increase in applications in the year following quarterback Doug Flutie’s last-second
touchdown pass to beat the University of Miami in 1984 (the so-called Flutie effect). A
second is the Lake Woebegone effect, in which schools overestimate their chances of
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athletics success and believe they are all above average. A third is the arms-race economic
behavior observable in an exercise called the entrapment game, in which a 20-dollar bill is
auctioned normally except that the second-highest (losing) bidder must also pay. The
bidding usually far exceeds the 20-dollar prize because a losing bid of $19 loses $19, but a
winning bid of $21 loses only $1, and so on.
Other calls for reform have come from (a) the Drake Group, (b) the Coalition on
Intercollegiate Athletics, and (c) the Presidential Coalition for Athletics Reform. The
Drake Group was formed in 1999 to support academic integrity in college sports. The
Drake Group called for seven academic reforms in college athletics: (a) Retire the term
student-athlete; (b) make the location and control of academic support services for
athletes the same as for all students; (c) establish policies that emphasize the importance
of class attendance and schedule so that athletic contests do not conflict with class
attendance; (d) replace one-year renewable scholarships with need-based aid or multi-year
scholarships that extend to graduation (five-year maximum); (e) require a cumulative
GPA of 2.0 each semester; (f) publicly disclose a student-athlete’s major, academic
advisor, required courses, electives, class GPAs, and instructors; and (g) require one year
of residency for transfer students and freshmen before they participate in a sport.
The Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletics (COIA) was formed in 2002 as a
coalition of Division I-A faculty senates to promote academic reform in college sports. It
sought to work with the American Association of University Professors, the Association
of Governing Boards, and the NCAA to achieve reforms. The COIA proposed reforms in
five areas: (a) admissions; (b) scholarships; (c) curricular integrity; (d) time commitment,
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missed class time, and scheduling of competitions; and (e) academic advising of athletes
(Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletics [COIA], 2005).
In the area of admissions, the COIA proposed that institutions develop policies
setting criteria for the admission of scholarship athletes and that institutions track the
academic performance of scholarship athletes, especially transfer students. The group
proposed that athletics scholarships be awarded on a year-by-year basis for up to five
years and that authority for revoking a scholarship should rest with the chief academic
officer. In the area of curricular integrity, the COIA proposed that data on athletes’
majors, courses, grades, and course GPAs for each sport be collected and shared with
appropriate campus governance bodies. Regarding time commitment, class time, and
scheduling, the COIA proposed (a) that the 20-hour-per-week practice rule be better
enforced, (b) that institutions and conferences establish policies on missed class time, (c)
that divided competition seasons not be permitted, (d) that norms for travel times be
established, and (e) that competitions not be scheduled during final exams. The group also
proposed that the academic advising office (a) report directly to the office of academic
affairs, (b) work closely with the Faculty Athletics Representative (FAR), (c) collaborate
closely with other campus advising units, (d) have appropriate independent authority, and
(e) track academic progress toward degree completion (COIA, 2005).
The Presidential Coalition for Athletics Reform was formed in 2003 as a coalition
of non-BCS institutions against the football Bowl Championship Series (BCS). Led by
Tulane University president Scott Cowen, whose Tulane football team was undefeated in
1998 but shut out of the top bowls, the Presidential Coalition for Athletics Reform sought
equity between BCS and non-BCS institutions. In 1998 six conferences (the Atlantic
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Coast Conference, the Big East, the Big 12, the Big Ten, and the Pacific-10, and
Southeastern Conference), one independent university (the University of Notre Dame) and
four bowls (the FedEx Orange Bowl, the Nokia Sugar Bowl, the Rose Bowl, and the
Tostitos Fiesta Bowl) formed the BCS. Through a system of rankings, rotations, and
selections, the BCS determines bowl participants and ultimately a national champion. The
Presidential Coalition for Athletics Reforms called the BCS unfair, inconsistent, harmful,
and restrictive. It called for a fairer arrangement that would (a) unify Division I-A, (b)
provide reasonable opportunity for all Division I-A schools to reach the top bowls, (c) be
more consistent with championships in other NCAA sports, and (d) enhance the interest
level and meaningfulness of bowl games (Cowen, 2003).
Myles Brand, president of the NCAA since 2002, described college athletics as
being at a crossroads (Brand, 2003). Brand noted that in some ways college sports had
never been in better shape: (a) College football would likely set attendance records, and
more football games were on television than ever before; (b) athletics participation by
women had grown by 400% over the last 30 years; (c) the Division I men’s basketball
championship had become one of the premier athletics events in the world; (d) athletics
revenues were greater than ever before; and (e) graduation rates for student-athletes were
at an all-time high in 2002. Brand simultaneously observed that (a) athletics costs were
also at an all-time high; (b) graduation rates for football and Division I men’s basketball
were below those of the general student body; (c) a series of major scandals had occurred;
(d) state legislatures were debating bills to address inequitable treatment of studentathletes; (e) charges of academic fraud among student-athletes were made at some of the
best universities; and (f) the concept of amateur athletics appeared to be untenable in the
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face of increasing athletics budgets and coaches’ salaries and continuing facility
expansions.
Brand proposed (a) continuing the academic reform in athletics; (b) continuing the
review of rules related to student-athlete welfare, such as safety, time commitments, and
insurance; (c) increasing the athletics scholarships to the full cost of attendance; (d)
increasing the accountability of coaches; (e) mainstreaming athletics into the university;
(f) utilizing normal university budget controls for athletics (as opposed to seeking
financial self-sufficiency); and (g) having faculty take a leadership role in academic
reform in athletics.
Presidents’ Leadership in Intercollegiate Athletics
The concept of institutional control under presidential authority is a
constitutionalized philosophy of the NCAA. Various campus constituencies are expected
to play an active role in administering an effective rules-compliance program, and chief
executive officers are specifically held responsible for the administration of the athletics
program (Katz, 2001). Section 2.1.1 of the NCAA Constitution (NCAA, 2005-2006)
states,
It is the responsibility of each member institution to control its intercollegiate
athletics program in compliance with the rules and regulations of the Association.
The institution’s chief executive officer is responsible for the administration of all
aspects of the athletics program, including approval of the budget and audit of all
expenditures. The institution’s responsibility for the conduct of its intercollegiate
athletics program includes responsibility for the actions of its staff members and
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for the actions of any other individual or organization engaged in activities
promoting the athletics interests of the institution. (p. 3)
Interestingly, however, in the early days of the NCAA and into the 1960s and
1970s, faculty representatives were dominant in the NCAA. Then, in the 1980s, as the
business side of college athletics grew, athletics directors and conference commissioners
became more prominent. A shift occurred in which faculty representatives focused more
on student issues and athletics directors focused more on business issues (Brown, 1999).
Also in the 1980s, as both revenue opportunities and violations increased and calls
for reform intensified, some university presidents sought more control of the NCAA.
The1984 NCAA convention proposal to give presidents more formal control was
defeated, but a Presidents Commission with advisory-only powers was created (McGraw,
1997).
The presidents were nonetheless still able to effect significant changes. In 1985,
presidents successfully promoted the death penalty, by which a university’s entire
athletics program could be banned from all competition for a year. (Only Southern
Methodist University has suffered this fate.) In 1991, presidents successfully supported
the 20-hour rule, limiting practice and competition to 20 hours per week (Hawes, 1999).
In 1992, presidents successfully pushed Proposition 16 (which strengthened 1983’s
Proposition 48), raising test-score and grade-point-average requirements. In 2002, the
presidents initiated academic reforms that have culminated in the Academic Progress Rate
(APR), which holds coaches accountable (under penalty of loss of scholarships) for the
year-to-year eligibility and retention of each student-athlete (Lederman, 2004).
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Following a major restructuring in 1997, the two top NCAA committees, the
Executive Committee and the Division I Board of Directors, were composed primarily of
university presidents. The NCAA Executive Committee, responsible for the association’s
strategy planning and oversight, is composed of the NCAA president, 12 Division I
presidents, 2 Division II and 2 Division III presidents, and the chairs of the Division I, II,
and III management councils. The Division I Board of Directors, responsible for policy
and rule changes, is composed of 11 Division I-A presidents (one per conference) and 7
Division I-AA or Division I-AAA presidents. Athletics administrators constitute the
Division I Management Council, whose 49 members vote on rules recommendations to
the Division I Board of Directors (Lederman, 2004).
Differing views have been expressed about whether presidents can really control
athletics on their own campuses. Patricia Cormier, president of Longwood University and
chair of the NCAA Division II Presidents Council, stated,
Presidential control is for us, the moral of the story. We believe you have to apply
to intercollegiate athletics the same set of standards that you are applying on your
campus for all students. There are no exceptions to this. (Copeland, 2003, para. 6)
Expressing a less optimistic view, original Knight Commission member and
former University of Maryland and professional basketball player Tom McMillen
observed, “On individual campuses, the presidents really are almost powerless. The
athletic machine is so strong, and it is very, very difficult for a president to stand up to it”
(Lederman, 2004, para. 10). Similarly, Arkansas athletics director Frank Broyles stated, “I
haven’t seen presidents do anything different or better than the people who were running
the show beforehand—to the contrary, actually” (Lederman, 2004, para. 24).
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Different views have also been expressed about whether presidents or conference
commissioners control athletics at the conference level. NCAA Executive Committee
chair and University of Tulsa president Robert Lawless stated,
A lot of the doubt about whether presidents are in control emanates from Division
I-A, and, most specifically, football. I would say at this point in time that it is not
accurate to say that the presidents are in control of football--certainly not
postseason football (Copeland, 2003, para. 39).
University of Kansas chancellor Robert Hemenway expressed a different view:
I know there’s a lot of talk out there about the conference commissioners somehow
guiding the presidents and chancellors in determining their collective direction. If
you’ve ever been to a conference meeting, I don’t think you would come to that
conclusion. It’s a complicated business, and there’s a lot of money associated with
it, and there’s a lot of complexity associated with it, so you need very good and
strong people to be commissioners. But I don’t think you’ll find any commissioner
who claims that they [sic] can take 10 or 12 highly compensated and extremely
strong-minded presidents and chancellors, and bend them to your [sic] will. I just
don’t think that’s the case. (Copeland, 2003, para. 43)
The presidents themselves appear to be confident of their control of athletics. Rose
(1993), in a survey of 293 Division I presidents with 186 (64%) responses, found that 92%
indicated that they were satisfied with their involvement in athletics. Caughron (1995), in
a survey of 106 Division I-A university presidents with 52 (49%) responses, found that the
presidents responded positively that they had authority in all matters of athletics
governance at their institutions (M = 4.67, SD = .86 on a five-point Likert scale). The

36

presidents also responded positively that they would have the support of their boards of
trustees in an athletics controversy (M = 4.46, SD = .80). Similarly, Easley (1998), in a
survey of 275 Division I presidents with 107 survey (39%) responses, found that 74% of
presidents believed they had 100% control over their athletics programs, and 21%
indicated at least 90% control. Patberg (2002), in a survey of 306 Division I presidents
with 219 (72%) responses, found that 99% of the respondents indicated that they had
authority on athletics governance on their own campuses, and 97% indicated that they had
the support of their boards of trustees on athletics. Most (98%) indicated that the
presidents were the final authority within their conferences.
Issues in the Management of College Athletics
White (2005), athletics director at the University of Notre Dame, succinctly
described the expectations faced by an athletics director:
We are expected to win, we are expected to graduate our student-athletes, we are
expected to play by the rules and we are expected to balance the budget. And we
are expected to do all those things in a much more visible setting than ever before.
(p. 18)
In light of these expectations, several issues about managing athletics have arisen.
One issue is the reporting relationship of the athletics director. Sanders (2004) conducted
a survey of the reporting relationships of athletics directors in 977 Division I, II, and III
institutions. On the basis of 395 athletics directors’ responses (40.4%), Sanders found that
the most common organizational structure in all NCAA divisions was the athletics
director’s reporting directly to the president; 42.3% reported this relationship.
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Division I-A Vanderbilt University startled the college athletics world in 2003 by
eliminating its athletics director and athletics department. The management of varsity
teams was moved to the Office of Student Athletics, Recreation and Wellness (Zillgitt,
2004). The management of sports facilities was moved to a new Office of Facilities and
Conferences. Responsibility for athletics media relations, marketing, broadcasting,
publications, and websites was moved to the Division of Public Affairs. The direction of
the sports club for fans and donors was moved to Development and Alumni Relations.
Athletics financial and administrative operations were moved to the Division of Student
Life and University Affairs. Athletics academic support was moved to the office of the
associate provost (“Vanderbilt announces athletics,” 2003).
A second issue is the organizational location of athletics-related support services.
One approach has been to locate services that support athletics within the athletics
department. The opposite approach is to integrate those services in the larger institution.
Curley (2005), athletics director at Pennsylvania State University, advocating the
integration approach, wrote,
Total integration of all the administrative components of the athletics program
within the university’s organizational structure gives the president the greatest
chance to be successful with one of the most challenging responsibilities placed
upon his or her shoulders. . . Changes have been made to organizational structures
on campuses that have resulted in athletics directors reporting directly to
presidents and integrating athletics department functions to be better aligned with
the central student support services of the university. The most notable
organizational integration has occurred with the change in reporting lines of
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academic support services to closely align with overall student academic support
services on campus. Other areas that have seen organizational reporting line
changes include, but are not limited to, development, finances, human resources,
summer camps, and medical delivery. Other university student services areas that
also should be integrated are admissions, financial aid, registrar, bursar, housing
and food services, and risk management. (p. 18)
Harvey Perlman, chancellor of the University of Nebraska, expressed the opposite
viewpoint on integration:
For example, at Nebraska, integrating academic-support programs into our general
advising program and having them report to the provost would be, in my view, a
bad idea. We have a successful academic-support program. Our athletics
department takes particular pride in its success and there is evidence throughout
our stadium and athletics facilities that academic success is recognized and taken
seriously. The only position I know of in a modern university more overburdened
than the president is the provost. What fractional share of that office’s attention
will be paid to athletics programs? And, more significantly, how can I hold my
athletics director responsible for the academic success of his student-athletes if he
does not have direct responsibility? Indeed, the more you “integrate” athletics
functions into the general university, the less responsibility the athletics director
has for anything other than winning on the field—an unhealthy circumstance in
my view. (Perlman & Potuto, 2005, p. 6)
A third issue is the particular organizational location and reporting relationship of
the athletics compliance function. Reifel Werner (2005) conducted a pilot survey of the
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views and management structures of Division I athletics compliance officers. A
convenience sample of 16 respondents was obtained via an invitation on an online
compliance discussion board. Of the 16 respondents, 11 reported the athletics director as
their direct supervisor, 3 reported to the associate athletics director, and 2 reported to the
senior associate or senior woman administrator. Of the 16 respondents, 11 reported having
a dotted-line reporting relationship in addition to a direct supervisor. Of the 11
respondents reporting a dotted-line relationship, 7 reported on a dotted line to the
president, and one each reported to the athletics director, the associate athletics director,
the faculty athletics representative, and the vice president of student affairs.
It can be observed that following high-profile infractions, some universities alter
the reporting relationship of compliance such that the position reports outside athletics or
has a dual reporting relationship. Responding to compliance difficulties at the University
of Colorado, the chancellor’s progress report on athletics stated, “In order to help ensure
independence in compliance responsibilities, the Provost will conduct the annual
performance evaluation and set the salary for the Associate Athletics Director for
Compliance, in consultation with the Athletics Director” (“Progress report on
implementation,” 2004). In the wake of compliance issues at Ohio State University, the
university president, Holbrook (2005), wrote,
Ohio State’s rigorous compliance program is recognized as one of the best in the
country. Nonetheless, we have taken additional steps to ensure that both aspects of
compliance [education and monitoring] are as strong as possible:
1. Attendance at the mandatory compliance-education programs is being
stringently enforced.
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2. A new dual reporting relationship for our compliance program to athletics and
the university’s office of legal affairs has been established.
3. The university general counsel participates in the biweekly meetings of the
executive compliance committee.
4. Attorneys from the office of legal affairs meet weekly with athletics
compliance staff. (p. 6)
Perlman and Potuto (2005), in describing the athletics organizational alignment at the
University of Nebraska, reported that the faculty athletics representative (who reported to
the chancellor’s office) had oversight over compliance operations. Perlman and Potuto
noted that Nebraska had had major infractions in two sports four years earlier.
Regarding athletics compliance directors themselves, Lawrence (2003) studied the
relationship between organizational climate and job satisfaction for Division I athletic
compliance directors. Surveys were sent to 346 Division I compliance directors, and 164
surveys were returned (47% response rate). Lawrence found that compliance directors
tended to be White males with (a) a master’s degree, (b) 6-10 years of experience in
athletics administration, and (c) the title assistant or associate athletic director. Overall job
satisfaction was moderately high and significantly related to (a) evaluation procedures, (b)
opportunities for promotion, (c) regard for personal concerns, and (d) relationships with
coaches.
A fourth issue is the faculty’s involvement in athletics governance. Newman,
Miller, and Bartee (2000) used a Delphi survey technique with 15 athletics directors and
15 faculty senate presidents to identify how faculty should be involved in the
administration, or governance, of intercollegiate athletics. Twenty-three respondents (77%
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response rate) identified 49 possible methods, means, or techniques. After three rounds of
the Delphi survey, the top three strategies with strongest agreement among the
respondents were (a) reviewing the academic support services made available for studentathletes; (b) comparing the graduation rate, retention, and academic performance of
student-athletes to the general population; and (c) cooperative reviewing of proposed
NCAA legislation regarding academic policies.
Regarding the relationship between athletics programs and institutions,
Baumgartner (1996) examined the influence of organizational culture on intercollegiate
athletics through interviews at four institutions in a Division I-A athletic conference. The
researcher found differences in values among the institutions regarding (a) athletic
programs, (b) student-athlete academic achievement, and (c) student-athlete welfare.
Baumgartner concluded that the behavior of intercollegiate athletics personnel was more
influenced by institutional culture than by job position. Marcoccia (2003) studied how
leadership enhanced the impact of Division I intercollegiate athletics on Syracuse
University. Nineteen leaders connected with intercollegiate athletics were interviewed.
Marcoccia concluded that an intercollegiate athletics program can draw positive attention
to its university and connect it to its constituencies if its leaders manage it in a manner
consistent with the university’s values and mission.
Research on Presidents’ Involvement in Athletics
Following the Knight Commission’s 1991 call for greater presidential control of
athletics, a number of researchers focused on the nature of presidential involvement in
athletics (Caughron, 1995; Easley, 1998; Freedman, 2002; McQueen, 1992; Patberg,
2002; Rose, 1993; Shavers, 2004).

42

McQueen (1992) analyzed the NCAA Presidents Commission’s efforts to reform
intercollegiate athletics from 1984 to 1991.2 McQueen used Easton’s political systems
analysis model as the conceptual framework. Easton’s model views political activity as a
system, with stresses from the environment acting as inputs, the political system
producing responses as outputs, and feedback flowing back to the system on the effects of
the outputs. The methodology was a historiography, in which past events were examined
to formulate generalizations. McQueen utilized (a) transcripts of NCAA Convention
proceedings, (b) minutes from Presidents Commission meetings, and (c) documents from
NCAA Council meetings, Administrative Committee meetings, and Executive Committee
meetings. Three leaders of the Presidents Commission were also interviewed.
McQueen observed that the Presidents Commission was successful in 1984
through 1986 in securing NCAA legislation in two major areas of concern: integrity and
economics. The Commission had communicated actively with chief executive officers
(CEOs) of NCAA-member institutions, using a detailed survey to identify their concerns.
All 1985 legislative proposals were then based on the survey findings.
McQueen identified a critical point in 1987 when the Presidents Commission
failed to secure passage of its legislative proposals. The Commission had allowed a group
of presidents with ties to the American Council on Education (ACE) to set its agenda for
reform. The Commission did not then have enough time to discuss issues adequately or
solicit support from other athletics groups. The Presidents Commission was also unable to
gather support quickly enough to propose any legislation in 1988.
The primary internal stresses at this time were crowded agendas and low
attendance by members. The Commission relieved the stresses by (a) authorizing its
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Executive Committee to decide the issues to be considered by the full Commission and (b)
modifying its rules to require that a member automatically resign after missing three
consecutive meetings.
The primary external stress at this time was the inability to establish consensus and
support on key issues. The Presidents Commission relieved this stress by (a) collaborating
with the NCAA Council on the details of legislative proposals; and (b) working within the
traditions of the NCAA, such as committees’ studying issues for at least one year before
attempting NCAA rules changes. The Commission’s effective communication with
NCAA-member CEOs was a critical element in securing the passage of legislation. The
communication included (a) an 18-month National Forum, a series of discussions on the
balance of academics and athletics; (b) the use of two former CEOs as consultants to
contact CEOs; (c) active recruitment of CEOs to attend the 1991 NCAA Convention; and
(d) designation of its proposals as roll-call (public) votes. The communication strategy
was successful. A record number of CEOs attended the 1991 Convention and voted
overwhelmingly in favor of the Presidents Commission’s reform legislation.
McQueen’s major conclusions were as follows:
1. The Presidents Commission should focus on only one or two issues a year.
Otherwise, too many issues dilute the Commission’s focus and effectiveness.
2. The Presidents Commission should collaborate with other interest groups, such
as athletics directors and conference commissioners, to develop the details of
legislative proposals. These groups are able to put into language the
Commission’s big picture ideas.
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3. Regular attendance by presidents at the Presidents Commission meetings was
necessary.
4. Presidents Commission members should maintain involvement over the long
term and avoid becoming involved only in reaction to scandals or perceived
threats of Congressional intervention.
Rose (1993) surveyed Division I college presidents’ involvement in intercollegiate
athletics. The survey addressed (a) those with whom presidents interacted on athletics, (b)
the issues addressed, (c) the amount of time devoted, (d) the presidents’ satisfaction with
their involvement, (e) their involvement outside their institutions, and (f) the reporting
relationships of their athletics directors. Surveys were sent to all 293 (at that time)
Division I presidents, and 186 (64%) responded.
Rose found that (a) 50% of the 186 presidents had discussions with their athletics
directors once per week, and 32% did so once per month; (b) 46% of presidents had
discussions with their faculty athletics representative once per month, and 29% did so
once per semester; (c) 30% of presidents discussed athletics with their trustees once per
month, and 40% did so once per semester; (d) 28% of presidents had discussions with
coaches once per month, and 45% indicated other frequencies; and (e) 39% of presidents
had discussions with athletics advisory committees once per semester, and 36% had no
conversations with them.
The topic of finances was ranked highest as the athletics topic on which presidents
spent the most time, with a weighted total of 277 mentions, followed by personnel (115),
administration and planning (93), academics (81), and NCAA (76).
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Regarding time on athletics issues, 70% of the 186 presidents reported spending
one to four hours per week. Interestingly, 49 presidents (26%) reported that their
institution had been the subject of an NCAA investigation during their tenure. Of these, 20
presidents indicated that they had increased the amount of time they spent on athletics as a
result of the investigation.
Most presidents (92% of the 186 respondents) indicated that they were satisfied
with their involvement in athletics. Rose concluded that presidents had responded to
concerns about lack of institutional control and were spending time on athletics. Rose
suggested that presidents should (a) examine with whom they interacted and for how long,
(b) determine whether athletics advisory committees were useful because interaction with
them was low, (c) be sure to be active internally if they were active externally in athletics,
and (d) consider supervising the athletics director directly because that reporting
relationship related positively to other athletics involvement.
Caughron (1995) examined the perceptions of Division I-A presidents toward the
athletics reform recommendations in the Knight Commission’s 1991 report. A 47-item
survey was sent to the presidents of the 106 (at that time) Division I-A universities, and 52
presidents (49%) responded. (The survey used primarily a five-point Likert scale and
multiple-choice questions. In a somewhat unusual approach, Caughron analyzed the
Likert-scale data using means and standard deviations.)
Caughron concluded that the presidents were generally in agreement with the
Knight Commission’s recommendations about presidential control, academic integrity,
financial integrity, and certification. The presidents indicated that they held the authority
over all matters of athletics governance at their institutions (M = 4.67, SD = .86, on a five-
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point Likert scale). The presidents also responded that they would have the support of
their boards of trustees in an athletics controversy (M = 4.46, SD = .80). They indicated
that presidents are in control of policy making at the conference level; 63% of the 52
respondents stated that presidents make all major policy decisions at their conferences,
15% stated that presidents define all major policies, and 17% stated that presidents are
active in influencing policies. They also responded that presidents, through the NCAA
Presidents Commission, should take an active role in defining policy (M = 4.65, SD =
.90).
The presidents supported the development of a certification program in which
athletics programs would be audited for rules compliance, academic and financial
integrity, and gender equity (M = 3.75, SD = 1.02). The presidents believed that greater
academic standards for incoming and current student-athletes would increase the
academic integrity of intercollegiate athletics (M = 3.90, SD = 1.22). The presidents did
not, however, support the reform measure that all student-athletes should be ineligible for
competition during their freshman year (M = 2.63, SD = 1.40).
The presidents indicated that athletics costs must be reduced (M = 3.96, SD =
1.04). Regarding the financial support of athletics, (a) 37% of the 52 respondents believed
that revenue-producing sports should be self-supporting, whereas non-revenue-producing
sports should be supported by the general university fund; (b) 31% believed that the
athletics department should be financially self-supporting; and (c) 23% believed that
athletics revenues should be placed in the general fund and athletics should be supported
by the general fund. They indicated that coaches should be held to the same standards as
faculty members on outside contracts (M = 4.39, SD = .80) and favored requiring that
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coaches share part of their outside revenue with the institution (M = 3.98, SD = 1.10). The
presidents did not support a Division I-A football playoff system (M = 2.75, SD = 1.43).
Easley (1998) examined how institutional control of athletics was exercised at
Division I institutions and where control problems existed. The presidents and athletics
directors of all 275 (at that time) Division I institutions were surveyed. Two surveys were
designed, one for the chief executive officers (35 items) and one for the athletics directors
(37 items). The surveys addressed (a) support for the president, (b) pressure to win, (c)
financial support, (d) threats to institutional control, and (e) institutional control strategies.
A total of 107 surveys (39%) were returned from the presidents, and 149 surveys (54%)
were returned from the athletics directors.
Regarding support for the president, Easley found that 99% of the 107 presidents
and 99% of the 149 athletics directors agreed (on a five-point Likert scale) that their
governing boards were supportive of presidential authority. Also, 90% of presidents and
91% of athletics directors indicated that boosters and alumni supported presidential
authority. Additionally, 99% of presidents and 100% of athletics directors believed that
the athletics director was supportive of presidential authority. Further, 74% of presidents
indicated that they had 100% control over their athletics programs, and 21% indicated at
least 90% control.
On the pressure to win, 65% of the 107 presidents and 70% of the 149 athletics
directors believed that their governing boards expected their athletics departments to have
winning programs. Additionally, 46% of presidents and 40% of athletics directors agreed
that the athletics director believed his or her job stability depended on winning.
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Regarding the pressure on coaches to win, 93% of the 107 presidents and 39% of
the 149 athletics directors believed that the athletics director expected coaches to have
winning programs. In football and basketball specifically, 83% of presidents and 77% of
athletics directors agreed that those coaches believed their jobs depended on winning. In
fact, 25% of athletics directors reported that the contracts of football and basketball
coaches contained athletics-performance clauses that could cause nonrenewal. In the
Olympic sports, such as track and swimming, 51% of presidents and 50% of athletics
directors agreed that coaches believed their jobs depended on winning. Also, 17% of
athletics directors reported that the contracts of Olympic-sport coaches had athleticsperformance clauses that could lead to nonrenewal.
On the topic of financial support, only 43% of the 107 presidents and 46% of the
149 athletics directors agreed that their respective institutions provided enough financial
support to the athletics department for it to be considered self-sufficient. In fact, 54% of
presidents reported that 50% or less of the athletics budget came from institutional or state
funds. Further, 50% of presidents and 56% of athletics directors indicated that their
athletics departments relied on funds generated from boosters and alumni.
The presidents were asked to name the greatest threats to institutional control. The
threats most commonly stated were (a) boosters (named by 27%); (b) money, funding, and
resources (20%); (c) coaches (11%); (d) agents (11%); and (e) external forces (5%).
Similarly, the athletics directors’ top threats were (a) boosters (named by 28%); (b)
professional agents (13%); (c) external forces (11%); (d) money, funding, and resources
(9%); and (e) coaches (8%).
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When the presidents were asked to identify their three top institutional control
strategies, the strategies most mentioned were (a) athletics director (named by 21%); (b)
compliance (9%); and (c) policy, procedures, and goals (9%). In turn, the athletics
directors’ top institutional control strategies were (a) education (named by 22%); (b)
compliance (19%); and (c) policy, procedures, and goals (10%).
Easley concluded that institutions had taken steps to establish institutional control
of athletics but that the pressure to win and reliance on external funds were causes for
concern.
Freedman (2002) conducted a historical analysis of institutional control issues and
reforms in NCAA Division I intercollegiate athletics. Freedman observed the NCAA
through the lens of Easton’s political systems analysis model. Easton’s model sees
political activity as a system, with disturbances in the environment acting as inputs, the
political system coping with the disturbances by producing outputs, and feedback
returning to the system on the resulting effects. Freedman analyzed the political history of
the NCAA as three cases: (a) the institutional control issues during the formation and
early history of the NCAA and the 1929 Carnegie Foundation report; (b) mid-twentiethcentury institutional-control issues and the 1952 and 1974 American Council on
Education (ACE) reports; and (c) the 1991, 1992, 1993, and 2001 Knight Commission
reports.
Freedman examined (a) the reports of the Carnegie Foundation, the American
Council on Education, and the Knight Commission; (b) the NCAA Division I Manual; (c)
memos, minutes, and documents of various NCAA committees; (d) NCAA Convention
Official Notices and Proceedings; (e) NCAA Enforcements records and its database of
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infractions; and (f) other articles. Interviews were also conducted with one former and one
current NCAA administrator.
In observing the early history of the NCAA, Freedman observed that students were
the original authorities of the system. Money and prestige quickly became stresses on the
system, and presidents and faculty took over as authorities. The philosophy of local
control (home rule) dominated. Institutions policed themselves, and the NCAA had no
enforcement power. Violations increased. Unable to resolve the competing stresses of
commercialization, rules integrity, academic values, and local control, the NCAA turned
to the Carnegie Foundation for a review. The Carnegie report outlined the problems, but
no significant change occurred.
Freedman described the mid-twentieth century as a period of growth in both
popularity and problems for the NCAA. Scandals occurred. Television arrived, and
money as a stress on the system increased. Athletics and academics were organizationally
split on campuses, making institutional control more difficult. The two ACE reports called
for reforms, but few changes were implemented.
Freedman characterized the period of the 1980s and 1990s as one in which money
continued to be the biggest stress on the system and also one in which structural and
governance changes were made. Restructuring put the presidents in control of NCAA
legislation and policies. But Freedman noted that stresses remained: “The NCAA system
and member institutions are still struggling to balance the competing demands of local
control and centralized organization, higher education and athletics, and internal and
external review” (p. 168).
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Patberg (2002) studied Division I presidents’ perceptions of their involvement in
athletics following the 1997 NCAA restructuring. In 1984, the NCAA had established a
44-member Presidents Commission with advisory-only powers. The Knight Commission
and others in the early 1990s had called for more direct presidential control in the
governance of the NCAA. In 1997, the governance of the NCAA was restructured. Boards
of directors, composed of presidents, were created over all divisions. An overall Executive
Committee, composed of representatives of the divisional boards, was also created. The
process by which legislation was adopted by one-vote-per-institution only at the NCAA
Convention was eliminated. Presidents were now the final authority in each division. In
Division I (as in each division), legislative proposals were forwarded from institutions and
conferences, through cabinets, to the Division I Management Council (composed of
athletics administrators and conference commissioners) and then, if passed, to the 18member Division I Board of Directors. The process was streamlined and year-round, with
18 Division I presidents actively involved and the rest, generally speaking, involved only
at the conference and institutional level.
Patberg’s research questions asked (a) whether the presidents were as involved in
athletics at the national level, conference level, and campus level after the restructuring as
they had been before; (b) whether the control of presidents had increased after the
restructuring; and (c) whether the presidents wished to be more engaged. Patberg sent a
31-item survey to the presidents of the 306 institutions that had been in Division I prior to
the 1997 restructuring; 219 responded (72%). Of these respondents, 151 presidents
(70.9% of respondents) had been in their positions before the restructuring.
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Patberg’s main findings were that although the presidents’ perceived levels of
involvement had not significantly changed since restructuring, each president viewed
his/her own participation more positively than that of his/her peers. The presidents clearly
saw themselves in control at the conference and campus levels. Specifically, Patberg
found the following:
1. At the national level, 53% of the 219 presidents indicated that they themselves
were more involved than before the restructuring (12% were neutral, and 35%
indicated less involvement).
2. At the national level, only 31% of the presidents indicated that their peers were
more involved since the restructuring (31% were neutral, and 38% indicated
that their peers were less involved).
3. At the conference level, 90% of the 219 presidents indicated that they
themselves were more involved. Only 38% saw their peers as more involved at
conferences (55% were neutral, and 7% called their peers less involved).
4. At the campus level, 90% indicated that they themselves were more involved.
Only 33% of the presidents saw their peers as more involved at the campus
level (53% were neutral, and 14% indicated their peers were less involved).
5. Regarding presidential influence at the national level, 39% of the 219
presidents indicated that they had as much influence on NCAA legislation as
prior to the restructuring (16% were neutral, and 45% indicated they were less
influential).
6. Regarding presidential influence at the conference level, 98% indicated that the
presidents were the final authority within the conference.
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7. Regarding presidential influence at the campus level, 99% of the presidents
indicated that they had authority on athletics-governance issues on campus.
Further, 97% indicated that they had the support of their boards of trustees on
athletics issues.
8. Regarding more engagement, 71% of the 219 respondents indicated a desire to
be more engaged in intercollegiate athletics.
Shavers (2004) compared athletics decision making to academic decision making.
A case study approach was used. Three criteria--(a) institutional type, (b) tenure of the
president, and (c) program composition--were used to narrow a list of potential institutions
from 115 to 13. The 13 institutions were then rated on athletics success. Three private,
four-year institutions were then chosen as the units of analysis: one high-success
institution, one medium-success institution, and one low-success institution. The
researcher conducted interviews at each university, using the snowballing technique to
select informants. A total of 37 semistructured, in-depth interviews were conducted.
Internal and external documents at each institution were also examined.
Shavers’ main findings were the following:
1. Division I-A athletics provided an institutional brand.
2. Sports were a source of prominence and pride.
3. The choice between investing in academic programs and investing in athletics
programs was perceived as difficult.
4. There was no consistent or unified opposition to the problems in college sports.
5. Presidents had little power or incentive to de-emphasize athletics.
6. Presidents would continue to be constrained in their ability to reform athletics.
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Risk Management and Compliance
Athletics compliance can be considered in the broader contexts of risk
management in higher education and compliance programs outside higher education, as
well as in the specific context of the NCAA’s approach to compliance.
Risks in Higher Education
Colleges and universities increasingly face legal and other risks. Santora and
Kaplin (2003) observed an enormous growth over the previous 30 years in the volume and
complexity of legal issues in higher education. The authors attributed the growth to (a)
rising consumer expectations of students and parents; (b) rising compliance challenges in
many critical areas of campus life, such as confidentiality of records, safety, and equal
opportunity; (c) rising technology-related legal issues regarding intellectual property,
personal privacy, and freedom of speech; (d) growth in entrepreneurial activities by
institutions as well as individual professors; and (e) an increasingly adversarial mindset, a
decrease in civility, and a diminishing level of trust in all societal institutions.
Santora and Kaplin called for a preventive-law approach and encouraged college
administrators to (a) review the institution’s arrangements for obtaining legal advice; (b)
encourage cooperation among leaders in preventive planning; (c) educate constituents
about the legal implications of their actions; (d) train compliance officers to identify early
warning signs of legal problems; (e) perform regular audits to identify areas of risk; (f)
engage leaders in continuing legal planning; (g) establish internal grievance, mediation,
and other dispute-resolution mechanisms to forestall formal legal action; and (h) develop a
campus culture that values constructive resolution of conflict.
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Whitfield (2003) observed constant change in higher education and identified
issues transforming higher education: (a) fierce competition for faculty, students, staff,
and financial resources; (b) pressure for increased productivity, responsiveness, and
accountability as well as decreased cost; (c) increased external scrutiny from government,
philanthropists, and governing boards; (d) rapidly increasing entrepreneurial ventures; and
(e) new technologies affecting educational delivery and research methods. Whitfield noted
the definition of risk offered by the National Association of College and University
Business Officers (NACUBO) and PricewaterhouseCoopers: “Risk is any issue that
impacts an organization’s ability to meet its objectives” (p. 84). The organization also
identified five types of risk: (a) strategic risk, (b) financial risk, (c) operational risk, (d)
compliance risk, and (e) reputational risk (Cassidy, Goldstein, Johnson, Mattie, & Morley,
2001).
Focusing on one higher education system in particular, Chaffin (2003) described
the institution-wide compliance risk management program of the University of Texas
System. The University of Texas System implemented the program, starting in 1998. The
Texas System program addressed compliance risk in all operations, including student
financial aid, basic research, clinical research, medical billing, environmental health and
safety, endowments, student activities, intercollegiate athletics, human resources, and
financial matters. Chaffin described the reason for the institution-wide compliance
program: “In the mid-1990s, the university system experienced a number of high-profile
internal control failures that resulted in the loss of assets, a compromised reputation with
the public and with funding authorities, and extensive damage control” (p. 40).
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Olivas (2004) also noted the increase in legal cases at universities in the last half of
the 20th century and called particular attention to the rise in nonlegal legal influences in
higher education. Olivas observed that nongovernmental, nonlegal forces such as
consortia, insurance carriers, accreditation groups, and sole-source suppliers had statutory,
litigative, or regulatory requirements that dictated policy responses.
Regarding consortia, Olivas described athletics conferences as the most formal
type of consortium, in which institutions affiliate, share athletic schedules, organize
tournaments, and participate in the larger network of national athletic competitions,
including championships. Olivas noted contractual and financial effects when institutions
change conferences and described the exposure of athletics violations at one university in
particular--Southern Methodist University:
That college athletics have legal implications is inarguable. In an extraordinary
document issued by a Special Committee of Methodist Bishops, concerning illegal
payments to athletes and numerous violations of NCAA regulations by Southern
Methodist University, detailed evidence of substantial wrongdoing was made
public in 1987. The Report included a pattern of rules violations, recruiting abuses,
cash payments to athletes, NCAA sanctions, collusion by trustees and
administrators to “keep the lid on,” decisions by the President of the Board (who
resigned to become Governor of Texas) to continue illegal payments, an
agreement to bribe a disgruntled former employee who threatened to go public,
public disclosures of the payments, deceptions towards the faculty NCAA
representative, a “strategy of containment and cover-up,” a plan for one person to
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become the scapegoat, and other improprieties that the Bishops termed
“embarrassing and offensive in many instances.” (p. 24)
Olivas recommended that institutions (a) undertake regular audits of programs for
risk assessment and review, and (b) ensure that nonlegal policies and regimes are fully
implemented. Olivas also called for research on the governance of the many nonlegal
influences on universities.
At the 2006 annual meeting of the National Association of College and University
Attorneys (NACUA), Kaplin and Lee presented the top 10 trends in higher education law.
These trends illustrate the increasing volume and complexity of the legal issues that
institutions face:
10. Liability arising from blogs, chat rooms, file sharing, and other Internet uses
and abuses.
9. Increased attention to the status of athletics and the rights and responsibilities
of athletes [italics added].
8. New attempts to understand and protect academic freedom, within an
institution and as a national custom.
7. Continuing tensions over student autonomy, as students seek to shape the
college experience to their needs and preferences.
6. Increasing involvement of university counsel in risk management and making
policy [italics added].
5. More tension between faculty members and the administration as attacks on
tenure continue and the use of adjuncts increases.
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4. A broadening focus on student diversity, especially socioeconomic status,
religious beliefs, national origin and ethnicity, and abilities and disabilities.
3. Continuing concerns regarding national security and how that affects academe.
2. Continuing challenges regarding the operation of education programs overseas
and the increased mobility of students and faculty members entering and
leaving the United States.
1. More federal and state regulation of higher education. (Selingo & Blumenstyk,
2006, p. 21)
Risks Associated with Athletics
Colleges and universities face risks specifically associated with intercollegiate
athletics. The Knight Commission (2001) reported that in the 1980s, 57 of 106 Division IA institutions (54%) were censured, sanctioned, or put on probation for major violations
of NCAA rules. In the 1990s, 58 of 114 Division I-A institutions (52%) were similarly
penalized.
The consequences for athletics noncompliance have ranged from embarrassment to
resignations, from loss of scholarships to loss of postseason play, and from the return of
actual athletics revenue to lawsuits (Cohen, 2005; Independent Investigative Commission,
2004; Lederman, 2004; Suggs, 2005; “U. of Michigan is further penalized,” 2003;
Wieman, 2004). Bernard (2003), general counsel at the University of Florida, predicted
the future hot spots in college athletics as (a) a perceived or real lack of emphasis by
institutions on the academic achievement of student athletes; (b) student-athletes’
increasingly asserting their legal rights when charged with discipline violations,
scholarships are revoked, or drug tests are positive; (c) increasingly complex athletics-
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related business arrangements with soft-drink companies, shoe and apparel contracts,
Internet broadcasting, web advertising, or trademarks; (d) skyrocketing compensation of
coaches; and (e) evolving regulatory oversight in areas such as Title IX, NCAA rules, and
taxation.
Bernard advised presidents to (a) hire the right people, particularly the athletics
director; (b) implement a system of checks and balances, including rules education, audits,
and enforcement; and (c) arrange other checks and balances, including involving faculty
and administrators outside the athletics department in its operations and oversight
committees. Bernard suggested that a president can provide athletics oversight by
communicating expectations and understanding the operation:
A president can exercise personal oversight over the athletics enterprise in two
ways: by articulating clearly his or her expectation that the athletics operation will
be run within a culture of best practices, and by personally understanding the
athletics operation and its role within the college or university. (Bernard, 2003,
para. 3)
The NCAA’s Approach to Compliance
Intercollegiate athletics has its own history and approach to compliance.
Compliance programs are mandated by the NCAA as a means of monitoring rules
compliance. NCAA member institutions are required to establish a compliance program to
assure that the athletics program adheres to NCAA rules and reports incidents of
noncompliance (Buckner, 2004; NCAA, 1996). The NCAA expects institutions to selfreport rules infractions and to propose appropriate remedies and penalties. The NCAA
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also investigates on its own when it becomes aware of the possibility of serious or
widespread infractions.
The NCAA constitution states that the chief executive officer is ultimately
responsible for the conduct of the athletics department. Bylaw 2.1.1 of the NCAA
Constitution (NCAA, 2005-2006) states,
It is the responsibility of each member institution to control its intercollegiate
athletics program in compliance with the rules and regulations of the Association.
The institution’s chief executive officer is responsible for the administration of all
aspects of the athletics program. (p. 3)
Although the president is responsible for compliance, it is generally understood
that the design and operation of the compliance program itself will be left up to the
athletics director and the athletics compliance officer. The NCAA (1996) stated the
following:
Obviously general institutional control is exercised by the chief executive officer
of a member institution. However, it is rare that the chief executive officer will
make decisions specifically affecting the operations of the institution’s athletics
program. Instead, the day-to-day duties of operation, including compliance with
NCAA rules, will have been delegated to subordinates either by specific action or
by the creation of appropriate job descriptions. More, it is usually left to senior
subordinates, such as the director of athletics, further to delegate various duties
regarding compliance with NCAA rules. (p. 1 )
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The NCAA’s approach to compliance can be seen in (a) its principles of
institutional control; (b) C.O.D.E., its outline of key program elements; and (c) the
information included in its program audits.
In its Principles of Institutional Control, the NCAA (1996) stated the principles
that define institutional control. An institution demonstrates institutional control of
athletics when
1. Formal institutional policies and procedures for compliance are in place.
2. Policies and procedures are being monitored and enforced, and are established
in such a way as to deter violations before they occur.
3. Communication of compliance procedures occurs clearly and regularly.
4. Steps are taken to alter a compliance system when there are indications the
system is not working.
5. After learning of a violation, the institution takes swift action.
6. The institution makes clear that violations of NCAA rules will result in
discipline and possible discharge.
7. The institution makes clear that individuals have the responsibility to selfreport any NCAA rules violation without fear of negative consequences.
8. Meaningful compliance education programs exist for personnel engaged in
athletically related operations. (NCAA, 1996)
C.O.D.E. is the NCAA’s acronym for the key elements of an effective compliance
program: (a) communication, (b) organization, (c) documentation, and (d) evaluation
(NCAA, 2001). A compliance program should contain these components of
communication:
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•

The institution’s commitment to rules compliance is demonstrated through oral
and written communications with various campus constituencies.

•

Key compliance tasks and responsibilities are communicated clearly to
individuals with compliance responsibilities.

•

In each department that plays a role in completing a compliance task, an
individual has been designated to communicate with other departments.

•

The institution has developed a comprehensive rules education program that
includes providing rules interpretations to campus constituencies.

In the area of organization, a compliance program should contain these components:
•

Senior-level institutional administrators assume leadership roles in establishing
the institution’s commitment to compliance initiatives.

•

The institution centrally coordinates its rules compliance program.

•

The institution is organized to ensure that rules compliance is a shared
responsibility requiring the involvement of individuals from outside the
athletics department.

•

Key tasks and responsibilities have been identified and assigned to appropriate
individuals in each area of compliance the institution considers critical and
sensitive.

•

Roles of key compliance personnel (chief executive officer, director of
athletics, faculty athletics representative, compliance coordinator, athletics
committee/board) are defined clearly and understood.
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•

A formal process for conducting investigations of alleged rules violations and
reporting confirmed rules violations to the NCAA and conference office has
been established.

In the area of documentation, the program should contain these components:
•

Policies and procedures relating to compliance systems are documented clearly
and available.

•

Each key compliance area maintains the supporting documentation necessary
to substantiate that institutional policies and procedures relating to compliance
systems are being followed properly.

•

Responsibilities of key participants in compliance areas are reflected in job
descriptions, letters of appointment and contracts.

•

The institution states in writing its commitment to rules compliance and widely
distributes this document to appropriate campus and external constituencies.

In the area of evaluation, a compliance program should contain these components:
•

Senior-level administrators approve policies and procedures in critical and
sensitive compliance areas.

•

Institutional staff members (inside and outside athletics) are evaluated
periodically on their rules compliance responsibilities.

•

Mechanisms are in place to ensure continuing and regular administrative
oversight in key compliance areas.

•

All aspects of the rules compliance program are subject to periodic review by
some institutional authority outside the athletics department. (NCAA, 2001)
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The third type of information related to NCAA compliance programs is the
program audit. According to NCAA rules, an institution should have an outside audit
every four years. (This is typically done by the conference to which an institution
belongs.) An audit generally includes a pre-audit questionnaire and an on-site visit.
Feedback is later provided in writing. The pre-audit questionnaire follows the topical
structure of the NCAA manual (ethical conduct, personnel, amateurism, recruiting,
academic eligibility, financial aid, awards and extra benefits, and playing and practice
seasons) and contains about 100 questions. The on-site audit typically includes interviews
with the compliance professionals as well as athletics administrators and the university
president (NCAA, 2001).
The NCAA’s approach to compliance, however, does not emphasize risk
assessment. Electronic searches of the NCAA web site and the 2005-06 NCAA Division I
Manual identified no instances of the terms risk assessment or risk analysis. The terms are
not mentioned in (a) the NCAA’s Principles of Institutional Control (NCAA, 1996), (b)
C.O.D.E., the NCAA’s description of compliance-program elements (NCAA, 2001), (c)
the NCAA’s prereview questionnaire, or (d) NCAA regional compliance seminar training
materials. The handouts of the session entitled “Institutional Control Defined” in the 2005
NCAA Regional Compliance Seminars do not include either term.
Approaches to Compliance Outside Higher Education
The 1990s saw the creation of models and frameworks for what constitutes an
effective compliance program in areas outside higher education (and thus outside
intercollegiate athletics). These outside compliance approaches can provide a useful lens
for observing intercollegiate athletics compliance. In particular, three influential
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compliance approaches have been (a) the 1991 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations, (b) the Committee of Sponsoring Organization’s (COSO) Internal ControlIntegrated Framework, and (c) the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) Compliance
Program Guidance for Hospitals.
These compliance-program frameworks spawned much writing about the need for
and the elements of compliance programs. Pelliccioni’s literature review process in 1999
identified 18,381 articles that addressed compliance programs and compliance
effectiveness in the health care, environmental, banking, defense, and insurance industries
(Pelliccioni, 2002).
The 1991 Sentencing Guidelines. The Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations
were issued by the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 1991. The purpose was to promote
voluntary compliance programs and make the punishment of corporations more uniform
and severe by offering reduced punishment for companies with meaningful programs in
place. With the guidelines, the government provided for the first time a model for duediligence compliance efforts. The guidelines were originally something of an experiment
but became widely influential. Kaplan (2004) noted that events such as the Caremark case
in the Delaware Court of Chancery, which cited the Sentencing Guidelines and ruled that
corporate directors could be liable for failing to exercise compliance-related oversight,
created a broad impact.
The 1991 Sentencing Guidelines stated that meaningful compliance programs
should include seven elements: (a) adequate compliance standards and procedures; (b)
effective high-level compliance oversight; (c) careful delegation and due care in hiring
employees; (d) effective training and education; (e) effective monitoring of the program,
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strong internal audit, and nonretaliatory internal reporting systems; (f) appropriate
responses to violations; and (g) corrective disciplinary action, as appropriate (U.S.
Sentencing Commission, 1991).
In 2004 the U.S. Sentencing Commission updated the Sentencing Guidelines. The
newer guidelines indicated that an institutional culture of compliance must be evident.
Thus, a compliance program must also (a) seek to identify violations of law or rule, (b)
train and educate high-level officials and others on standards and obligations, (c)
incorporate compliance as a behavioral norm, (d) include active leadership by senior
managers and trustees, (e) identify and prioritize issues on the basis of risk assessment,
and (f) emphasize ethics (Desio, 2004; U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2004).
COSO’s Internal Control--Integrated Framework. The Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations (COSO) was formed in 1985 by five associations: (a) the American
Accounting Association, (b) the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, (c)
Financial Executives International, (d) The Institute of Internal Auditors, and (e) the
National Association of Accountants (now the Institute of Management Accountants).
COSO sponsored the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (popularly
known as the Treadway Commission after its chairman, James C. Treadway, Jr.). The
Treadway Commission studied the causes of fraudulent financial reporting and developed
recommendations.
In 1992, the Treadway Commission produced COSO’s Internal Control-Integrated Framework for financial reporting (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
[COSO], 1992). In the framework, internal control was defined as “a process, effected by
an entity’s board of directors, management, and other personnel, designed to provide
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reasonable assurance regarding . . . the effectiveness and efficiency of operations,
reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws” (COSO, 1992,
para. 5). Internal control was described as having five components: (a) control
environment, (b) risk assessment, (c) control activities, (d) information and
communication, and (e) monitoring.
Control (meaning, control-conscious) environment factors included (a) the
integrity and competence of people, (b) management’s philosophy and operating style, (c)
assignment of authority, (d) organization and development of people, and (e) the attention
of the board of directors. Risk assessment included (a) the identification and analysis of
relevant risks and (b) the determination of how the risks should be managed. Control
activities included (a) approvals, (b) authorizations, (c) verifications, (d) reconciliations,
(e) reviews, (f) security, and (g) segregation of duties. Information and communication
included (a) operational, financial, and compliance reports; (b) internal and external
communication; and (c) communication of control responsibilities. Monitoring included
(a) ongoing monitoring in the course of operations, (b) separate evaluations, or (c) a
combination of both.
It can be noted that Crawford et al. (2001), in describing the compliance approach
in the University of Texas System, suggested that great similarities existed between the
1991 Sentencing Guidelines and COSO’s Internal Control--Integrated Framework. In
their view, the Sentencing Guidelines represented a strengthening and emphasis of activity
areas that were also identified by COSO.
In 2004, in response to headline-making corporate scandals, COSO produced a
second framework (COSO, 2004). The second framework expanded on the first and
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addressed corporate governance and risk management. The framework addressed risks
related to an organization’s strategic, operations, reporting, and compliance objectives.
The COSO enterprise risk-management framework expanded the number of components
to eight, adding three new ones: (a) objective setting, (b) event identification, and (c) risk
response. Objective setting meant that objectives must be in place so that the risks
associated with them can be assessed. Event identification meant that internal and external
events related to the objectives must be identified, distinguishing between risks and
opportunities. Risk response meant that management must identify its risk tolerances and
risk appetite and select risk responses (avoiding, accepting, reducing, or sharing risk) for
the identified risks (COSO, 2004).
OIG’s Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals. In the early 1990s, estimates
were that at least 10% of all healthcare dollars were being lost to fraud (Pelliccioni, 2002).
In response, in 1998 the Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued the Compliance
Program Guidance for Hospitals. The guidance was based on the 1991 Sentencing
Guidelines. OIG’s guidance stated that, at a minimum, comprehensive compliance
programs in hospitals should include seven elements: (a) standards of conduct, (b)
designation of a compliance officer and a compliance committee, (c) effective training and
education, (d) effective lines of communication (such as access to the compliance officer
and hotlines), (e) standards enforced through well-publicized disciplinary guidelines, (f)
auditing and monitoring, and (g) response to detected offenses and corrective action
(Office of Inspector General [OIG], 1998).
In 2005 OIG issued supplemental guidance to hospitals on compliance programs,
providing healthcare-specific details and reiterating the key elements of a compliance
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program as (a) designation of a compliance officer and compliance committee; (b)
development of compliance policies and procedures, including standards of conduct; (c)
developing open lines of communication; (d) appropriate training and education; (e)
internal monitoring and auditing; (f) response to detected deficiencies; and (g)
enforcement of disciplinary standards (OIG, 2005).
Research on Compliance Outside Higher Education
Several studies outside higher education have examined the prevalence and
relationships of various compliance-program elements. Weaver, Trevino, and Cochran
(1999) surveyed ethics officers of 1,000 Fortune 500 (industrial and service) corporations
listed in 1995, receiving 254 responses (26% response rate). The survey inquired about
elements of ethics and compliance programs, including (a) ethics policy statements, (b)
ethics officers, (c) ethics offices, (d) ethics hotlines, (e) the chief executive officer’s
(CEO) involvement in ethics, and (f) ethics training and communication.
Regarding policy statements, 98% of the 254 respondents reported having a formal
ethics policy document. On ethics officers, 54% of respondents reported having a single
officer specifically charged with ethics. With regard to ethics offices, 30% of respondents
reported a specific department expressly dealing with ethics. On hotlines, 51% of
respondents reported some type of telephone-based system for employees to report issues.
Regarding CEO involvement, 13% of the 254 ethics officers reported seven or
more ethics-related conversations with the CEO per year, 21% reported three to six
conversations per year, and 46% reported one to two conversations per year (and 20%
reported no conversations). On ethics meetings, 15% of CEOs attended four or more
ethics-focused meetings per year, 23% attended two or three meetings per year, and 30%
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attended one meeting (and 32% attended no meetings). On ethics communications, 5% of
CEOs sent out company-wide, written communications on ethics more often than
annually, and 46% sent messages once per year (and 38% did so every few years and 11%
never sent written ethics communications).
With regard to communication, less than one third of the 254 respondents reported
that employees received ethics messages (other than the code or policy) more than once
per year. Regarding training, only about one fourth of respondents reported that
employees received annual ethics training.
The authors concluded that although the great majority of companies had ethics
policies, the support of the policies varied widely, indicating that companies had perhaps
adopted low-cost, symbolic aspects of ethics management (Weaver et al., 1999).
Trevino, Weaver, Gibson, and Toffler (1999) investigated the relationship between
employee perceptions of ethics/compliance program factors and their perceptions of
ethics/compliance outcomes. The researchers surveyed about 10,000 randomly selected
employees at six American companies.
The survey asked about the employees’ perceptions of compliance-program
factors, including program orientation, formal program characteristics, and ethical culture.
Program orientation referred to whether the program was perceived by employees as (a)
values based (based on organizational ethical values), (b) compliance based (based on
preventing or detecting violations of laws or rules), (c) oriented toward satisfying external
stakeholders (such as customers and the public), or (d) oriented toward protecting top
management from blame. Formal program characteristics referred to (a) employees’
awareness and use of the organization’s code of conduct and report mechanism, as well as
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(b) ethics included in performance appraisals and (c) program follow-through. Ethical
culture referred to elements such as (a) leadership, (b) reward systems, (c) communication
about ethics, and (d) perception of fairness and care.
The survey also asked about the employees’ perceptions of seven
ethics/compliance outcomes in their organizations: (a) unethical or illegal behavior
observed during the past year, (b) employee awareness of ethical or illegal issues at work,
(c) ethics/compliance advice-seeking within the company, (d) delivering of bad news to
management, (e) reporting of ethics/compliance violations, (f) better decision making in
the company because of the ethics/compliance program, and (g) employee commitment to
the organization. The respondents’ perceptions about compliance-program factors were
correlated with their perceptions about compliance outcomes to identify the relationships
between ethics/compliance management and outcomes.
Given the large number of respondents, the following Pearson product-moment
correlations were all reported as statistically significant. The authors found that a
compliance program should be perceived as values based. For example, a values
orientation positively correlated with employee commitment (r = .59) and better decision
making (r = .56). The perception of a program as compliance oriented was also found to
be positively related to outcomes. For example, a compliance orientation positively
correlated with better decision making (r = .49).
Regarding formal program characteristics, the authors found that a compliance
program should be perceived as consistent in its policies and active in follow-up on
reports, and ethics should be a part of performance appraisals. For example, consistent
policies/actions positively correlated with employee commitment (r = .69) and better
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decision making (r = .67) and negatively correlated with unethical conduct (r = -.56).
Formal report mechanism was positively correlated with better decision making (r = .54).
Similarly, follow-up on reports positively correlated with better decision making (r = .60)
and advice seeking (r = .59). Performance appraisal was also positively correlated with
better decision making. Interestingly, the authors found having a code of conduct to be
less related to outcomes than expected. For example, code familiarity’s highest positive
correlation was an r of .27 with better decision making. Refer to code’s highest positive
correlation was an r of .26, also with better decision making.
Regarding ethical culture, the authors found cultural factors to be influential, with
leadership, fair treatment, talk about ethics, and the perception that ethical behavior is
rewarded among the significant factors. For example, executive leadership was positively
correlated with employee commitment (r = .70) and negatively correlated with unethical
conduct (r = -.52). Supervisory leadership was positively correlated with okay to deliver
bad news (r = .67) and negatively correlated with unethical conduct (r = .55). Fair
treatment was positively correlated with employee commitment (r = .76) and okay to
deliver bad news (r = .72) and negatively correlated with unethical conduct (r = -.54).
Ethics talk was positively correlated with better decision making (r = .62). Ethical
behavior rewarded was positively correlated with employee commitment (r = .63) and
okay to deliver bad news (r = .61) and negatively correlated with unethical conduct (r = .54). Employee focus was positively correlated with employee commitment (r = .67).
Two harmful cultural factors were the perceptions of unquestioning obedience to
authority and an organizational focus on self-interest. For example, obedience to authority
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was negatively correlated with okay to deliver bad news (r = -.62). Self-interest focus was
negatively correlated with employee commitment (r = -.57).
The authors’ recommendations included (a) identifying employee perceptions
about ethics and compliance, (b) building a solid ethical culture, (c) creating a valuesbased program that also incorporated compliance accountability, and (d) focusing on
program follow-through (Trevino et al., 1999). Ironically, the study by Weaver et al.
(1999) showed that most companies had adopted formal code-of-conduct policies,
whereas the study by Trevino et al. (1999) indicated that formal codes of conduct were not
strong program factors.
In Medicare-Medicaid compliance in healthcare, Pelliccioni (2002) studied (a) the
extent of compliance-program implementation, (b) the relationships between complianceprogram elements and compliance outcomes, and (c) the relationships among the
compliance-program elements themselves. The compliance-program elements were those
described in the 1991 Sentencing Guidelines: (a) standards and policies, (b) oversight
responsibility, (c) education and training, (d) lines of communication, (e) auditing and
monitoring, (f) enforcement and discipline, and (g) response and prevention. The
compliance outcomes were compliance awareness and billing accuracy.
With the help of two expert panels, Pelliccioni developed an Indicator
Questionnaire to measure the extent to which compliance programs were implemented.
(The Indicator Questionnaire contained 119 questions tied to 137 compliance indicators,
which in turn were tied to the seven program elements.) The expert panels also identified
awareness items for an Employee-Awareness Questionnaire.
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Thirty hospitals were randomly selected (8 small, 13 medium, and 9 large). At
each hospital, (a) the Indicator Questionnaire was administered in person to four to seven
executives and managers, (b) the Employee Awareness Questionnaire was selfadministered by 25 randomly selected staff employees and 25 randomly selected
physicians, and (c) 100 in-patient and 100 out-patient Medicare-Medicare invoices were
randomly selected and audited for accuracy.
Pelliccioni found a mean score among the hospitals of 53.5% on the Indicator
Questionnaire measuring the extent of program implementation (versus a perfect score of
100% implementation of the indicators identified in the literature survey and by the expert
panels). Pelliccioni noted,
First, in contrast to the ‘zero tolerance’ standard historically employed by the
government for health care providers, the mean performance score on all of the
seven elements collectively was 53.51%, with the best performing hospital
achieving 67.68% correct responses and the worst performing hospital obtaining
37.60% correct responses. Perhaps the most valuable implication of this finding is
to highlight how imperative it is for the government and industry to come to terms
with the disparity between what is being expected, what is being achieved and
what is a reasonable expectation. (pp. 259-260)
Regarding the extent of implementation of each of the seven program elements
(across the hospitals), response and prevention had the highest mean score (80.4%),
followed by oversight responsibility (72.4%), education and training (57.8%), auditing
and monitoring (51.5%), lines of communication (51.1%), enforcement and discipline
(51%), and standards and policies (45.5%).
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The mean score by (nonphysician) employees on the Employee Awareness
Questionnaire was 60.8%; 358 of 750 employees (48%) responded. The mean score by
physicians on the questionnaire was 42.1%; 166 of 750 physicians (22%) responded.
The mean percent correct on billing accuracy was 57.2% (with mean inpatient
billing accuracy of 54.6% and mean outpatient billing accuracy of 59.7%). (One-way
analyses of variance showed no effects of organization size or implementation period on
awareness or invoice accuracy.)
Regarding relationships among the seven compliance program elements, analyzing
the data at the hospital level (N = 30), Pelliccioni found two sets of high Pearson productmoment correlations, perhaps indicating that the seven program elements were not
mutually exclusive concepts.
In one set of relationships, the lines of communication element was positively
correlated with enforcement and discipline (r = 0.97). The lines of communication
element was also positively correlated with oversight responsibility (r = 0.83). Pelliccioni
suggested that clear lines of communication regarding problems could really be a part of
enforcement and discipline. Also, lines of communication and oversight responsibility
may both address communication, differing only on mechanisms versus infrastructure.
In a second set of relationships, training and education was negatively correlated
with auditing and monitoring (r = -0.82). Training and education was also negatively
correlated with standards and policies (r = -0.76). In explaining the negative correlations,
Pelliccioni suggested that either (a) organizations might struggle both to train and
memorialize and monitor (given the resources required to do both) or that (b)
implementing some aspect of one of these elements negatively affects the other.
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Multiple regression analyses were then performed to identify which elements were
related to the dependent measures. Response and prevention was significantly related to
inpatient billing accuracy, explaining about 16% of the variance (R2 = .1563). Auditing
and monitoring was significantly related to outpatient billing accuracy, explaining about
15% of the variance (R2 = .1529).
Analyzing the data at the respondent level (N = 204), Pelliccioni used factor
analysis to determine whether seven distinct elements actually existed. Interestingly, nine
factors emerged (and were named as follows): (a) compliance-program risk factors 1 (e.g.,
standards of conduct and OIG guidance), (b) development and updating of the compliance
program, (c) regulatory and statutory risk factors, (d) billing and coding risk factors, (e)
reporting mechanism protocols, (f) type of reporting mechanism, (g) protocol for accuracy
and dissemination of regulatory mandates, (h) compliance-program risk factors 2 (e.g.,
Medicare and Medicaid statutes), and (i) compliance officer reporting structure.
After inconsistent items were removed, multiple regression analyses were
conducted among the factors and the dependent variables. The factor protocol for
accuracy and dissemination of regulatory mandates was significantly related to employee
awareness, explaining about 27% of the variance (R2 = .273). The factors type of
reporting mechanism and protocol for accuracy and dissemination of regulatory mandates
together were significantly related to inpatient billing accuracy, explaining about 24% of
the variance (R2 = .242) (Pelliccioni, 2002).
Risk Management and Compliance in Higher Education
Kaplin and Lee (1995) described the four most common methods of risk
management in higher education as (a) risk avoidance, (b) risk control, (c) risk transfer,
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and (d) risk retention. Risk avoidance eliminates activities or avoids creating activities that
involve risk. Risk control defines and structures activities to reduce or limit risk. Risk
transfer moves risk to other parties through methods such as insurance, indemnification
agreements, and releases and waivers. Risk retention accepts risk and prepares for legal
liability through self-insurance.
Risk assessment has been noted as a fundamental component of compliance in
higher education. Crawford et al. (2001) described the approach to risk assessment in the
University of Texas System’s institutional compliance program. Risk assessment was one
of the four key activities during the first six months of program implementation, together
with (a) establishing the compliance infrastructure, (b) training the compliance
infrastructure staff, and (c) developing a standards-of-conduct guide and compliance
training program. The primary purpose of the initial risk assessment was to identify the
significant compliance risks at the institutional level. The authors described the specific
steps of risk assessment as follows:
1. Risks were identified in bottom-up workshops in work units (the lowest level
of budgeted departments within the organization). In two-hour sessions, 12-15
participants identified risks through brainstorming. Then, for each risk, the
participants measured its potential impact (as high, medium, or low), and its
probability of occurrence (as high, medium, or low). The risks were then
prioritized (high-high, high-medium, and so forth).
2. The prioritized risk inventories from work-unit workshops were then
prioritized by risk area. The 15 risk areas on the academic side in the Texas
System were (a) student welfare, (b) funding formulas, (c) human resources,
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(d) fiscal management, (e) environment health and safety, (f) accreditation, (g)
basic research, (h) grants and contracts, (i) IRS, (j) intercollegiate athletics, (k)
privacy of information, (l) student financial aid, (m) gift restrictions, (n)
information resources, and (o) safeguarding assets. Risk-area experts then
reviewed and reprioritized the lists of risks to produce a prioritized list of risks
for each risk area.
3. An institutional compliance committee then determined the risks with the
greatest significance for the institution as a whole. This list of critical
institutional risks was communicated to management and became the focus of
the institutional compliance program.
4.

Managing each risk involved (a) the designation of one responsible party; (b)
a monitoring plan with operating controls, supervisory controls, and oversight
controls; (c) a training plan; and (d) a reporting plan.

5. Risk-assurance strategies included certification, oversight controls, internal
audit controls, and sometimes external-expert peer review.
6. Responding to noncompliance included having (a) policies and procedures that
described the means of identifying instances of noncompliance and the
appropriate remediation, and (b) a mechanism for reporting instances of
noncompliance without retaliation.
Chaffin (2003) described the implementation phases of the compliance program at
each institution in the Texas System as (a) program design and infrastructure, (b)
communication and training, (c) management of mission-critical compliance risks, and (d)
appraisal and renewal. Program design and infrastructure involved (a) establishing
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program objectives, (b) developing an action plan, (c) creating an institutional compliance
officer position, (d) establishing an institutional compliance committee, and (e) creating a
separate compliance function. Communication and training involved (a) producing a
standard-of-conduct guide, (b) providing web-based compliance training for all employees
(70,000 across the Texas System), and (c) instituting a confidential reporting mechanism.
Managing mission-critical compliance risks involved (a) identifying risks in risk areas
(such as student financial aid, athletics, and human resources); (b) selecting the
compliance risks most critical at the institutional level; and (c) addressing the critical risks
by designating a single responsible party for each risk and developing a monitoring plan,
training plan, and reporting plan. The appraisal and renewal phase of the compliance
program involved (a) addressing instances of noncompliance, (b) providing ongoing
assurance regarding the management of the critical risks, and (c) conducting periodic
assessments of the program.
Whitfield (2003), in a qualitative study, interviewed leaders at a medical research
facility, a financial-services company, two research universities, and three other top-50
universities to investigate the applicability of enterprise-wide risk-management programs
to higher education. Enterprise-wide risk management referred to programs that address
all types of risk (strategic, financial, operational, compliance, and reputational). The
informants served either as president, chief business officer, dean, executive vice
president, chief operating officer, chief operational risk officer, chief compliance officer,
or chief audit executive. Whitfield inquired about the strategy, design, metrics, and
barriers to success of the programs in effect at the institutions.
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Whitfield concluded that the corporate sector’s enterprise-wide risk-management
framework is transferable to higher education. Whitfield’s interviews indicated that a
successful enterprise-wide risk-management program required (a) that trustees and
presidents accept that an environment of constant change produces risk and set a riskconscious tone at the top, (b) that the approach be proactive rather than crisis reactive, (c)
that a risk-champion and risk-management committee be created, and (d) that the
perspective be institution-wide rather than piece-meal. Whitfield also identified the
importance of institution-wide risk assessment as well as of awareness training. The
barriers to success identified were (a) risk’s not being on the agenda of executives and
trustees, (b) cultures and organizational structures that prevent an institution-wide
perspective, and (c) a lack of proven metrics.
Risk assessment has been applied in other fields outside higher education. For
example, Williams, Walker, and Dorofee (1997) described the use of risk assessment in
managing software projects. A list of risk statements was generated. The format for risk
statements included a condition and at least one consequence (such as “Potential slip in
module translation schedule; will impact rest of system coding”, p. 78). Risk statements
were evaluated on potential impact (high, medium, or low) and probability (high, medium,
or low). The risk statements were then classified by type and ranked in priority order.
Risk-mitigation plans were then developed for each risk (or risks were accepted without
mitigation). Risk management included monitoring and altering plans as needed,
“dropping to a watch-only mode at a specific threshold, and closing the risk when it no
longer exists” (Williams et al., 1997, p. 80).
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In another example, Delabbio et al. (2003) described the use of risk assessment in
the implementation of fuel-cell-powered mining equipment in a mine. A likelihood-impact
matrix was used to rate risks (see Figure 1). Potential impact was rated on a scale of 1 to 5
(negligible, minor, moderate, major, and catastrophic). Likelihood was also rated on a
scale of 1 to 5 (rare, unlikely, moderate, likely, and almost certain). Extreme risks were (a)
those with catastrophic impact and moderate, likely, or almost-certain likelihood and (b)
those with major impact and almost-certain likelihood. Major risks were (a) those with
catastrophic impact but unlikely or rare likelihood, (b) those with major impact and likely
or moderate likelihood, (c) those with moderate impact and likely or almost-certain
likelihood, and (d) those with minor impact but almost-certain likelihood. Extreme and
major risks were considered first priority, requiring immediate action. The risks were also
analyzed qualitatively in terms of existing controls, precision with which the risk was
understood, and intervention difficulty.
In a third example, Alexander and Marshall (2006) described the use of risk
assessment in an extension program to help farmers with business planning. Workshop
participants were asked to think of risks their businesses faced and to evaluate the
probability and consequence of each event on a scale of 1 to 10. For example, the event of
a 35-year-old business owner’s passing away might be rated very low in probability, at 1,
but very high in consequences, at 10. Participants were taught the options of avoiding,
reducing, retaining, or transferring the risk (Alexander & Marshall, 2006).
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Likelihood-Impact Matrix
Impact
Likelihood

1

2

3

4

5

Negligible

Minor

Moderate

Major

Catastrophic

Medium

Major

Major

Extreme

Extreme

5

Almost certain

4

Likely

Minor

Medium

Major

Major

Extreme

3

Moderate

Minor

Medium

Medium

Major

Extreme

2

Unlikely

Minor

Minor

Medium

Medium

Major

1

Rare

Negligible

Minor

Minor

Medium

Major

No action required
Manage as second priority
Immediate action required prior to proceeding with demonstration, manage as first priority

Figure 1. A likelihood-impact matrix for assessing risks in the use of mining equipment,
showing how risks are prioritized on the basis of potential impact and likelihood of
occurrence. In this matrix, risks with rare likelihood are still considered major if their
impact would be catastrophic. Conversely, risks with minor impact are also considered
major if their likelihood is almost certain. From “Fuelcell risk assessment, regulatory
compliance, and implementation of the world’s first fuelcell-powered mining equipment
at Placer Dome--Campbell Mine,” Delabbio et al., 2003, Natural Resources Canada
(NRCan), p. 5. Copyright 2002 by Hatch. Reprinted with permission.
Sheldon and Hoffman (2005) studied the prevalence of institution-wide ethics and
compliance programs in four-year colleges and universities. The authors surveyed 2,399
college and university presidents and chancellors, with a low response rate of 19% (450
respondents). The findings indicated that whereas 79% of the 450 respondents thought
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they should have an institution-wide ethics or compliance program, only 43% had one. Of
the schools with an institution-wide program, (a) 92% of the 450 respondents had a
written statement of core values, and 91% had a code of ethics or code of conduct; (b)
88% applied their program to administration, and 85% applied their program to faculty;
(c) 80% monitored ethics or compliance issues; (d) 60% offered ethics or compliance
training to employees; (e) 56% had an ethics or compliance officer; (f) 42% had an ethics
or compliance committee; and (g) 33% had a helpline or hotline for reporting misconduct
or seeking advice.
In a University of Washington study, the authors presented an overview of
compliance and risk management, reviewed models for such programs in higher
education, and described four case studies (University of Washington, 2006). In the study,
risks were defined as the uncertainties that may impact an institution’s ability to reach its
goals. Both risk management and compliance were described as consisting of four
iterative actions in a risk cycle: (a) identification, (b) assessment, (c) mitigation, and (d)
monitoring (see Figure 2).
Risk assessment was described as focusing on a limited number of risks with a
high likelihood of occurrence and a high impact on the institution. Risk maps were
presented as a tool for visualizing risks on the basis of their potential impact and
likelihood of occurrence (see Figure 3). Completed by knowledgeable campus groups, risk
maps can serve as a basis for allocating attention and resources.
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Risk
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Risk
Communication
and Monitoring

Risk
Assessment

Risk
Mitigation

Figure 2. Risk cycle showing risk management and compliance as consisting of four
iterative actions: identification, assessment, mitigation, and monitoring. From
“Collaborative enterprise risk management,” 2006, University of Washington, Seattle.

Transferring risk through insurance and addressing risks in individual functions
(such as the safety of human subjects in research) were described as basic approaches to
risk. Institutional compliance was presented as a more advanced approach. Two models
were offered as possible frameworks for institutional compliance at a university:
centralized compliance and enterprise risk management. Centralized compliance was
described as institution-wide but covering only compliance risks. The seven elements of
the U. S. Sentencing Guidelines were noted as a commonly used model for a good
compliance program. They are as follows: (a) compliance standards and procedures, (b)
the role of organizational leadership, (c) employee screening, (d) training and education,
(e) internal monitoring and auditing (including confidential reporting), (f) discipline and
incentives, and (g) response and prevention.

85

5
Catastrophic

High Impact
High Likelihood

Low Impact
Low Likelihood

Low Impact
High Likelihood

Impact

High Impact
Low Likelihood

Insignificant
1

5

Likelihood of Occurrence
Rare

Almost Certain

Figure 3. Risk map for visualizing risks on the basis of potential impact and likelihood of
occurrence. Attention and resources are focused on risks with high impact and high
likelihood. From “Collaborative enterprise risk management,” 2006, University of
Washington, Seattle.

Enterprise risk management was also described as institution wide but covering all
types of risk (financial, operational, strategic, and compliance) and integrating risk into
strategy. COSO’s eight-element framework was indicated as the benchmark model for
enterprise risk management; it includes: (a) internal environment, (b) objective setting, (c)
event identification, (d) risk assessment, (e) risk plan, (f) control activities, (g) information
and communication, and (h) monitoring and measurement.
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Three parameters were offered for determining the appropriate framework for a
compliance or risk-management program at a given university: (a) scope, (b) organization,
and (c) philosophy. Scope referred to compliance risk only versus all types of risk.
Organization referred to the desired organizational structure. Organizational decisions
included whether to have a central compliance officer, a separate central office, and
decentralized compliance officers in operating units, as well as the desired reporting
relationships, means of coordination, and enforcement authority. Philosophy referred to
the preferred approach of the program: a control model versus a collaborative model. A
control model was described as focusing on reporting and outside monitoring, with the
compliance officer in an enforcement role. A collaborative model was described as
focusing on flexible approaches and internal monitoring, with the compliance officer in an
advising role.
Stanford University was described as collaborative and moving toward full
enterprise risk management. Its approach was observed to include (a) the use of risk
assessments, (b) assignment of a responsible manager to each high-priority risk, (c) a
compliance committee, (d) involvement at the board of trustees’ level, and (e) a director
of compliance operating in a facilitative and advisory role.
The University of Texas System was described as focusing on compliance risk and
operating in a corporate style. Its approach was observed to include at each university (a)
an institutional-compliance officer, (b) an executive committee, (c) risk assessment, (d)
compliance training, (e) single-party responsibility for each risk, (f) controls and
monitoring, and (g) a formal assurance system.
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The University of Minnesota was described as focusing on compliance risk and
operating with a collaborative approach. Its approach was observed to include (a)
emphasis on the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, (b) a compliance partner responsible for
compliance in each risk area, (c) compliance program reviews in each risk area, and (d) a
compliance officer operating in an assistance role. The university was described as
beginning to expand its program to include other risks in addition to compliance. As
shown in Figure 4, the compliance officer used a heat map to illustrate for senior leaders
the risks faced by the university (T. Schumacher, personal communication, June 6, 2006).
The three bands show risks in low (light), medium (darker), and high (darkest) bands.
Athletics can be seen in the darkest high-risk band.
The University of Pennsylvania was described as focusing on compliance risks and
operating in a corporate style initially but in a more collaborative style later. Its approach
was observed to include (a) an office of institutional compliance, (b) hub and spoke
collaboration with compliance functions in individual units, and (c) an officer responsible
for audit, compliance, and privacy.
As a summary of the four case studies, the University of Washington study
included a matrix with two dimensions: the scope of risks addressed and philosophical
approach (see Figure 5). Scope referred to compliance only versus all (enterprise) risks.
Philosophical approach referred to control versus collaboration. The control approach
was seen as focusing on structure, with (a) clear accountability, (b) a separate compliance
organization, (c) heavy use of monitoring, and (d) serious consequences for poor
compliance. The collaborative approach was presented as focusing on process and
outcomes, with (a) informal leadership roles, (b) integration into management
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responsibilities, (c) use of compliance committees, and (d) encouragement of open
communication.

High
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Technology Transfer
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Asset Management
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Figure 4. A University of Minnesota compliance risk heat map showing institutional
compliance risks rated on impact and risk (likelihood) and presented as low-risk, mediumrisk, and high-risk bands. Athletics can be seen in the high-risk band. From T.
Schumacher, personal communication, June 6, 2006. Reprinted with permission.

The matrix showed (a) Texas and Pennsylvania as being focused on compliance
only with a control approach, (b) Minnesota as focused on compliance only with a more
collaborative approach, and (c) Stanford as focused on enterprise risk management with a
collaborative approach. The study’s authors recommended Stanford’s approach as
desirable for Washington (University of Washington, 2006).
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Centralized
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Risk
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Texas

Control

Figure 5. The approaches to institutional compliance of four universities shown on a
matrix with dimensions of scope and philosophy. Scope is compliance-risks-only versus
all enterprise risks. Philosophy is collaboration-oriented versus control-oriented. From
“Collaborative enterprise risk management,” 2006, University of Washington, Seattle.

Summary
Universities face risks associated with athletics noncompliance. College sports are
popular, but a perception of them as commercialized and even corrupt also exists.
Athletics expenses have been rising, increasing the pressure for wins and revenue and in
turn increasing temptations for rules noncompliance. The NCAA was founded in the midst
of rules problems, and the tension between athletics and the academic mission has existed
from the start. Reports by the Carnegie Foundation in 1929, the American Council on
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Education in the 1950s and 1970s, and the Knight Commission in the 1990s called for
major reforms. The calls for reform had little effect until university presidents began to
assert influence in the 1980s through an advisory-power-only Presidents Commission.
Following a major restructuring in 1997, presidents constituted the top committees in the
NCAA.
Studies of presidential involvement in athletics have indicated that presidents have
become more involved and are confident of their control. Most Division I-A athletics
directors report directly to their presidents. Some issues in the management of athletics
have been (a) the position to whom the athletics director reports, (b) the organizational
locations of athletics-support functions, (c) the organizational location of the compliance
function, and (d) faculty involvement in athletics.
Colleges and universities increasingly face legal and other risks. Observers have
called for preventive approaches. Compliance risk is one significant type of risk.
Institutions face compliance risks in athletics. Both in the 1980s and in the 1990s,
more than half of the Division I-A institutions were censured, sanctioned, or put on
probation. Noncompliance risks include competitive, revenue, expense, and reputation
consequences. The NCAA has its own approach to compliance. Its principles of
institutional control include (a) formal policies and procedures, (b) monitoring and
enforcement, (c) communication of procedures, (d) alterations of systems as needed, (e)
swift response to violations, (f) communication of disciplinary consequences, (g)
individual reporting without negative consequences, and (h) compliance education. Its
C.O.D.E. model outlines key compliance-program elements: (a) communication, (b)
organization, (c) documentation, and (d) evaluation. Its program audits include
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questionnaires covering the topics of the NCAA manual, as well as interviews with
compliance professionals, athletics administrators, and the university president. The
NCAA’s approach to compliance programs does not include the use of risk assessment.
Compliance-program effectiveness has been an area of considerable activity
outside higher education. Influential models for compliance programs have been the U.S.
Sentencing Commission’s 1991 Sentencing Guidelines and COSO’s Internal Control-Integrated Framework. The Sentencing Guidelines’ seven compliance-program elements
are (a) standards and procedures, (b) oversight, (c) care in delegation and hiring, (d)
education, (e) monitoring, audit, and reporting systems, (f) response to violations; and (g)
corrective disciplinary action. The COSO framework includes (a) a control environment,
(b) risk assessment, (c) control activities, (d) information and communication, and (e)
monitoring.
The research on compliance programs outside higher education has shown that the
great majority of companies had ethics policies but that programmatic support of the
policies varied widely. Values-oriented compliance programs, cultural factors, and
program follow-through have been shown to be important.
Risk assessment has been used as an approach to compliance in higher education.
A study indicated that whereas 79% of the 450 responding presidents and chancellors saw
the value of having an institution-wide risk-management program, only 43% of the
schools actually had one. The University of Texas System, in particular, has described its
risk-assessment approach, in which work units have identified risks and prioritized them
on the basis of their magnitude of impact and probability of occurrence. Risks have been
compiled in risk areas, and critical institution-level risks have been identified.
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The authors of a University of Washington study described centralized compliance
and enterprise risk management as two models for compliance in higher education.
Centralized compliance addresses compliance risk only. Enterprise risk management
addresses financial, operational, strategic, and compliance risk. Two philosophical
approaches were also differentiated: control and collaboration. A control approach
emphasizes (a) structure, (b) accountability, (c) a separate compliance organization, and
(d) outside monitoring. A collaborative approach emphasizes (a) process and outcomes,
(b) integration into everyday management, (c) compliance committees, and (d) open
communication.
Chapter 3 is a description of the researcher’s design and methods, including
descriptions of the research site, informants, interview method, and data analysis methods.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD
Chapter 3 is a description of the design of the study and the researcher’s methods,
including descriptions of the (a) research site, (b) informants, (c) interview method, (d)
means of ensuring the trustworthiness of the data, (e) means of protecting the rights of the
informants, and (f) data analysis methods.
Design
The study was a cross-sectional, descriptive case study. Johnson (2001), in
classifying nonexperimental research, defined a descriptive case study as a study in
which the researcher’s primary objective is to describe a phenomenon and document its
characteristics. The design was cross-sectional in that the data were collected at a single
point in time. Patton (2006) noted that the gold standard for research designs should be
methodological appropriateness. In this case, a descriptive case study was considered
most appropriate because the use of risk management in athletics compliance was an
uncommon and possibly beneficial approach that had not been thoroughly documented.
The design of the study can also be considered a grounded theory design
(Maxwell, 2005). In studies with grounded theory designs, researchers collect qualitative
interview data and inductively identify categories or themes in the data. On the basis of
the interview data, the researcher develops a theory that conceptually explains a
particular process or set of interactions. Creswell (2002) observed,
Grounded theory designs are systematic, qualitative procedures that researchers
use to generate a theory that explains, at a broad conceptual level, a process,
action, or interaction about a substantive topic. The procedures for developing this
theory include collecting primarily interview data, developing and relating
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categories (or themes) of information, and composing a figure or visual that
portrays the theory. In this way, the theory is “grounded” in the data from
participants. (p. 60)
In the context of the case study research design, the researcher’s methods
included (a) selection of a research site, (b) identification of informants, (c) data
collection through interviews and review of documents, (d) ensuring the trustworthiness
of the data, (e) protection of the rights of informants, and (f) data analysis.
Research Site
The State University System3 was selected purposively as the research
environment on the basis of the extensiveness of its institution-wide risk management
program. The State University System has been active in describing its experiences in
risk management (for example, presenting at seminars and conferences).
Within the State University System, Carston State University (CSU) was selected
as the primary institution-level research site for four reasons:
1. Both the athletics director and the compliance officer at Carston State
University were on the State University System’s original Intercollegiate
Athletics High-Risk Working Group in 1998, which first applied riskmanagement concepts to athletics. Thus, both individuals had experienced the
full history of the effort.
2. Carston State University was a Division I school with a compliance staff of
one professional and one administrative assistant.
3. The athletics director at Carston State University had been active at the
national level in the NCAA. He had served on NCAA Peer Review Teams and
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had been active in the I-AAA Athletic Directors Association. Thus, he had
had experiences that gave him an awareness of the NCAA perspective on
compliance.
4. Athletics and risk management staff members at Carston State University
expressed an interest and willingness to participate in the study.
Informants
The study’s informants at Carston State University were (a) the president, (b) the
athletics director, (c) the institutional compliance officer, (d) a faculty member on the
Athletics Council, (e) the athletics compliance coordinator, (f) the senior woman
administrator, and (g) the head men’s basketball coach. To achieve triangulation,
interview data were also collected from informants at (a) the State University System’s
System-Wide Compliance Office, (b) the Mid-Central Conference, and (c) the NCAA
Enforcement office.
Staff members at the State University System-Wide Compliance Office, which
oversees compliance at all of the institutions in the State University System, were
interviewed for their perspectives on risk management in higher education, athletics
compliance risk, and the athletics compliance program at Carston State University. The
informants at the System-Wide Compliance Office were (a) the system-wide compliance
officer, (b) the assistant director of system-wide compliance, and (c) the system-wide
compliance supervisor.
The compliance director of the Mid-Central Conference (who conducted CSU’s
most recent NCAA external compliance review) served as an informant in order to
provide an outside perspective on CSU’s athletics compliance program.

96

Two members of the NCAA Enforcement staff served as informants in providing
the NCAA perspective on the use of risk assessment in athletics compliance.
Data Collection
Two kinds of data were collected: interview data and documents. Interviews were
primarily one to one and face to face, and varied from approximately one hour to two
hours in length. The interviews were conducted at three physical locations: (a) the
Carston State University campus, (b) the System-Wide Compliance Office, and (c)
NCAA headquarters (see Table 1). One interview was conducted jointly with two
informants. One interview was conducted by telephone. The interviews were semistructured in that questions varied on the basis of the particular role of the informant, the
content of the informant’s comments, and the researcher’s understanding at that point.
Nevertheless, the focus of all questions was on the process of risk assessment and the
perceived consequences of risk assessment on the compliance program and the
institution. The researcher used an Olympus DS-2200 digital audio recorder to record the
interviews. The digital interview files were then uploaded to a laptop computer.
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Table 1
The Informants, their Affiliations, and the Interview Method

Affiliation

Informant

Carston State University

University president

Face to face

Athletics director

Face to face

Institutional compliance officer

Face to face

Faculty member, Athletics Council

Face to face

Athletics compliance coordinator

Face to face

Athletics senior woman administrator

Face to face

Head men’s basketball coach

Face to face

State-Wide Compliance Office System-wide compliance officer

Interview method

Face to face

Asst. dir., system-wide compliance

Face to face

System-wide compliance supervisor

Face to face

Mid-Central Conference

Conference compliance director

Telephone

NCAA Enforcement

Two staff members (joint interview)

Face to face

A telephone interview was conducted with one informant who was not located at
the primary research site. The telephone interview was also audio-taped, and the
telephone interview was conducted in similar fashion to the face-to-face interviews.
E-mail was used for follow-up questions in several instances to clarify and amplify the
content of the interviews.
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Documents related to risk assessments and compliance plans were collected and
reviewed. The documents included risk-management and compliance documents from
both CSU and the State University System. A complete list of documents is included in
Appendix D.
Trustworthiness of the Data
In qualitative research, trustworthiness of the data is the parallel standard to
validity in quantitative research. The believability of the data was established through
triangulation, member checking, and auditing. Triangulation occurred at three levels. At
the institutional level, the views of the CSU president, athletics director, and institutional
compliance officer, as well as of other CSU informants, were compared. At the system
level, the views of the CSU informants were triangulated with the views of the State
University System compliance professionals and the Mid-Central Conference compliance
director. Finally, the views of the CSU, State University System, and Mid-Central
Conference informants were compared with those of the NCAA-enforcement staff
members. Member checking was conducted through debriefing with each informant
immediately following an interview. Auditing was achieved by maintaining an audit trail
of all interviews, documents, and notes.
Protecting the Rights of the Informants
All data have been reported anonymously. Pseudonyms have been used to protect
the institution’s and informants’ identities. The raw data, in the form of audio tapings,
were kept confidential and maintained securely by the researcher. The audio files were
uploaded to a personal computer following each interview. Once uploaded to the
computer, the audio files were erased from the recorder. The audio files were accessed
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only by the researcher and were password protected on the computer. All audio data were
destroyed upon completion of the dissertation defense. The subjects were informed of the
research results. The anonymity of the subjects and institution was maintained in all
reports.
Data Analysis
The recorded interviews were transcribed by the researcher. Lofland and Lofland
(1995) described researcher-transcribed interview data as follows:
The written record of the interview, then, is an amalgam of the following: (a)
summaries and notes of what the informant said generally at some point, (b)
verbatim transcription of responses that seem important at the point of the writeup, (c) field notes of relevant extra-interview encounters with the informant, (d)
personal emotional experiences, (e) methodological difficulties or successes, and
(f) ideas--little, tentative pieces of analysis. (p. 88)
The data were analyzed by coding and memoing. Notes and concepts were written
immediately after the interviews and again during the replay of the recorded interviews.
Glaser and Strauss (1967) referred to this as the constant comparison method. Codes are
“labels that classify items of information as pertinent to a topic, question, answer, or
whatever” (Lofland & Lofland, 1995). Memos are “the written-out counterparts or
explanations and elaborations of the coding categories” (Lofland & Lofland, 1995, p.
193). Strauss and Corbin (1990) maintained,
Writing theoretical memos is an integral part of doing grounded theory. Since the
analyst cannot readily keep track of all the categories, properties, hypotheses, and
generative questions that evolve from the analytical process, there must be a
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system for doing so. The use of memos constitutes such a system. Memos are not
simply “ideas.” They are involved in the formulation and revision of theory
during the research process. (p. 10)
Concept charting was also used to visualize and organize ideas, possible themes,
and informants’ comments. Items were written on post-it notes and arranged on a wallsize sheet of paper. Lofland and Lofland (1995) described concept charting as follows:
A . . . strategy of visualizing and, therefore, of developing analysis is to arrange
all one’s working elements on a single sheet of paper, often a very large piece of
paper, for the purpose of more clearly envisioning the relations among the
elements. (p. 198)
Computer assisted, qualitative data analysis software was not used. Through use
of the two theoretical frameworks as conceptual lenses, coding, memoing, and concept
charting were found to be sufficiently powerful techniques for identifying themes in the
data.
In addition to the analysis of interview data, documents related to Carston State
University’s athletics compliance risk assessments and compliance plans were reviewed
and analyzed as evidence of the risk-assessment process and its influences.
Chapter 4 is a presentation of the data and the key themes arising from the data,
including (a) a description of the research site’s compliance-related organization, (b) a
presentation of its risk-based compliance process, and (c) the key themes that were
identified in the interview data, with supporting excerpts.

101

CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA
The data are presented in four parts. The first part is an overview of the research
site. The second part shows the compliance-related organization, as described by the
informants and visualized by the researcher. The third part contains the key themes that
were identified through analysis of the interview data, as well as samples of supporting
interview data. The fourth part is a description of the risk-based compliance process, as
conceptualized by the researcher, which connects the themes to the compliance operation.
Overview
The State University System is a system of public universities, including Carston
State University.4 The State University System has a coordinated compliance program in
which each institution in the system operates an institution-wide compliance program. At
each institution, risks are identified, prioritized, and combined to list the top risks faced
by the institution. Risk management plans that include policies, procedures, training, and
monitoring are then developed.
Overview of the State University System
The State University System is composed of several public universities. Some of
the universities also have associated medical facilities. A number of high-profile
compliance problems in various functions and institutions in the 1990s led the system
chancellor and board of regents to mandate a system-wide compliance effort. Institutionwide compliance programs have since been implemented at all of the institutions in its
system. A state-wide compliance office provides compliance oversight, training, and
auditing. Each institution has an institutional compliance officer.

102

Overview of Carston State University
Carston State University (CSU) is one of the institutions in the State University
System. Carston State University is a large, public, coeducational university. As of Fall
2005, the university had more than 19,000 undergraduate students and more than 5,000
graduate students. The university offers about 80 baccalaureate, 70 master’s, and 30
doctoral degrees. It has ten colleges, including business, education, engineering, liberal
arts, nursing, science, and social work. It has a faculty of about 1,500 and about 3,500
other staff. Its 2005 operating budget was more than $300 million with about $50 million
in research and sponsored activity. It has a racially mixed student body that includes
about 10% international students.
Carston State University has 14 NCAA Division I teams and is considered a
Division I-AAA (no football) school. It is a member of the Mid-Central Conference. Its
men’s sports include baseball, basketball, cross country, golf, tennis, and indoor and
outdoor track. Its women’s sports include basketball, cross country, softball, tennis,
indoor and outdoor track, and volleyball.
Carston State University has an athletics compliance staff of one compliance
professional and one full-time administrative assistant. Thus, it can be considered similar
in scope to many mid-major Division I-A (football) schools, Division I-AA (football)
schools, and other Division I-AAA schools.
The Compliance Organization
The compliance organization can be understood through consideration of (a) the
State University System’s organization, (b) Carston State University’s institutional
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compliance organization, and (c) Carston State University’s athletics compliance
organization. At all three levels, both departments (or offices) and committees exist.
The State University System’s Compliance Organization
The State University System compliance-related organization includes (a) the
System-Wide Compliance Office, which provides oversight of compliance at all
institutions in the System; (b) the network of institutional compliance officers, each
located at an institution in the system; and (c) high-risk working groups, which are interinstitutional task groups focused on particular high-risk areas.
The System-Wide Compliance Office
The System-Wide Compliance Office coordinates the state-wide operation of
institutional compliance programs at the individual institutions in the system.
The role of the System-Wide Compliance Office. The System-Wide Compliance
Office provides oversight of the institutional compliance programs at each of the
institutions in the system. Its staff includes the system-wide compliance officer, an
assistant director, and a compliance supervisor. The staff receives and reviews annual risk
assessments from each of the institutions. The staff organizes the peer-review system in
which compliance professionals review the compliance programs at each other’s
institutions. The staff also conducts its own reviews and audits, provides compliance
training and resources, and compiles and shares best practices.
Craig5 (system-wide compliance supervisor) stated,
This office provides primarily best practice sharing; we facilitate peer reviews
across the institutions; the sharing of best practices and communications is one of
the main things we do in this office.
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The State University System has a single board of regents governing its
universities and medical centers. The system-wide compliance officer is responsible for
apprising the System’s chancellor and board of regents of the status and activities of
institutional compliance throughout the system.
Institutional compliance officers. Each institution has an institutional compliance
officer. The System-Wide Compliance Office communicates regularly with the
institutional compliance officers. The institutional compliance officers are responsible for
sending risk assessments and risk-management plans to the System-Wide Compliance
Office.
Initial institutional high-risk areas. The State University System initially
identified ten high-risk areas at the institutional level:
1. Asset management risks included physical and financial assets not being
safeguarded.
2. Clinical billing risks (for universities with hospitals) included medical billing
not appropriately documented and coded.
3. Endowments risks included nonadherence to the terms of endowment
agreements.
4. Environmental health and safety risks included improper use and handling of
dangerous materials, lab safety issues, and fire safety issues.
5. Human resources risks included nonadherence to applicable rules, regulations,
and laws (including equal opportunity and affirmative action, leave
administration, and fair hiring practices).
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6. Information resources and security risks included failure of systems integrity,
continuity, and availability; nonadherence to security regulations; and
insufficient external access.
7. Intercollegiate athletics risks included nonadherence to NCAA rules and
regulations, as well as other athletics-related risks.
8. Research risks included research not conducted in accordance with approved
protocol or federal regulations.
9. Contract administration and effort reporting risks included improper effort
reporting on federal grants, as well as unallowable costs.
10. Privacy risks included improper disclosure of private, sensitive, or protected
information related to HIPAA,6 FERPA,7 and Graham-Leach-Bliley.8
The initial high-risk working groups. During its initial implementation of
institution-wide risk management, the State University System established 13 high-risk
working groups, one of which was the Intercollegiate Athletics High-Risk Working
Group. The 12 other high-risk working groups at the State University System level were
(a) basic research; (b) campus security; (c) clinical research; (d) conflicts of interest; (e)
endowments; (f) environmental, health, and safety; (g) fiscal management; (h) HIPAA;
(i) human resources; (j) information technology; (k) medical billing; and (l) student
financial aid.
These high-risk working groups provided guidance to the institutions on
compliance in particular risk areas. The members of each working group were experts
from the various institutions. These ad hoc committees developed risk-area-specific
monitoring, training, and reporting plans that could be used as templates by all
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institutions in the System. In addition, the risk-management plans served as frameworks
with which the System-Wide Compliance Office could audit the institutions.
The Intercollegiate Athletics High-Risk Working Group
The Intercollegiate Athletics High-Risk Working Group was charged with
developing (a) a communication network among athletic compliance directors, (b) a
common set of athletics-related high-risk areas, (c) monitoring plans, and (d) a
specialized training plan.
The Intercollegiate Athletics High-Risk Working Group was composed of two
athletics directors, five athletics compliance professionals, and an internal auditor. They
represented five universities in the system.
Fourteen high-risk areas. The Intercollegiate Athletics High-Risk Working Group
identified 14 high-risk areas in four categories (see Table 2). In the category of
Institutional Control, the high-risk areas were (a) rules education and (b) infractions. In
the category of Departmental Management, the high-risk areas were (c) athletic
department certification and annual audit, (d) fiscal management, and (e) the
conference’s operating code. In the category of Student-Athlete Management, the highrisk areas were (f) recruiting, (g) student eligibility, (h) financial aid, (i) extra benefits, (j)
gender equity, and (k) student welfare. In the category of Third-Party Management, the
high-risk areas were (l) sport camps, (m) facilities safety, and (n) inclement weather.
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Table 2
Fourteen High-Risk Areas in Athletics, as Initially Identified by the State University
System’s Intercollegiate High-Risk Working Group

Category

High-risk area

Institutional control

Rules education
Infractions

Departmental management

Athletics department certification and annual audit
Fiscal management
Conference’s operating code

Student-athlete management

Recruiting
Student eligibility
Financial aid
Extra benefits
Gender equity
Student welfare

Third-party management

Sport camps
Facilities safety
Inclement weather
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Seventy-four specific risks. The working-group members then identified 74
specific risks within the 14 high-risk areas, which they rated as high impact (if they
occurred) and as high or medium probability (likelihood of occurrence). (See Appendix E
for a complete list of the 74 specific risks.) For example, a specific risk in the high-risk
area of student eligibility was inadequate documentation of yearly Student-Athlete
Statement and Drug Consent Form.
Three levels of controls. The working group then developed monitoring plans for
the 74 specific high risks (see Appendix F for a sample of the risk-monitoring-plan
format). The working-group members defined three levels of controls in the monitoring
plans: (a) operating controls, (b) supervisory controls, and (c) oversight controls.
Operating controls were procedures applied by operating staff during every transaction in
a process to ensure compliance with rules governing the process (for example,
segregation of duties and reconciliations). Supervisory controls were procedures
performed immediately afterward by first-line managers on a sample of completed
transactions to ensure that operating controls had been applied. Oversight controls were
procedures applied by senior managers soon afterward on completed transactions to
ensure that operating or supervisory controls had been applied (for example, status
reports, exception reports, and budgeted versus actual comparisons).
For the specific risk of inadequate documentation of yearly Student-Athlete
Statement and Drug Consent Form, the operating control was an initial team meeting in
which all student-athletes completed the required forms (the evidence of control was the
signed and dated NCAA forms). The supervisory control was the Director of
Compliance’s reviewing 100% of the signed NCAA forms and matching the signed
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forms to team rosters (the evidence of control was the Eligibility Grid and the Squad
List). The oversight control was the selection of a sample of student-athletes from the
Squad List and verification that the NCAA forms had been completed (the evidence of
control was a quarterly memorandum detailing the results of the oversight controls sent to
the athletics director, athletics compliance office, and institutional compliance office).
The basic premise of the three levels of controls was that no additional assurance
would be gained from someone checking his or her own work. No matter who performs
the operating controls, someone else needs to perform the supervisory and oversight
controls.
Two lessons of the Working Group. The Intercollegiate Athletics High-Risk
Working Group reported two lessons learned during its development of the monitoring
plans. The first lesson was that oversight controls could be performed by a variety of
individuals (such as the athletics director, the compliance coordinator, the faculty athletic
representative, members of a compliance committee, or the internal audit department),
depending on the resources of the institution. The second lesson was that monitoring
information was not consistently being submitted to athletic directors (who were defined
as the responsible parties9) or to the institutional compliance committees. This was
deemed critical so that the responsible party was aware of instances of noncompliance
and could administer corrective action.
CSU’s Institutional Compliance Organization
The compliance-related organization at Carston State University includes (a) the
Institutional Compliance Office, (b) the Institutional Compliance Executive Committee,
and (c) a number of compliance committees.
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CSU’s Institutional Compliance Office
The Institutional Compliance Office includes Institutional Compliance and
Internal Audit. The office assists work units and high-risk areas in identifying and
prioritizing risks and in designing compliance monitoring plans and training plans. The
office also maintains the compliance training program. The staff of the Institutional
Compliance Office includes the institutional compliance officer and a director of
institutional compliance, as well as an internal audit group.
The responsibilities of the institutional compliance officer. The institutional
compliance officer’s responsibilities are to (a) make compliance part of everyday life at
the institution, (b) monitor compliance program activities, and (c) communicate with the
president regarding compliance.
Making compliance part of everyday life involves (a) communication for
awareness, (b) creating a risk-based plan and compliance manual, (c) providing training,
(d) creating monitoring plans and assurance processes, (e) setting up a confidential
reporting mechanism, and (f) creating reporting procedures. Monitoring includes the
monitoring of (a) training, (b) risk assessment, (c) monitoring plans, (d) responses to
instances of noncompliance, and (e) the confidential-reporting mechanism.
Communication with the president includes (a) instances of noncompliance that require
executive action, (b) the risk-based plan, (c) monitoring activities, (d) compliance
committee meeting minutes, and (e) the compliance program self-assessment.
Auditing athletics compliance. Once a year the audit group in the Institutional
Compliance Office audits one of the athletics program’s top three risk areas.
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Jack (athletics director):
We have three areas that we have Susan look at every three years. It’s an
opportunity to have a second set of eyes on those three high-risk areas.
CSU’s Institutional Compliance Executive Committee
The Institutional Compliance Executive Committee provides oversight for CSU’s
institutional compliance program. The role of the Committee is to provide seniorexecutive-level decision making for the compliance program. Its responsibilities are to (a)
provide guidance and direction on policy, (b) allocate resources, and (c) ensure that
appropriate action is taken on instances of noncompliance.
CSU’s Compliance Committees
Compliance committees (subcommittees of the Institutional Compliance
Executive Committee) were formed for each of the high-risk areas at Carston State
University. The purpose of the compliance committees was to (a) identify, prioritize, and
report specific risks in their respective risk areas; (b) review the associated riskmanagement plans designed to mitigate the identified risks; and (c) monitor the evidence
of controls.
The 10 initial compliance committees at Carston State University addressed (a)
research; (b) academic affairs; (c) environmental health and safety; (d) human resources;
(e) taxes and tax issues; (f) financial accounting, contracting, purchasing, and associated
reporting; (g) student affairs; (h) intercollegiate athletics; (i) campus security and crime
control; and (j) endowments and fund raising. Carston State currently has seven high-risk
areas: (a) research, (b) accounting and business services, (c) endowments, (d)
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intercollegiate athletics, (e) information technology, (f) environmental safety, and (g)
physical plant.
CSU’s Athletics Compliance Organization
The athletics compliance-related organization includes (a) the Athletics Council,
(b) its main subcommittees, and (c) the Athletics Department (see Figure 6).
CSU’s Athletics Council
CSU’s Athletics Council originally had 12 members. The Athletics Council and
an Intercollegiate Athletics Compliance Committee existed separately. The Athletics
Council and the Intercollegiate Athletics Compliance Committee were then combined to
form a single committee (using the name Athletics Council) that provided guidance and
review on athletics risks and athletics compliance.
Jack (athletics director):
We came up with this concept to empower them to do something and have them
in charge of monitoring our department.
Normally they work in pairs or threes. We have a couple of groups that do
monitoring on eligibility. They check Richard’s [athletics compliance
coordinator] records to be sure everything is correct.
The members of the Athletics Council are (a) the athletics director (co-chair) (b)
the faculty athletics representative (co-chair), (c) six faculty members, (d) two studentathletes, (e) a student (the student body president), (f) the associate provost, (g) the
registrar, (h) the director of scholarships, (i) the admissions counselor for international
students, (j) an admissions-transcript evaluator, (k) the assistant director for student
health services, (l) the assistant vice-president for management services, (m) the
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university financial reports manager, (n) the senior woman administrator, (o) the
associate athletics director for finance and administration, (p) the athletics academics
coordinator, and (q) the athletics compliance coordinator.
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Figure 6. CSU’s compliance-related organizational structure as observed and drawn by
the researcher, on the basis of interviews. The structure shows the organizational
relationships of CSU’s (a) Institutional Compliance Executive Committee, (b) Athletics
Council and its subcommittees, (c) Athletics Department, and (d) Institutional
Compliance Office. The organizational structure also shows the System-Wide

114

Compliance Office and its Intercollegiate Athletics High-Risk Working Group at the
State University System level.
CSU’s Athletics Council Subcommittees
The Athletics Council has three main subcommittees: (a) the Governance and
Commitment to Rules Compliance subcommittee, (b) the Academic Integrity
subcommittee, and (c) the Equity and Student-Athlete Welfare subcommittee. The
subcommittees correspond to the NCAA’s Operating Principles, which are the basis on
which each institution must be certified by the NCAA every ten years.
The Governance and Commitment to Rules Compliance subcommittee. The
responsibilities of the Governance and Commitment to Rules Compliance subcommittee
are to (a) monitor certification of student-athletes; (b) monitor recruiting records; (c)
review playing and practice records; (d) review the rules education of coaches, studentathletes, and boosters; (e) review reports of rules violations and approve plans for
preventing future violations; and (f) review efforts related to relevant NCAA operating
principles. The subcommittee is responsible for NCAA Operating Principle 1.1
(institutional control, presidential authority, and shared responsibilities) and Operating
Principle 1.2 (rules compliance).
The members of the subcommittee are (a) two faculty members, (b) the
admissions-transcript evaluator, (c) the registrar, (d) the athletics compliance officer, and
(e) the director of scholarships.
The Academic Integrity subcommittee. The responsibilities of the Academic
Integrity subcommittee are to (a) monitor student absences due to team scheduling, (b)
monitor sports scheduling, (c) recommend institutional and departmental policies
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regarding university-excused absences, (d) monitor athletics graduation rates by sport, (e)
monitor the admission of student-athletes, (f) monitor grade point averages by sport, (g)
monitor academic support services, and (h) review efforts related to relevant NCAA
operating principles. The subcommittee is responsible for NCAA Operating Principle 2.1
(academic standards) and Operating Principle 2.2 (academic support).
The members of the subcommittee are (a) a student-athlete, (b) three faculty
members, (c) the faculty athletics representative, (d) the associate provost, and (e) the
athletics compliance officer.
The Equity and Student-Athlete Welfare subcommittee. The responsibilities of the
Equity and Student-Athlete Welfare subcommittee are to (a) conduct exit interviews, (b)
monitor the ratio of minorities in each sport, (c) review Student-Athlete Advisory
Committee meeting minutes and concerns and respond as appropriate, (d) analyze the
gender and ethnic makeup of the athletics department staff, (e) monitor the sportsmanship
and ethical conduct of students and staff during athletic competition, and (f) review
efforts related to relevant NCAA operating principles. The subcommittee is responsible
for NCAA Operating Principle 3.1 (gender issues), Operating Principle 3.2 (minority
issues), and Operating Principle 3.3 (student-athlete welfare).
The members of the subcommittee are (a) the athletics director, (b) the senior
woman administrator, (c) the athletics academics coordinator, (d) the admissions
counselor for international students, (e) the student body president, (f) a student-athlete,
(g) the assistant director for student health services, (h) the assistant vice-president for
management services, (i) and the associate athletics director for finance and
administration.
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Two other subcommittees. Two other subcommittees exist but are not currently
active: the Executive subcommittee and the Fiscal Integrity subcommittee. The
responsibilities of the Executive subcommittee were to (a) act on compliance matters
between Athletics Council meetings as necessary, and (b) act on sensitive matters not
appropriate for the full committee. (The policy of the previous administration had been
avoidance of discussion of compliance issues in the presence of student-athletes or
students. The current administration has the opposite philosophy, and students are
currently included in all compliance-related discussions.)
The Fiscal Integrity subcommittee was formed when fiscal integrity was assessed
as part of the every-ten-years certification. Fiscal integrity is no longer evaluated as part
of certification but instead is audited annually as required by the NCAA. Nonetheless,
Carston State has maintained the Fiscal Integrity subcommittee as an existing although
not regularly active body and can use its services as needed.
CSU’s Athletics Department
The athletics director is named as the responsible party for all athletics-related
risks. The athletics director reports to the president and is the co-chair (with the faculty
athletics representative) of the Athletics Council. Each year the athletics director submits
the Athletics Council’s prioritized list of risks to the Institutional Compliance Office. The
athletics director receives risk-monitoring reviews by the Athletics Council
subcommittees as well as audits by the Institutional Compliance Office.
The athletics compliance coordinator performs normal athletics-compliance duties
and also facilitates and participates in athletics risk-management plans. The athletics-
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compliance coordinator conducts periodic in-service training for Athletics Council
members so that the council members can monitor compliance processes.
Three other athletics department staff members serve on the Athletics Council: (a)
the senior woman administrator, (b) the associate athletics director for finance and
administration, and (c) the athletics academics coordinator. Although athletics
department members serve on various Athletics Council subcommittees, they do not
participate in compliance audits.
Themes in the Interview Data Related to Each Research Question
Twenty-two themes were identified from the 12 interviews conducted and the 17
types of documents reviewed. These themes were distinct patterns in the interview data
that were vivid and distinct to the researcher. The themes were derived by coding the
transcribed data, memoing (writing notes after the interviews and during transcription),
and concept charting (physically visualizing the ideas and notes). Descriptions of each
theme and supporting interview data, organized by research question, follow.
Incorporating Risk Assessment into Athletics Compliance
Research Question 1 was What are the specific methods and steps of
incorporating risk assessment into athletics compliance? The following themes were
identified as related to incorporating risk assessment into athletics compliance.
1. Athletics compliance was embedded in CSU’s institutional compliance program.
At Carston State, athletics compliance was part of an institution-wide compliance
effort that addressed all risk areas. Athletics, together with other risk-facing departments
and areas, followed an institution-wide process of (a) forming a compliance committee;
(b) identifying, prioritizing, and reporting risks; (c) developing plans for managing the
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risks; and (d) assuring that the plans were in effect. CSU’s Institutional Compliance
Office (a) deployed a common framework and vocabulary of risks and risk management,
(b) monitored the risk management activities of Athletics (and all areas), (c) produced an
institution-wide list of prioritized risks, and (d) reported risks and risk-management
activities to the president. Far from being a private, internally managed staff function of
the Athletics department, athletics compliance was a public process with university-wide
participation that followed a consistent set of risk-management principles and fit into a
university-wide effort to safeguard the institution.
Susan (institutional compliance officer):
Overall, the compliance program has been positive. We’ve done culture shifts
over the last eight years. . . . I don’t think we’re there, yet.
Craig (system-wide compliance supervisor):
Think about what would keep your boss out of jail, and that’s a part of it, but what
keeps you from achieving your mission and the objectives of your institution?
2. Risks management in compliance had commitment at the top.
At CSU, the president was involved in, and knowledgeable about, the riskmanagement process. It did not appear, for example, that compliance practitioners in
Athletics, at CSU, and at the System level were talking only to each other without
executive attention. The president was involved in seeing risk plans, talking to the
Institutional Compliance Executive Committee, talking to the athletics director, and
talking to the coaches about compliance. It seemed clear that executive commitment to
risk-management in compliance was needed at CSU and was provided.
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Dr. Winthrop (university president):
I do think it is important just to let people know that we are totally committed to
compliance and following NCAA regulations, and that . . . it’s not just their job,
it’s my job, it’s the athletics director’s job, that we’re all expected to take these
regulations very seriously and that less than our best efforts won’t be tolerated.
I think it requires first of all a commitment on the part of the president of
the university to make compliance a priority, a priority for him or her as well as
the institution and not to delegate that to someone else.
Craig (system-wide compliance supervisor):
The key, arguably the most important of all in an effective compliance program,
is the tone at the top, approval from the top, that this is a valuable exercise.
Otherwise it’s not going to happen. Absolutely will not happen.
William (system-wide compliance supervisor):
It’s a matter of education and the tone at the top. We work very hard with our
board and president to set the right example in this process. It starts at the board
and it goes all the way down to the coaches.
3. The university adopted a standard language of risk.
Carston State established a common vocabulary of compliance and risk terms and
a taxonomy of risk-related concepts and actions. The Athletics department, Institutional
Compliance Office, and compliance-related committees and subcommittees shared a
common language and mindset about risk. This common language transcended the
terminology used in specific regulatory areas, such as the NCAA rules or Title IX law,
and allowed athletics-related risks to be considered holistically. These terms included
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language such as (a) compliance, (b) risk, (c) high-risk area, (d) specific risk, (e) risk
assessment, (f) self-assessment, (g) potential impact, (h) probability of occurrence, (i)
risk prioritization, (j) A risk, (k) B risk, (l) risk management, (m) risk mitigation, (n)
responsible party, (o) operating controls, (p) supervisory controls, (q) oversight controls,
(r) monitoring, (s) noncompliance, (t) corrective action, (u) risk assurance, (v) risk
reporting, (w) audit, and (x) peer review.
Julie (senior woman administrator):
As a group we decide what should be an A or B category.
William (system-wide compliance officer):
We do individual risk assessments for all the areas and then we bring them
forward and then we develop a university-wide risk assessment. And so we end
up with somewhere around 50 or so university-wide risks. And by looking at it
that way, you can say, where do I want to put my resources university wide? How
many do I want in athletics compliance? How many do I want in environmental
protection? How many do I want in research compliance? So you have a rational
way to allocate those limited resources.
When we started . . . we were all by ourselves, and we were speaking a
lingo that was foreign in higher ed.
4. Risks were identified by scanning CSU’s specific environment.
The value of risk assessment appeared to depend on being continuously aware of
events and changes in CSU’s particular environment. Rules change each year, both
through changes to existing rules and the addition of new rules. (Academic Progress
Rate, or APR, is a good example of a new set of NCAA rules with major competitive and
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reputational risks.) Incidents that point out new risks may occur at other schools. The mix
of student-athletes, including new international students or transfer students, may change,
with implications for possible violations. The sudden success of a team may create new
risks. Doing a risk assessment one time and locking in those initially identified risks was
mentioned as a pitfall to avoid.
Pamela (assistant director, system-wide compliance):
There was one of the national championship rings [from another institution] on
eBay. The NCAA rule is that a current student-athlete can’t benefit . . . so here is
an obscure little rule related to the ability to sell a ring . . . you can’t monitor the
whole book, you have to bring it down to a level. It helps illustrate, with athletics,
that the complexity of that manual adds to the complexity of the risk assessment.
Because normally winning a ring for a championship, that would not fall high on
your risk assessment . . . that’s why you can’t do a risk assessment once and be
done.
Craig (system-wide compliance supervisor):
You’ve got to take some risks. You try to control the biggest ones, but not the
lowest ones. That’s why you also have to continuously renew and find out what
are the additional risks associated with this, and what are the consequences if this
risk were to happen.
Institutions have to make calls about what is a high risk, medium risk, low
risk. Things change. They have to constantly be aware of the changing
environment. And what are the responsibilities of the institution and the emerging
trends at large.
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Discussion of CSU’s compliance risks raised the point that different schools face
different risks. Several informants noted that Division I-A power schools face certain
risks (such as boosters providing cars or no-show jobs to star athletes) that mid-major
Division I-A and Division I schools do not realistically face. The informants also saw the
NCAA as focused on enforcing the rules rather than suggesting the most practical and
efficient means of complying with the rules. Richard, the athletics compliance
coordinator, stated that “the way they [NCAA] have enforced compliance is by
penalizing after the fact rather than preparing you before the fact. And I think that has
always been the case.” The sheer number of rules in the NCAA Division I Manual (in the
thousands) caused concern. Craig, the system-wide compliance supervisor, stated, “The
NCAA has an unbelievable amount of rules. I would be very concerned if we weren’t
doing risk assessment.”
Dr. Winthrop (university president):
Any time you’re in the business of awarding athletics scholarships and trying to
be in full compliance with NCAA regulations, which are very detailed and
specific, it requires a lot of attention.
Susan (institutional compliance officer):
I’ve always told Jack, “You know, you can’t monitor a manual.” You have to pick
something in the manual that you think is a high risk. You can’t possibly monitor
the whole thing. The manual is this thick [gesture].
Pat (conference compliance director):
I’m working with a school right now that is going before the Committee on
Infractions with the NCAA, and it is tough for our level of schools when their
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overall athletics budget is 4 million, and not the 20 or 30 million that the
Committee on Infractions is used to. So . . . you’re trying to prioritize areas that
are fertile for violations.
Pamela (assistant director, system-wide compliance):
I think they [the NCAA] recognize that you can’t, I mean, look at the book, it’s
six inches!
Craig (system-wide compliance supervisor):
The NCAA, because the complexities are so far out there . . . is it acceptable to
say, “I understand there is a risk, but we’re going to choose to not do anything
about it?” That is something we do, whether knowingly or unknowingly, we do
that all the time across all areas. And I don’t think that is a bad thing. We have to
make very crisp judgments and understand very clearly that if a risk happens,
there is a consequence.
5. All types of athletics-related risks were considered.
At Carston State, a holistic approach to athletics risks was taken. Athletics risks
identified at the institution included rules-compliance risks and also (a) NCAA
certification risks, (b) fiscal-management risks, (c) gender-equity risks, (d) travel-safety
risks, (e) facilities-safety risks, and (f) inclement-weather risks. Of the 74 specific
athletics risks identified by the State University System’s Intercollegiate Athletics HighRisk Working Group, (a) 49 specific risks (66%) were related to NCAA rules; (b) 8
specific risks (11%) were related to gender equity, certification, and conference rules; (c)
6 specific risks (8%) were related to student-athlete welfare, safety, and health; (d) 6
specific risks (8%) were related to facilities safety and inclement weather; and (e) 5
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specific risks (7%) were related to fiscal management. In the traditional mindset of
athletics compliance, the athletics-compliance coordinator focuses only on NCAA rules
compliance. Other athletics-related risks, even gender equity, are not traditionally
considered part of the athletics-compliance coordinator’s purview. Carston State’s
holistic approach to athletics risk prevented separate silos of compliance efforts and made
the full array of athletics risks apparent.
Jack (athletics director):
Initially, one area that was really high risk to us was transportation issues.
Because that particular year [another university in the system] had an accident
that killed a couple of kids. We created some new policy on team travel.
6. A single, active athletics-compliance committee was established.
Carston State’s Intercollegiate Athletics Compliance Committee (now called the
Athletics Council) is the single athletics-related compliance committee. Initially, an
athletics council existed separately from the athletics-compliance committee, but the two
committees were combined and called the Athletics Council. Through its subcommittees,
the Athletics Council addresses the broad spectrum of athletics issues, including
academic integrity, gender equity, and student-athlete welfare issues, as well as rules
compliance. The Athletics Council’s membership represents broad participation from the
university and includes (a) faculty members; (b) the faculty athletics representative; (c)
student-athletes; (d) administrators representing academics, finance, admissions,
scholarships, and health; and (e) athletics administrators.
Significantly, rather than serving in a purely advisory capacity, the Athletics
Council members, through their participation in subcommittees, engage in actual
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reviewing and monitoring of compliance-related logs, reports, and statistics. Their work
is considered part of the risk-assurance process. In other words, committee members do
real work related to compliance.
Dr. Burns (faculty member on the Athletics Council):
I’ve checked out the coaches’ logs, we’ve looked at bills, records, the signing of
the forms. I do it once a year, and someone else does it once a year, and other
members of the committee check other things once a year, probably half a dozen
or so [checks] a year.
7. Compliance and certification activities were combined and aligned.
Rather than treating athletics compliance and athletics certification as separate
activities, Carston State combined and aligned these activities, considering the
certification process as a part of its risk-assurance process.
The NCAA requires each institution to be certified every ten years. The
certification process involves a certification self-study by the institution and outside
review by a certification review team. Certification focuses on three areas (which
correspond to NCAA Operating Principles): (a) governance and commitment to rules
compliance, (b) academic integrity, and (c) equity and student-athlete welfare.
Institutions undergoing the certification process are expected to form committees in these
three areas, review the institution’s relevant progress, report the status in the self-study,
and assist the outside review team in its review.
Even though certification occurs only once every ten years, Carston State formed
permanent Athletics Council subcommittees in the three certification areas. Thus, (a)
ongoing risk-assessment, management, and assurance activities occur in areas that are in
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natural alignment with NCAA operating principles; (b) self-study is an ongoing process;
and (c) the certification experience is used as outside review for risk assurance.
The Influence of Risk Assessment on the Compliance Function
Research Question 2 was What influence does a risk assessment experience have
on a compliance function’s priorities, processes, and resource allocations? The
following themes were identified as related to the influence of risk assessment on the
compliance function.
8. The methodologies of risk management and athletics compliance had to be reconciled.
Risk management is not, on its face, intuitively compatible with athletics
compliance. Risk management typically starts at a high, conceptual level. Categories of
risks, then high-risk areas, and then, specific risks are identified. Having started at such a
high level, even a specific compliance risk can still be above the level of a specific
NCAA rule. The nature of this process can be of concern to athletics-compliance
practitioners. A practitioner knows that infractions are not defined in broad areas;
infractions occur in regard to very specific rules. For example, during risk assessment,
student-athlete eligibility might be identified as a high-risk area, with a number of
specific risks identified below it. However, a compliance practitioner knows that there are
51 pages in the NCAA Division I Manual on student-athlete eligibility, containing 12
sections and hundreds of individual, highly specific rules. (For example, Bylaw 14.4.3.1
states that “[e]ligibility for competition shall be determined based on satisfactory
completion of at least: (a) Twenty-four-semester or 36-quarter hours of academic credit
prior to start of the student-athlete's second year of collegiate enrollment (i.e., third
semester, fourth quarter); (b) Eighteen-semester or 27-quarter hours of academic credit
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since the beginning of the previous fall term or since the beginning of the certifying
institution's preceding regular two semesters or three quarters (hours earned during the
summer may not be used to fulfill this requirement); and (c) Six-semester or six-quarter
hours of academic credit the preceding regular academic term (e.g., fall semester, winter
quarter) in which the student-athlete has been enrolled full time at any collegiate
institution.”)
Understandably, an athletics-compliance coordinator can perceive that risk
assessment may be useful in meeting the institution’s needs for a bird’s-eye view of risks
but is not useful at the rule level. The separate methodologies of risk management and
athletics compliance have to be joined and resolved. To be useful to the compliance
practitioner, risk assessment must be positioned as (a) a means of prioritizing areas of
attention and allocating resources, (b) as a vehicle for communicating openly about risk
exposure, (c) as a protocol for planning levels of controls, and (d) as an opportunity for
obtaining outside monitoring assistance but not as a substitute for detailed rules
knowledge or specific, rule-level compliance procedures.
Richard (athletics compliance coordinator):
I didn’t feel it was specific to what I did. They were looking at the big picture
rather than the details and specifics that I needed. I’m not against it, and I think it
needed to be done because I think what they have avoided is some disastrous
things, but I’m more concerned about the little things, the little details that are
easily overlooked.
The mechanics of risk management can be a double-edged sword. The power of
risk management is in its rigorous methodology, such as (a) identifying, rating, and
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prioritizing risks; (b) reporting consistently and regularly; (c) identifying individual
responsible parties; and (c) establishing multiple levels of controls. The methodology
involves forms and reports, specific vocabulary, and uniformity of effort across risk areas
and work units. However, it can also appear to be red tape, that is, bureaucratic
requirements that meet the needs of the administration rather than tools that help the
compliance effort at the ground level.
Pamela (assistant director, system-wide compliance):
The other challenge is keeping them up to date, because it is a lot of work to do a
comprehensive risk assessment. It takes a long time. And higher education is so
decentralized that once you’ve identified the risk, making sure all the monitoring
plans are in place and the training is a challenge.
9. Risk assessment highlighted the challenge of covering all rules.
The concept of risk assessment raises the notion that some risks need more
attention than others and that all rules cannot be equally covered. Schools are different,
and their risks are different. Some of the factors that make it impossible to cover all rules
equally are (a) the differences among schools in terms of size, athletics budget, and level
of competitiveness; (b) the size of the compliance staffs at different schools; (c) the effort
involved in covering a rule in terms of procedures, education, and monitoring; and
finally, (d) the huge number of NCAA rules. Athletics-compliance professionals are
typically not in the habit of admitting that everything isn’t covered. However, when the
topic of risk assessment is raised, compliance practitioners readily admit that everything
cannot be covered.
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Richard (athletics-compliance coordinator):
I think people that say they don’t do that same thing are not honest. I know our
coaches are trying to go by the rules, so I don’t take a stopwatch to practice. . .
But there are only so many hours and so much one person can do to monitor every
single rule in that book, so I think it is just natural that everyone spends more time
on those that are most serious. And I don’t think it is humanly possible unless you
have a staff of 10 people to do it all.
William (system-wide compliance officer):
How in the world do we get our arms around this two-foot manual, and where do
we put our entire resources? To my knowledge, the NCAA and conference have a
rule book, and they say you must comply with all the rules, but they haven’t really
helped you develop a process to do all of that.
Dan (NCAA Enforcement staff member):
We often hear, from an attorney who is representing a coach, for instance, that
“I’m a Harvard Law School graduate and have been practicing law for 30 years,
and I can’t understand this manual.” I’ve heard frustration with the size of the
manual and the difficulty of understanding the rules.
John (NCAA Enforcement staff member):
From the NCAA’s perspective, it’s the institution’s responsibility to monitor their
program, but it unfortunately gets put on one person’s responsibility in
compliance. So, if the institution doesn’t devote enough resources to do that, it
doesn’t get the institution off the hook. But from an individual standpoint, you
hear expressed frustration.
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10. Risk management fostered shared responsibility for athletics compliance.
The risk-management approach at CSU required that a single individual be
identified as the responsible party for each risk. This clarification and documentation of
accountability was seen as a key step in managing the risk. In the High-Risk Working
Group’s risk plans, the athletics director (not the athletics compliance officer) was listed
as the single responsible party for all 14 high-risk areas. Thus, at CSU the athletics
compliance coordinator was seen as the compliance expert and adviser but not as the
party with the ultimate or sole responsibility for compliance. Put plainly, the riskmanagement approach at CSU put the athletics director, not the compliance coordinator,
under the gun. The compliance coordinator’s role was to help the athletics director fulfill
his compliance responsibility. The CSU compliance program did not seem compliancecoordinator-centric, as some programs at other institutions perhaps are. At CSU, the
athletics-compliance coordinator did not appear to be the sole driver of all compliancerelated actions, bearing the knowledge, responsibility, and pressure of compliance more
or less alone. Instead, the athletics director, athletics-compliance coordinator, Athletics
Council, and Institutional Compliance Office all played a significant part in compliance.
William (system-wide compliance officer):
The key to the whole thing is having someone that is held accountable. It’s not the
compliance officer; it’s the AD [athletics director]. I ask a lot of people the
question “Who is the responsible party” and many times they come back and say
this compliance person or that compliance person, and that is not right. It’s the
athletics director or the vice-president who are the real responsible parties.
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The shared responsibility for athletics compliance included actual monitoring by
Athletics Council subcommittee members. The subcommittee members served as
additional resources for doing the work of monitoring compliance practices and evidence
of controls.
Jack (athletics director):
I think one reason why we have to go about this method is when you don’t have
the staff to oversee it, like the I-A schools may have, this is one means by which
you can assure that risks are being addressed, and we’re doing appropriate
monitoring by utilizing the resources you have, in our case, the Athletics Council.
11. Oversight controls put the final eyes outside the athletics department.
The risk-management approach at CSU emphasized that no additional assurance
is gained by someone’s checking of his or her own work. Operating controls, supervisory
controls, and oversight controls were designed to be performed by different parties. At
CSU, the athletics-compliance coordinator often performed a given compliance process
himself or supervised a process performed by others (thus providing operating or
supervisory controls). Oversight control was then performed by others, often Athletics
Council members or Institutional Compliance Office staff. In other institutions, it can be
said that the compliance coordinator is sometimes (or even often) seen as providing the
final assurance on compliance (except for every-four-years, outside compliance reviews).
In those cases, the compliance officer is often in the position of checking his or her own
compliance efforts. This was not the case at CSU.
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Julie (senior woman administrator):
The things that are considered, maybe not in terms of risk assessment, but maybe
the key priorities . . . I mean like camp money and things like that, it just seems
like it is a good practice to have different eyes on money and to have different
people turning money in. I don’t know how you could function safely without
that.
12. Risk management instilled confidence in the compliance program.
It appeared at CSU that risk assessment created a sense of confidence that (a)
knowledgeable people had brainstormed and analyzed the risks, (b) that decisions had
been made about which risks were high priority, (c) that attention and resources were
being allocated appropriately to the risks, and (d) that controls at multiple levels were in
place for monitoring the risk-management plans. There was a general sense that the right
things were being worried about and that energy was being put in the right places.
Dr. Winthrop (university president):
I think it’s a heightened awareness on a regular, repeated basis. We’re going
through an exercise every year on risk analysis, and I think it requires that. That’s
not a guarantee that you won’t have problems or even violations, but it highlights
and underscores the significance of the issues and how important compliance is,
and it looks at the high-risk areas and kind of puts it in front of your face. And I
think there is a great advantage in that.
The Influence of Risk Assessment on Communication
Research Question 3 was What influence does a prioritized list of athletics
compliance risks have on the communication and decision-making dynamics among the
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compliance-office department, the athletics department, and the university
administration? The following themes were identified as related to the influence of risk
assessment on athletics-compliance communication and decision making.
13. Risk assessment informed the president about athletics risks.
At CSU, the risk assessment effort connected the university president directly
with compliance. It can be said that a common concern among athletics-compliance
officers is that compliance risks are, to some degree, in the closet. At CSU, risk
assessment provided a structured message (in the form of prioritized risks and riskmanagement plans) that communicated to the administration about compliance exposure
and plans in place to mitigate the exposure. Risk assessment also placed athletics risk in
its proper context and proportion within the overall institution.
Dr. Winthrop (university president):
I am confident that we have solid procedures in place and a good structure to
monitor compliance. However, I also know that there are no guarantees and that
there can always be a violation or a breakdown even in very well-thought-out
procedures. So vigilance, monitoring, and reinforcing expectations in terms of our
coaches and student-athletes is really very important on a regular, ongoing basis.
14. Risk management in athletics occurred in a culture of transparency.
Risk management in athletics at CSU operated in a departmental culture of
openness and transparency. An open-door, open-book mentality was evident. One can
perhaps appreciate the significance of this by imagining that an academic department
were to allow members of the campus to do spot checks on grade books, class
assignments, and graded papers. Describing the oversight-control responsibilities of the
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Athletics Council members, Jack, the athletics director, described matter-of-factly how
teams of Athletics Council members periodically appeared, unannounced, to do checks,
“Three at the most [on a team], and you never know when they’re going to come in.”
Whereas a stereotype may exist elsewhere of athletics as defensive, or at least private,
about internal operations, the opposite appeared to be the case at CSU. The willingness to
have delicate issues discussed openly and to have sensitive areas crucial to athletics
success (such as recruiting and eligibility) checked by outsiders seemed to be a success
factor in risk management. Dr. Burns, a faculty member on the Athletics Council, stated,
“I think they do an excellent job here. In my opinion, they share lots of information about
a lot of things.” Openness appeared to be essential to successful risk management.
Richard (athletics-compliance coordinator):
What is good is that there are people that are really paying attention to us and
asking questions that frequently are healthy and that we need to answer. It is
another layer, and I welcome another layer. We can’t get too many outside people
looking at what we do. I’ve changed my philosophy 100% on that . . . you know, I
didn’t care [for] the intrusions, but now I view it as the most healthy thing for an
athletics department to be involved in. I could see the dangers, some of the
schools that got in trouble, they really had no one outside their program really
knowing what they did. And some people almost killed their program because
they may have thought they were doing it right, but they had no one really coming
and checking to see if they were.
The institutional compliance program integrated athletics into the university. The
broad membership and high level of involvement of the Athletics Council seemed to
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integrate athletics into the university community. Jack, the athletics director, in
describing the mission of the Athletics Council, stated, “We came up with this concept to
empower them to do something and have them [be] in charge of monitoring our
department.” The combination of (a) the broad membership from both academic and
administrative areas, (b) the significance of the Athletics Council’s oversight-control
responsibilities, and (c) the transparency of the athletics department seemed to make
athletics an accepted and integral part of the university.
Dr. Winthrop (university president):
I think that since we do risk analysis in other areas of the campus, it says that
athletics is one of the important segments of the campus. It doesn’t attach too
much emphasis on athletics and treat it like it is its own enterprise; it treats it like
part of the university, and I think that is the way it should be. It shouldn’t be
neglected, nor should it be given some exalted status on the campus; it’s like any
other department. It’s important, or it wouldn’t be here, and that’s an important
message to send. Because I think that is where you run into problems is where
athletics becomes an empire unto itself and it is isolated from the rest of the
academic enterprise, and it needs to be a part of, not separate from.
Pamela (assistant director, system-wide compliance):
One of the interesting pieces to this, when they started working on their risk
assessment they brought cross-culture, cross-department lines together. It changed
the communication within the institutions, so you no longer had these separate
silos. It’s not necessarily gone, but there is more communication between the
silos.
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William (system-wide compliance officer):
CSU had a compliance failure in their athletic program. And they fired their AD.
And Jack [who had been at CSU] was appointed as interim and was ultimately
selected, and his charge was to run a compliant program with integrity. And so he
saw first hand what can happen to an athletic program. In fact, they were very
close to doing away with athletics. It had such a negative impact on their
university. He then had to embrace a process that would allow them to organize
themselves in a way that they could follow the rules with very limited resources.
15. Three NCAA compliance risks evolved as perennial top priorities.
The risk-assessment process in athletics at CSU originally involved reviewing a
list of 20 or more risks, rating their impact and probability on a scale of 1-10, and
multiplying the scores to calculate and rank the risk priorities. However, after several
years, three main risk areas arose (in the judgment of the Athletics Council) as the top
ones faced by athletics: (a) student-athlete financial aid, (b) recruiting, and (c) eligibility.
This phenomenon can be seen as both positive and concerning. On the positive side,
increasing familiarity with risks lessened the need to review a checklist of risks to
stimulate risk awareness and discussion. Also, there was a sense that some risks had been
addressed and thus lowered in priority. On the concerning side, locking onto certain risks
as standard ones could defeat the purpose of methodically reassessing risks and
identifying new risks in a continually changing environment.
Some initially high risks were controlled and then lowered in priority. CSU
addressed some initially identified risks, such as summer-camp finances and lightning
safety, by reviewing and revising existing policies and procedures. Those risks, having
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been addressed, were then no longer considered high priority. The exercise of identifying,
addressing, and then lowering the priority of these risks was seen as valuable and as an
essential part of the initial implementation.
Jack (athletics director):
Those kinds of risks made us look at our policy and procedure, review it, and
either come up with a new one, revise it, improve it, and this allowed us to take
that risk off.
There is, however, an opposing view on this. In particular, a subtle distinction
arises as to whether a risk with a severe potential consequence should ever be lowered in
priority. The opposing view is that a risk with a severe potential consequence should
always be an A risk even though mitigation plans have been put in place.
Craig (system-wide compliance supervisor):
When does an A risk cease to be an A risk? Most of the time when we have A
risks they are A risks because the consequences associated with the single
occurrence are significant, and we don’t want a single occurrence to occur. So,
my opinion is that an A risk never becomes a B risk. . . .You can’t change often
the consequence of something happening, but you can impact the frequency in
which they occur.
The NCAA’s Perspective on Risk Assessment
Research Question 4 was What influence does a risk-assessment approach have
on an institution’s interactions with the NCAA, which does not have a risk-assessment
mindset? The following themes were identified as related to the NCAA’s perspective on
risk assessment.
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16. NCAA Enforcement sees its job as enforcing all rules.
NCAA Enforcement sees its role as enforcing all NCAA rules. When
investigating an incident, NCAA Enforcement determines (a) whether a system was in
place to prevent an infraction, (b) how the institution reacted to and reported the incident,
and (c) whether indications of institutional control are evident. The Enforcement office
does not wish to hamper enforcement by labeling any rules as more important or
pertinent than others. Also, it does not wish to lessen institutional responsibility for
control by prescribing funding or staffing levels for compliance. Thus, NCAA
Enforcement focuses on ends rather than means. It appeared that the NCAA would, in
essence, neither approve nor disapprove of risk management as an approach to athletics
compliance. If risk management were to foster interdepartmental communication, shared
responsibility, and adequate resources for compliance, then NCAA Enforcement would
presumably look favorably on those impacts. Conversely, if the violation of a rule were
not prevented because its possible occurrence had been deemed unlikely, the
Enforcement office would not look favorably on that situation.
Dan (NCAA Enforcement staff member):
An institution’s obligation is to monitor all aspects of their athletics program for
compliance so there are not particular areas that we rank as more important than
another. It’s really going to come down to, if you have problems in an area that
the institution was not monitoring sufficiently, it could be, and probably would
be, a failure to monitor and maybe a lack of institutional control.
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John (NCAA Enforcement staff member):
There is no question in enforcement; our job is to enforce the rules. In
enforcement, our job is to process cases.
17. NCAA Enforcement sees the challenge of covering all rules but cannot relent.
NCAA Enforcement acknowledges that some schools can afford bigger
compliance staffs than others. The Enforcement office is not unaware of the number and
complexity of the rules or of the differences among schools. Nonetheless, NCAA
Enforcement aims to stay true to its mission to enforce all rules. The Enforcement office
does not wish to condone insufficient funding or staffing of compliance nor accept the
excuses that “We don’t have time to cover everything,” or “We decided that was a low
priority.” NCAA Enforcement does not envision itself providing relief in cases in which
the likelihood of a violation was rated low and, then, an incident did in fact occur.
John (NCAA Enforcement staff member):
I can also tell you that those schools that have seven or eight [compliance staff
members] oftentimes don’t think they have enough yet. There are some informal
discussions going on about “How much is enough? When does it stop?” We had a
compliance person at a school [with a large compliance staff] that went to the AD
and said she needed another compliance staff position because “Here are the areas
we aren’t monitoring.” And the AD’s response was “Okay, that’s fine, but when
does this stop?” Part of the point that I make here is that schools at the top of the
spectrum from the budget standpoint have similar problems that they face as the
schools do that may have a one-person compliance staff.

140

We’ve gone in to the Committee on Infractions with allegations of lack of
institutional control or failure to monitor at times when we felt the institution was
not sufficiently staffed in compliance or when the compliance area was asking for
more help. The Committee on Infractions has made it very clear that they will not
take that into consideration. It’s an institutional responsibility to sufficiently
monitor the athletics program.
18. The NCAA advocates shared responsibility for compliance.
NCAA Enforcement strongly believes in the concept of shared responsibility for
compliance. The Enforcement office sees the (spoken or unspoken) assignment of sole
responsibility for compliance to the athletics-compliance coordinator as a misconception
and mistake. NCAA Enforcement looks to the president, the athletics director, and even
the coaches to be engaged in athletics compliance from their respective positions.
John (NCAA Enforcement staff member):
The compliance person needs to be comfortable going outside to someone. In
some cases, you may have the athletics director encouraging noncompliance. I’ve
seen schools where the president’s office is partially responsible for the
compliance budget. You see it a lot right after or during a major infractions case.
You usually get a reporting line to the president. And it’s about as close as you
can get to an ideal situation during those times. But it takes going through a major
infraction case and having those issues for an institution to really understand it.
Especially from the president’s office.
We understand the pressures that the compliance people particularly are
under. . . . We also have to subscribe to the theme that compliance is an
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institutional responsibility, not just one person who has been hired to pull it all
together.
19. Self-reporting of infractions is seen as a sign of compliance health.
Although it may seem counter-intuitive, NCAA Enforcement views the selfreporting of infractions as positive. Self-reporting is seen as an indication that an
institution’s compliance effort is working. Conversely, a lack of self-reporting is seen as
a warning sign that perhaps (a) monitoring is not occurring, (b) investigation of possible
problems is not occurring, or (c) reporting is being squelched. Self-reporting indicates to
the Enforcement office that rules are understood, monitoring is in place, and the
responsibility of the institution to control itself is understood by all key parties.
John (NCAA Enforcement staff member):
When I was on the conference level, we kept tabs on reports from each institution.
And the ones that had very low numbers of violations--one or two a year--we
worried far more about them than the ones that were reporting 16, 17, or 18
violations. At the I-A level, it’s impossible for you to go through and have zero
violations, and if we’re getting no reports, something is wrong there.
We had a president at a recent infractions-committee meeting who made
the statement that they hadn’t had a violation in five years. He thought he was in
there really bragging. You could look up and see the committee members
thinking, “What is going on here?” The president thought he was making a great
point, but it was the exact opposite.
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20. The bottom line for the NCAA is a high-functioning compliance program.
NCAA Enforcement’s perspective is that delineating upfront the specifics of an
adequate compliance effort would hurt its ability to enforce the rules. Its view is that
decisions about what constitutes an effective compliance program are up to the
institution. The Office sees the NCAA Committee on Infractions’ Principles of
Institutional Control10 as the framework from which institutions should make decisions
about specific compliance-program practices. Rather than prescribe the acceptable scope
and functioning of a compliance program, the Enforcement office’s approach is to
observe, when an incident has occurred, whether monitoring and other elements of
institutional control, such as education and documentation, were in place.
John (NCAA Enforcement staff member):
It is possible, probably likely, that if you had a serious problem in one area that
you had chosen to not to concentrate on, that you could end up with a failure to
monitor and lack of institutional control. And part of that is being aware of or
alert to problems.
We had a monster case at one university where a student-athlete had a
summer job [in another part of the country] during the summer by a booster. The
kids simply were not working. We had a discussion about that: How far do you
really have to go to monitor that? Do you have to actually go on-site? You may
decide that just because of your resources that you can’t focus on that, but our
position would also be you can’t ignore it.
The Committee [on Infractions] put out a paper in 1996 where it set forth
the principles of institutional control, and it believes that paper provides enough
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guidance to institutions. It does not want to create a checklist where, if you do
this, you will have the seal of good housekeeping. It believes those decisions
should be made at the institutional level.
The Influence of Risk Assessment on Compliance Outcomes
Research Question 5 was What influence does a risk-assessment experience have
on compliance outcomes? The following themes were identified as related to the
perceived influence of risk assessment on compliance outcomes.
21. CSU was seen as having an effective athletics-compliance program.
CSU had experienced compliance problems earlier (under a different athletics
director). Today, the athletics program is seen as having a well-functioning compliance
operation. The perspectives of the conference compliance director, the institutional
compliance director, and an Athletics Council member (all of whom are outside the
athletics department) were that CSU’s compliance effort is strong.
Ian (head men’s basketball coach):
I would definitely say that compliance here is much stricter than other
universities, based on what I see when I’m out on the road. There are no gray
areas here at CSU.
Pat (conference compliance director):
It’s a lot of work on their end, but anything that is providing additional reviews
and checks and balances and having different people outside of the department,
and even outside the university, look at what they think is a risk is going to help.
It’s going to help find things that otherwise wouldn’t have been found.
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William (system-wide compliance officer):
I would say that we have changed the culture. The culture is clearly to do the right
things right. And when we started eight years ago, we didn’t even know what risk
assessment was, but now that term is used regularly throughout our everyday
lives.
22. Risk-management advocates see beyond compliance risks to all risks.
Among risk-management advocates, adopting risk management in the area of
compliance inevitably leads to considering other types of risk. Determining the
institution’s exposures, controls against those exposures, and assurances of the controls
naturally seems to apply beyond complying with rules and laws. This thinking mirrors the
progression of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO), which produced its
Internal Control--Integrated Framework (focused particularly on compliance) in 1992
and its Enterprise Risk Management--Integrated Framework (expanding its scope to
strategic, operational, financial, reputational, and compliance risk) in 2004. This mindset
was also seen in CSU’s approach to athletics risks, which considered safety, gender
equity, and fiscal management as well as NCAA rules compliance.
Pamela (assistant director, system-wide compliance):
The risk-assessment world has changed. . . . We’ve now moved to more of an
enterprise-wide footprint. . . . So, you have more departments doing risk
assessment instead of just those areas that you know need compliance operations.
So, they’re . . . moving the look of risk from just compliance to your operational,
your strategic, and your financial. . . . Higher education has lagged in looking at
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risk from an enterprise approach. They tend to pocket it where they’ve had
problems.
William (system-wide compliance officer):
[Risk assessment] has moved quite frankly beyond compliance to all our business
thinking, and we’re fast approaching using enterprise risk management, so it’s not
only compliance risks, but it is financial risk, operational risk, and strategic risk.
The Risk-Based Compliance Process
As observed by the researcher, the risk-based compliance process at CSU has
three major subprocesses: (a) risk assessment, (b) risk management, and (c) risk
assurance (see Figure 7). A striking feature of risk assessment in athletics at CSU is the
open discussion and prioritization of athletics risks. A prominent feature of risk
management in athletics at CSU is an emphasis on multiple levels of controls to ensure
that preventive practices are in place. A noteworthy feature of risk assurance in athletics
at CSU is the participation of Athletics Council members as monitors of compliance
practices. Descriptions of each of these subprocesses follow.
Risk Assessment
At CSU, risk assessment is the process of scanning the environment and
identifying, rating, prioritizing, and reporting risks. The objective of risk assessment is to
identify risks and rank them according to potential impact and likelihood of occurrence.
In the State University System, each institution submits a risk-based compliance
plan to the System-Wide Compliance Office annually. To create the plan, each committee
assigned to a high-risk area identifies, assesses, and prioritizes its risks. The risks are then
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combined at the institutional level and reprioritized by the institutional compliance
executive committee.
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Figure 7. A process view of risk-based compliance at CSU as observed and drawn by the
researcher on the basis of interviews. Risk management in compliance was observed to
have three distinct subprocesses: (a) risk assessment, which produced risk priorities; (b)
risk management, which put plans into operation and produced evidence of compliance
actions; and (c) risk assurance, which produced audits of the compliance actions.

As a committee assigned to the high-risk area of athletics, the Athletics Council
completes the following 14 steps:
1. Identify and document the goals and objectives of the high-risk area
(intercollegiate athletics) within the context of Carston State University’s
mission statement.
2. Identify and document risks associated with the accomplishment of the goals
and objectives. (What could go wrong? What must go right?)
3. Review the most current lists of risks to determine whether the risks identified
in Step 2 are included on that list. (The previous year’s lists of risks are

147

important considerations, but, at the same time, risks can also change because
of changing laws and situations.)
4. Once the inventory of risks has been determined and documented, assess the
probability of occurrence of each risk.
5. Assess the potential impact of each risk and ascertain whether there has been a
previous occurrence of that risk.
6. For each risk, rate the probability of occurrence on a scale of 1 (lowest level
of concern) to 10 (highest level of concern) and the potential impact on a scale
of 1 to 10.
7. For each risk, multiply the probability rating and the impact rating, and rankorder the list of risks on the basis of the multiplied scores.
8. Separate the rank-ordered risks into an A list and B list, the A list reflecting
the items of highest concern.
9. Submit the goals and objectives and the A and B lists to the Institutional
Compliance Office.
10. Instruct the Institutional Compliance Office to combine the lists into
institution-wide A and B lists.
11. Discuss, with the provost, senior vice-president for finance and
administration, and institutional compliance officer the institution-wide A and
B lists.
12. Present the institution-wide A and B lists to the Institutional Compliance
Executive Committee.
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13. Have the Institutional Compliance Executive Committee validate the
institution-wide A and B lists.
14. On the basis of this information and after consultation with the institutional
compliance officer submit the annual risk-based plan of compliance activities
to the System-wide Compliance Office.
Viewed as a process, risk assessment starts with a scan of the environment as
input and produces a prioritized list of risks as output. An athletics-compliance
practitioner visiting CSU might notice in particular (a) the open discussion about risks
faced in CSU’s specific environment, (b) the clear determination that some risks are high
priority, and (c) the corresponding acknowledgment that low risks will be given less
attention.
Risk Management
At CSU, risk management is the process of (a) identifying specific risks within
the broadly defined risks that were ranked as high priority, (b) developing risk-mitigation
plans, and (c) implementing the plans. The objective of risk management is to create and
implement mitigation plans that are openly shared, rigorously defined, and broadly
supported.
Mitigation planning includes (a) defining a single responsible party; (b) reviewing
relevant policies; (c) defining, clarifying, and updating processes and procedures; (d)
conducting risk-specific training; and (e) determining operating and supervisory controls.
Defining a single responsible party for the risk establishes an accountable owner. (At
CSU, the athletics director is the responsible party for all athletics high-risk areas.)
Reviewing policy involves decision making about principles and rules related to the risk
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and its mitigation. Defining processes and procedures includes clarifying who does what,
building in safeguards against missteps, and determining all operational details. Training
includes communicating expectations and operational details to all who touch the
process. Determining operating and supervisory controls involves (a) defining what dayto-day operators and managers will do to check the integrity of the process and (b)
determining what auditable evidences of control will be produced.
Mitigation plans are then put into operation. Staff members (such as coaches and
admissions and financial administrators) conduct operations and produce evidence of
operating controls. Supervisors (such as the athletics-compliance coordinator) check the
evidence of operating controls and produce evidence of supervisory controls. (A key
principle is that no one can serve as a supervisory control on his or her own operating
work.)
Viewed as a process, risk management starts with a prioritized list of risks as
input and produces evidence of controls as output. A visiting athletics-compliance
practitioner might particularly observe (a) the detailed attention that the risk-management
methodology focuses on high-priority risks, and (b) the multiple controls defined in
mitigation plans to ensure that compliance practices are being implemented.
Risk Assurance
At CSU, risk assurance is the review of risk management activities by parties
outside the operating and management hierarchy to verify that controls are in place and
functioning. Risk assurance is the implementation of oversight controls. It is
accomplished primarily through review of evidence of operating and supervisory
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controls. The objective of risk assurance is to provide verification from outside the chain
of command that processes and controls are functioning as designed.
In athletics at CSU, risk assurance activities include (a) Athletics Council
subcommittee monitoring, (b) internal audits and inspections, (c) annual NCAA financial
audits, (d) conference compliance reviews, and (e) the NCAA Division I Athletics
Certification Self-Study and Peer Review.
Subcommittee monitoring includes the review of the evidence of operating and
supervisory controls. Athletics Council subcommittee members monitor (a) the admission
of student-athletes, (b) the certification of student-athletes, (c) recruiting records, (d)
playing and practice records, (e) sports scheduling, (f) student-athlete absences due to
sports schedules, (g) Student-Athlete Advisory Committee meeting minutes, (h) grade
point averages by sport, (i) graduation rates by sport, (j) the ratio of minorities by sport,
(k) the gender and ethnic makeup of the athletics department staff, and (l) the
sportsmanship and ethical conduct of students and staff during competitions. In addition,
subcommittee members review compliance-function activities, such as (a) rules
education, (b) rules violations, and (c) plans for preventing violations. Subcommittee
members also monitor academic-support services and conduct exit interviews.
The Institutional Compliance Office annually audits one of the athletics
program’s top three risk areas (student-athlete financial aid, recruiting, and eligibility).
The Internal Audit group of the Institutional Compliance Office conducts an annual
financial audit of the Carston State athletics program. This financial audit is required of
all Division I programs and is considered an oversight control.
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The Mid-Central Conference conducts the NCAA-required compliance review
every four years. The compliance review includes a prereview questionnaire and on-site
interviews of athletics and institutional staff members, including the president. The
review involves all aspects of NCAA rules and compliance procedures. The result is a set
of recommendations to the athletics department. The compliance review by the
conference is considered by Carston State to be an oversight control and part of outside
risk assurance.
The NCAA’s every-ten-years certification is also considered part of Carston
State’s athletics risk assurance. The Athletics Council members serve as the core of the
certification committee and are joined by additional members. The three subcommittees
of the Athletics Council (Governance and Commitment to Rules Compliance, Academic
Integrity, and Equity and Student-Athlete Welfare) operate on a permanent basis and
reflect the topic areas of the outside-certification review.
Viewed as a process, risk assurance takes evidence of controls as input and
produces verifications of the controls as output. An athletics-compliance practitioner
visiting CSU would likely notice (a) the participation by campus members in monitoring
compliance practices and (b) the consideration of all outside audits and reviews as a set
of oversight controls.
Summary
The athletics-compliance organization at CSU included its (a) system-wide
compliance office, (b) institutional compliance executive committee, (c) institutional
compliance office, (d) athletics council, and (e) athletics department staff members.
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Twenty-two themes regarding the use of risk management in compliance were identified
in the content of 12 interviews and 17 types of documents.
CSU was able to incorporate risk management into its athletics-compliance
program. Athletics compliance was embedded in CSU’s institutional compliance
program. Risk management in compliance had commitment at the top. The university
adopted a standard language of risk. Committee members scanned CSU’s specific
environment to identify risks. All types of athletics-related risks were considered. A
single, active athletics-compliance committee was established. Compliance and
certification activities were combined and aligned.
Risk management had a perceived positive influence on the athletics-compliance
function. The methodologies of risk management and athletics compliance had to be
reconciled. Risk assessment highlighted the challenge of covering all rules. Risk
management fostered shared responsibility for athletics compliance. Oversight controls
put the final eyes outside the athletics department. Risk management instilled confidence
in the compliance program.
Prioritizing athletics risks influenced communication and decision making
positively. Risk assessment informed the president about athletics risks. Risk
management in athletics occurred in a culture of transparency. Three NCAA compliance
risks evolved as perennial top priorities.
NCAA Enforcement appears to look neither favorably nor unfavorably on risk
management, leaving decisions about compliance approaches to the institutions. NCAA
Enforcement sees its job as enforcing all rules. NCAA Enforcement sees the challenge of
covering all rules but cannot relent. The NCAA advocates shared responsibility for
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compliance. Self-reporting of infractions is seen as a sign of compliance health. The
bottom line for the NCAA is a high-functioning compliance program.
Risk management was perceived as having a positive influence on athletics at
CSU. CSU was seen by informants both inside and outside CSU athletics as having an
effective athletics-compliance program. Risk management advocates tended to see
beyond compliance risks to the management of all types of risks.
The compliance process at CSU was observed to include risk assessment, risk
management, and risk assurance. Risk assessment is done annually in high-risk areas.
Prioritized risks are combined at the institution level and reported to the system level.
Risk-management plans are developed, submitted, and implemented. Assurance activities
occur to ensure that risk-management plans are in effect.
Chapter 5 contains a summary of the study, discussion of the themes in the
interview data, recommendations regarding the implementation of risk-management in
athletics compliance, and recommendations for related future research.
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The summary and conclusions are presented in four parts. The first part is a
summary of the study. The second part is a discussion of the themes in the interview data
in relation to the research questions, theoretical frameworks, and researcher’s
expectations. The third part is a set of recommendations for educational leaders regarding
the use of risk management in athletics compliance. The fourth part is a set of
recommendations for future research in athletics compliance and risk management in
higher education.
Summary of the Study
The topic of this study was the use of risk assessment in athletics compliance and
its influence on (a) the athletics-compliance function, (b) communication between
athletics and the administration, (c) interactions with the NCAA, and (d) athleticscompliance outcomes.
Statement of the Problem
Risk assessment is not a standard operating procedure in athletics compliance.
Plainly put, some (or even many) athletics-compliance officers make individual
judgments about compliance priorities, given the resources they have, and hope for the
best. The expectation of the study was that assessing institution-specific athleticscompliance risks and creating risk-management plans for high-priority risks would be
beneficial to the athletics-compliance function, the athletics program, and the university
president.
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Purpose
The purpose of this study was to
1. Identify the methods and steps of implementing risk assessment in
intercollegiate athletics compliance.
2. Evaluate the influence of a risk-assessment approach in athletics compliance
on (a) the operation of the athletics-compliance function, (b) communication
and decision making about athletics compliance at the institution, (c)
interactions with the NCAA, and (d) athletics-compliance outcomes.
Theoretical Frameworks
The first theoretical framework was the description of risk-assessment procedures
in higher education provided by Crawford et al. (2001). The framework indicated that
risk assessment should include (a) identification of risks, (b) measurement of the risks in
terms of potential impact and probability of occurrence, (c) prioritization of risks, (d)
reporting of priorities, and (e) creation of risk-management plans.
The second theoretical framework was the updated U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
for Organizations (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2004). This framework indicated the
elements of an effective compliance program. On the basis of the framework, an effective
compliance program should (a) identify violations, (b) show evidence of a culture of
compliance, (c) educate senior managers and trustees, (d) have active senior leadership,
(e) prioritize on the basis of risk assessment, (f) establish compliance as a behavioral
norm, and (g) emphasize ethics (Desio, 2004). The 2004 Sentencing Guidelines also
include the original 1991 Sentencing Guidelines for compliance-program elements: (a)
standards and procedures; (b) high-level oversight; (c) careful hiring and delegation; (d)
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training and education; (e) monitoring, auditing, and nonretaliatory reporting; (f)
response to violations; and (g) disciplinary action.
Research Questions
The research questions of the study were the following:
1. What are the specific methods and steps of incorporating risk assessment into
athletics compliance?
2. What influence does a risk-assessment experience have on an athleticscompliance function’s priorities, processes, and resource allocations?
3. What influence does a prioritized list of athletics-compliance risks have on the
communication and decision-making dynamics among the athleticscompliance function, athletics department, and university administration?
4. What influence does a risk-assessment approach have on an institution’s
interactions with the NCAA, which does not have a risk-assessment mindset?
5. What influence does a risk-assessment experience have on athleticscompliance outcomes?
Design and Method
The design of the study was a descriptive case study in which interview data were
collected and documents were reviewed at a single point in time. The researcher’s
objective was to document the characteristics and experiences of using risk management
in athletics compliance, as described by the informants and reflected in relevant
documents. The design of the study can also be described as a grounded theory design in
that the researcher identified categories, or themes, in the interview data and a conceptual
theory that connected the themes.
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The State University System11 was selected purposively as the research
environment on the basis of the extensiveness of its system-wide institutional compliance
program. Within the State University System, one university, Carston State University,
was selected as the primary institution-level research site. The State University System’s
System-Wide Compliance Office, the Mid-Central Conference, and the NCAA were also
included in the study in order to obtain multiple viewpoints.
Two kinds of data were collected: interview data and documents. Interviews were
primarily one to one and face to face and 1-2 hours in length. The interviews were
conducted at three locations: (a) the Carston State University campus, (b) the SystemWide Compliance Office, and (c) NCAA headquarters.
The study’s informants at Carston State University were (a) the president, (b) the
athletics director, (c) the institutional compliance officer, (d) a faculty member on the
Athletics Council, (e) the athletics-compliance coordinator, (f) the senior woman
administrator, and (g) the head men’s basketball coach. The informants at the SystemWide Compliance Office, which oversees compliance at all of the institutions in its state
university system, were (a) the system-wide compliance officer, (b) the assistant director
of system-wide compliance, and (c) the system-wide compliance supervisor. The
compliance director of the Mid-Central Conference, who conducted CSU’s most recent
external compliance review, also served as an informant. Finally, two members of the
NCAA enforcement staff served as informants for the NCAA perspective on the use of
risk assessment in athletics compliance.
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Documents related to risk assessment and compliance were collected and
reviewed. The documents were obtained from both CSU and the State University System.
A complete list of the reviewed documents is included in Appendix D.
The interview data were analyzed through the use of coding, memoing, and
concept charting. The documents were analyzed as evidence of the risk-assessment
process and its influences.
The Compliance Organization
The data provided descriptions of the compliance organization. The compliance
organization that guides athletics compliance at Carston State University includes (a) the
State University System’s system-wide compliance organization, (b) CSU’s institutional
compliance organization, and (c) CSU’s athletics-compliance organization.
The State University System’s compliance-related organization includes (a) the
System-Wide Compliance Office, which provides oversight of compliance at all
institutions in the System; (b) the network of institutional compliance officers, each
located at an institution in the system; and (c) high-risk working groups, which are interinstitutional task groups focused on particular high-risk areas.
The institutional compliance-related organization at Carston State University
includes (a) the Institutional Compliance Office, (b) the Institutional Compliance
Executive Committee, and (c) a number of compliance subcommittees and individuals
responsible for high-risk areas.
The athletics-compliance-related organization at CSU includes (a) the Athletics
Council, (b) its subcommittees, and (c) key members of the Athletics Department.
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Summary of the Themes in the Interview Data
Twenty-two themes were identified from the 12 interviews conducted and the 17
types of documents reviewed. These themes were distinct categories of the interview
data. The themes are listed in Table 3 with the research questions to which they relate
(see Chapter 4 for descriptions of the themes and supporting interview data).
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Table 3
Summary of the 22 Themes Identified in the Interview Data

Research questions

Themes identified in the interview data

Research question 1:

1. Athletics compliance was embedded in CSU’s

What are the specific
methods and steps of
incorporating risk

institutional compliance program.
2. Risk management in compliance had commitment at
the top.

assessment into athletics

3. The university adopted a standard language of risk.

compliance?

4. Risks were identified through scanning of CSU’s
specific environment.
5. All types of athletics-related risks were considered.
6. A single, active athletics-compliance committee was
established.
7. Compliance and certification activities were
combined and aligned.

Research question 2:

8. The methodologies of risk management and

What influence does a risk

athletics compliance had to be reconciled.

assessment experience have

9. Risk assessment highlighted the challenge of

on a compliance function’s
priorities, processes, and
resource allocations?

covering all rules.
10. Risk management fostered shared responsibility for
athletics compliance.
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Table 3 (continued)

Research questions

Themes identified in the interview data

Research question 2

11. Oversight controls put the final eyes outside the

(continued):
What influence does a risk
assessment experience have

athletics department.
12. Risk management instilled confidence in the
compliance program.

on a compliance function’s
priorities, processes, and
resource allocations?

Research question 3:
What influence does a
prioritized list of athleticscompliance risks have on
the communication and
decision-making dynamics
among the compliance
function, the athletics
department, and the
university administration?

13. Risk assessment informed the president about
athletics risks.
14. Risk management in athletics occurred in a culture
of transparency.
15. Three NCAA compliance risks evolved as perennial
top priorities.
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Table 3 (continued)

Research questions

Themes identified in the interview data

Research question 4:

16. NCAA Enforcement saw its job as enforcing all

What influence does a riskassessment approach have
on an institution’s
interactions with the
NCAA, which does not
have a risk-assessment
mindset?

rules.
17. NCAA Enforcement understands the challenge of
covering all rules but cannot relent.
18. The NCAA advocated shared responsibility for
compliance.
19. Self-reporting infractions was seen as a sign of
compliance health.
20. The bottom line for the NCAA was a highfunctioning compliance program.

Research question 5:
What influence does a riskassessment experience have
on compliance outcomes?

21. CSU was seen as having an effective athletics
compliance program.
22. Risk-management advocates saw beyond
compliance risks to all risks.
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The Risk-Based Compliance Process
The risk-based compliance process at CSU was observed by the researcher to
include three subprocesses: (a) risk assessment, (b) risk management, and (c) risk
assurance.
At CSU, risk assessment is the process of scanning the environment and
identifying, rating, prioritizing, and reporting risks. Risks are rated and ranked according
to potential impact and likelihood of occurrence. In the State University System, each
institution submits a risk-based compliance plan to the System-Wide Compliance Office
annually. To create the plan, each high-risk area (such as athletics, research, or
endowments) in an institution identifies, assesses, and prioritizes its risks. The risks are
then combined at the institutional level and reprioritized by the institutional compliance
executive committee.
At CSU, risk management is the process of (a) identifying specific risks within
the broadly defined risks that were ranked as high priority, (b) developing risk-mitigation
plans, and (c) implementing the plans. Mitigation planning includes (a) designating a
single responsible party; (b) reviewing relevant policies; (c) defining, clarifying, and
updating processes and procedures; (d) conducting risk-specific training; and (e)
determining operating and supervisory controls. Designating a single party responsible
for the risk establishes an accountable owner. Reviewing policy involves decision making
about principles and rules related to the risk and its mitigation. Defining processes and
procedures includes clarifying who does what, building in safeguards against missteps,
and determining all operational details. Training includes communicating expectations
and operational details to all who touch the process. Determining operating and
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supervisory controls involves (a) defining what day-to-day operators and managers will
do to check the integrity of the process and (b) determining what auditable evidences of
control will be produced. Mitigation plans are then put into operation.
At CSU, risk assurance is the review of risk-management activities by parties
outside the operating and management hierarchy in order to verify that controls are in
place and functioning. Risk assurance is the implementation of oversight controls. It is
accomplished primarily through the review of the evidence of operating and supervisory
controls. In athletics at CSU, risk-assurance activities include (a) Athletics Council
subcommittee’s conducting monitoring activities, (b) internal audits and inspections, (c)
annual NCAA financial audits, (d) conference compliance reviews, and (e) the NCAA
Division I Athletics Certification Self-Study and Peer Review.
Discussion of the Themes in the Interview Data
The themes are discussed in relation to (a) the research questions, (b) the
theoretical frameworks, and (c) the researcher’s expectations.
The Themes in Relation to the Research Questions
Discussion of the themes as they relate to each research question follows.
Incorporating Risk Assessment into Athletics Compliance
Research Question 1 was What are the specific methods and steps of
incorporating risk assessment into athletics compliance? It is a conclusion of this study
that CSU was successfully able to incorporate risk assessment into its athleticscompliance program.
Risk assessment was actually a subprocess (together with risk mitigation and risk
assurance) of the larger process of risk management at CSU. Perhaps the most striking
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aspect of risk assessment in CSU athletics was the open listing, prioritizing, and
discussing of athletics risks. A similarly striking aspect of risk mitigation was an
emphasis on multiple levels of controls such that no person served as a check on his or
her own work. The most noticeable aspect of risk assurance was the participation of
Athletics Council members as monitors of compliance practices with full access to
athletics operations. All of these aspects appeared to be successfully implemented and
were described positively by the informants.
CSU’s approach to culture change. It has been noted that instituting change is
difficult in loosely coupled organizations, such as universities (Baldridge, Curtis, Ecker
& Riley, 1977; Cohen & March, 1974, 1986; Weick, 1976). Nonetheless, several
informants referred to the adoption of institutional compliance and risk management at
CSU and in the State University System as a successful culture change (albeit one still in
progress).
Three factors emerged in the interview data as keys to the successful culture
change: (a) a systematic process, (b) the tone at the top, and (c) multiple messages about
compliance. These factors all seemed essential and to support each other. Thus, a threelegged stool seemed an apt analogy for this observed approach to culture change (see
Figure 8).
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Figure 8. CSU’s approach to culture change as observed and drawn by the researcher.
Three elements in successfully moving toward a risk-based compliance culture appeared
to be (a) a systematic process, (b) a compliance-oriented tone at the top, and (c) multiple
messages within the institution about the importance of compliance.

The tone at the very top was set by the board of regents’ mandate for system-wide
institutional compliance. At the institutional level, CSU’s president reviewed the
institution’s prioritized risks and risk plans and spoke with the athletics directors and
coaches about compliance. In CSU’s athletics program, the athletics director set a tone of
openness and inclusiveness with the Athletics Council regarding risks and compliance.
There seemed no doubt among the informants that compliance had the attention of the
chain of command.
The compliance process at CSU and in the State University System was detailed
and methodical. Working groups and committees were formed. Procedures were defined,
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and instructions, forms, and templates were provided for each step. Risk assessments
were conducted and risk-management plans were created. Committees submitted reports
on risk areas to their institutions, which in turn submitted reports on institutional risks to
the State University System. Operations were reviewed and audited. The process might
be described by some outside observers as control oriented. But the thoroughness of the
approach appeared to pay off at CSU in the integration of risk-based compliance into the
fabric of operations.
The faculty and staff of CSU received continual, multiple messages about the
importance of compliance, in the form of training, written communications, and
meetings. Compliance training was provided for all employees in the State University
System. Specific training on how to complete risk-management plans was conducted at
the institutional level. Athletics Council members received training related to the athletics
operations that they were asked to monitor. It seemed that the message that compliance
was important was repeatedly conveyed.
The Influence of Risk Assessment on the Compliance Function
Research Question 2 was What influence does a risk-assessment experience have
on a compliance function’s priorities, processes, and resource allocations? A conclusion
of this study is that risk management had an influence on the athletics-compliance
function that was perceived as positive. Three noticeable characteristics of the function
included (a) an openness about compliance risks, (b) a shared responsibility for
compliance, and (c) multiple levels of controls.
Openness about compliance risks was evident in the open discussion of
compliance risk in the Athletics Council and in written reports to CSU’s Institutional
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Compliance Office about athletics risk priorities and risk plans. Concerns about rules and
risks were stated plainly and publicly in the CSU athletics program. This included open
dialogue with the administration (including the president) about compliance.
Shared responsibility for compliance was evident in that (a) the athletics director
was assigned as the single party responsible for all athletics risks, and (b) Athletics
Council members participated as reviewers of athletics operations. Whereas some
athletics-compliance coordinators complain of having sole responsibility for compliance
and no help, the opposite was true at CSU.
Multiple levels of controls were built into risk-management plans at CSU. Thus,
there was public proof that procedures were operated as planned, as well as outside eyes
on key risk areas. Also, with multiple checks, it appeared that pressure on a single
individual to look the other way was less likely.
The Influence of Risk Assessment on Communication
Research Question 3 was What influence does a prioritized list of athleticscompliance risks have on the communication and decision-making dynamics among the
compliance function, athletics department, and university administration? Prioritizing
athletics risks appeared to influence communication and decision making in a positive,
healthy way. In particular, risk assessment provided a structured method of
communicating with the president about athletics risks.
A theme in the interview data is that risk management in athletics occurred in a
culture of transparency. This characteristic of transparency can be seen as part of a
broader culture of communication in CSU athletics. Several cultural characteristics of
communication about compliance and risk were observed: (a) clear accountability, (b)
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multiple controls, (c) empowered participation, (d) transparency about risks and
mitigation plans, (e) rationality about institution-specific risks, and (f) presidential
awareness (see Table 4 for aspects of the themes that relate to these cultural
characteristics). It is fair to say that these characteristics are not universal in all athleticscompliance programs. It would not be surprising to hear an athletics-compliance
practitioner describe the compliance culture at his or her institution as the opposite, that
is, having (a) accountability focused mainly on the compliance person, (b) single
controls, (c) little outside review, (d) a closed-door culture, (e) an irrational mindset that
all compliance risks can be covered equally, and (f) either no or highly edited
communication with the president.
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Table 4
Cultural Characteristics Related to Communication and Decision Making about Athletics
Compliance

Observed cultural

Aspects of the themes related to

characteristics

the cultural characteristics

Accountability

The athletics director was formally and publicly designated
as the single party responsible for athletics compliance.
The risk-management procedures then demonstrated that
accountability by providing him with reports on status and
requiring his sign-off on various control documents.

Controls

Multiple levels of controls existed in the risk-management
plans. No one served as the control on his or her own work.
Evidence of controls was emphasized. Oversight control
was conducted by individuals outside the athletics
department.

Participation

The Athletics Council was not a symbolic organization but
an active body empowered with compliance
responsibilities and access to information. The Athletics
Council’s 20 members represented broad campus
participation.
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Table 4 (continued)

Observed cultural

Aspects of the themes related to

characteristics

Transparency

the cultural characteristics

An atmosphere of transparency existed in the athletics
program. This was evident in the frank discussion about
athletics risks in the Athletics Council and with the
Institutional Compliance Office, as well as the openness in
having members of these groups monitor athleticscompliance processes.

Rationality

The athletics program did not attempt to portray itself as
having every possible risk and rule covered. The mindset
was that on the basis of knowledgeable assessment of the
particular CSU environment, special attention should be
paid to highly prioritized risks.

Executive awareness

The president was in the loop about institutional risks,
including athletics-compliance risks. Knowledge of
compliance risk was not closeted in the athletics
department.
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The NCAA’s Perspective on Risk Assessment
Research Question 4 was What influence does a risk-assessment approach have
on an institution’s interactions with the NCAA, which does not have a risk-assessment
mindset? A conclusion is that risk management had no perceived influence, positive or
negative, on CSU’s interactions with the NCAA.
All processes related to the NCAA appeared to proceed normally. CSU selfreported secondary violations as discovered. It received its every-four-years, NCAArequired, outside compliance review by its conference. CSU was initiating preparation for
its every-ten-years NCAA athletics certification at the time of this study.
An observation of this study is that NCAA Enforcement looks neither favorably
nor unfavorably on risk management, leaving such decisions about (and responsibility
for) compliance programs to individual institutions. If risk management were to be
helpful in garnering support and shared responsibility for compliance, the NCAA would
presumably look favorably on it. But an athletics program adopting risk management
should expect no special treatment from the NCAA regarding its enforcement of risks.
A conclusion is that because the NCAA’s Principles of Institutional Control (see
Chapter 2) do not mention risk assessment, there is no official acknowledgment by the
NCAA that an athletics program cannot monitor every rule equally. This is however
intuitively true from an athletics-compliance practitioner’s viewpoint at the institution
level and must be faced, and this study concludes that risk management is a rigorous,
rational means of doing so.
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The Influence of Risk Assessment on Compliance Outcomes
Research Question 5 was What influence does a risk-assessment experience have
on compliance outcomes? It is a conclusion of this study that risk management had a
positive influence, as perceived by the informants, on athletics compliance at CSU.
CSU’s compliance program was viewed as effective by its outside reviewer (the
Mid-Central Conference compliance director). The CSU informants who were outside the
athletics department echoed this, as did the State University System informants. Several
informants indicated that the compliance effort had improved since the tenure of an
earlier administration. A number of informants described CSU athletics’ culture of
compliance, emphasis on ethics, and strict expectations for behavior.
The Themes in Relation to the Theoretical Frameworks
Discussion of the themes as viewed through the conceptual lenses of the two
theoretical frameworks follows. The first theoretical framework describes the riskassessment procedures. The second theoretical framework outlines the elements of
effective compliance programs.
Risk-Assessment Procedures
Viewing the themes through the description of risk-assessment procedures
provided by Crawford et al. (2001) revealed that risk assessment did in fact occur at
CSU. The interview data indicated that risks were (a) identified, (b) rated on potential
impact and probability of occurrence, (c) prioritized, (d) reported at the institutional level,
and (e) addressed with risk-management plans. Table 5 shows the risk-assessment
procedures described by Crawford et al. (2001) and the aspects of the themes related to
risk-assessment procedures observed by the researcher at CSU.
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Table 5
The Themes in Relation to the Risk-Assessment Procedures described by Crawford et al.
(2001) as a Theoretical Framework

Risk-assessment procedures

Aspects of the themes related to

(Crawford et al., 2001)

risk-assessment procedures

Identification of risks

Athletics Council members reviewed and
discussed a list of athletics-risk areas. The list
included risk areas noted by the State University
System’s High-Risk Working Group as well as
other risk areas identified at CSU.

Measurement of risks

Athletics Council members rated each risk on

on potential impact and

potential impact and probability of occurrence on

probability of occurrence

scales of 1 to 10.

Prioritization of risks

The impact and probability scores were
multiplied, and the risks were ranked according to
the multiplied scores. The rank-ordered list was
then divided into A (higher) and B (lower) risks.

Reporting of priorities

The A risks were reported to CSU’s Institutional
Compliance Office.
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Table 5 (continued)

Risk-assessment procedures

Aspects of the themes related to

(Crawford et al., 2001)

risk-assessment procedures

Creation of risk-management plans

Risk-management plans were created for highly
ranked risk areas. The plans included (a)
identification of specific risks, (b) designation of
responsible parties, (c) clarification and
documentation of policies and procedures, (d)
training, and (e) multiple levels of controls.

At CSU the risk-assessment activity evolved somewhat. During several annual
iterations, a list of risks was reviewed and discussed, and risks were arithmetically rated
and ranked. Eventually, three high-risk areas (recruiting, financial aid, and eligibility)
were seen as perennial top priorities and the risk-assessment process became less
formalized. This evolution can be viewed in two ways. On the one hand, it is
understandable that the Athletics Council’s multiyear familiarity with its athletics risks
would lead to consensus on a set of ongoing top risks. On the other hand, de-emphasizing
the formal steps of risk assessment may mean that a new risk appearing on the horizon
(such as a significant rule change) might be missed.
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U. S. Sentencing Guidelines
Viewing the themes through the updated U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2004) showed that the compliance program
in athletics at CSU was perceived as effective. The interview data indicated that program
elements, such as risk assessment, standards and procedures, high-level oversight,
training, monitoring, auditing, and disciplinary action, were in place. The interview data
also indicated that softer aspects of effective compliance, such as a culture of compliance,
compliance established as a behavioral norm, and an emphasis on ethics, were also
evident. Table 6 shows the list of compliance-program elements indicated by the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines and aspects of the themes related to compliance-program elements
observed by the researcher at CSU.
The comments of all CSU informants indicated that the athletics-compliance
program is a well-functioning operation, a high priority, and the subject of much
attention. In particular, the perspectives of the conference compliance director, the
institutional compliance director, and an Athletics Council member (all of whom function
outside the athletics department) were that CSU’s compliance effort is strong.
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Table 6
The Themes in Relation to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as a Theoretical Framework

Compliance-program elements

Aspects of the themes related to

(U.S. Sentencing Guidelines)

compliance-program elements

Identify violations

CSU self-reported several secondary violations per
year.

Show evidence of a culture

A culture of compliance was evident in (a) the open

of compliance

discussion of risks in the Athletics Council, (b) the
reporting of athletics-risk priorities at the institutional
level, and (c) the involvement of the Athletics Council
in monitoring compliance activities.

Educate senior managers

Compliance training was conducted at the institutional

and trustees

level by CSU’s Institutional Compliance Office.
Athletics-compliance training was also conducted for
Athletics Council members.

Have active senior leadership

Institutional compliance was mandated by the State
University System’s board of regents. CSU’s president
reviewed the institution’s prioritized risks. At the
athletics-program level, the athletics director actively
led the Athletics Council.
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Table 6 (continued)

Compliance-program elements

Aspects of the themes related to

(U.S. Sentencing Guidelines)

compliance-program elements

Prioritize on the basis of risk

Athletics risk areas were identified and prioritized

assessment

annually, and risk-management plans were created for
high-priority risks.

Establish compliance as

CSU’s institutional compliance program provided an

a behavioral norm

organizational context for athletics compliance.
Multiple levels of controls provided checks and
balances on behavior. Ian, the men’s basketball coach,
observed, “There are no gray areas here at CSU.”

Emphasize ethics

An ethical tone was evident at CSU. William, the
system-wide compliance officer, stated, “We work
very hard with our board and president to set the right
example in this process. . . . It starts at the board, and it
goes all the way down to the coaches.”

Standards and procedures

Athletics high-risk areas were well-documented. Riskmanagement plans served as written directions for
performing key operations. CSU’s institutional
compliance program required specific procedures, such
as reporting prioritized risks.
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Table 6 (continued)

Compliance-program elements

Aspects of the themes related to

(U.S. Sentencing Guidelines)

compliance-program elements

High-level oversight

Oversight was provided at the system level by the
System-Wide Compliance Office, at the institutional
level by the Institutional Compliance Office and
Institutional Compliance Executive Committee, and at
the athletics level by the Athletics Council.

Careful hiring and delegation

The CSU athletics program tended to promote from
within, so staff members are known. The athletics
director was assigned as the single responsibility party
for all athletics risks (thus, responsibility for
compliance was not delegated below that level).

Training and education

Compliance training was provided to all employees in
the State University System. CSU’s Institutional
Compliance Office provided training in completing
risk-management plans. Athletics Council members
received training related to the areas they monitored.
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Table 6 (continued)

Compliance-program elements

Aspects of the themes related to

(U.S. Sentencing Guidelines)

compliance-program elements

Monitoring, auditing, and

Athletics Council members monitored high-risk areas.

nonretaliatory reporting

The Institutional Compliance Office conducted audits
of operations that were high-priority risks. Selfreporting of violations by coaches was expected.

Response to violations

The athletics compliance coordinator responded in
writing to Athletic Council monitoring reports.
Corrective actions were included in self-reports.

Disciplinary action

CSU’s previous athletics director was terminated
because of a compliance failure. Richard, the athleticscompliance coordinator, stated about CSU, “If you’re
trying to take advantage of the rules and get an
advantage over anyone we compete with, you’re going
to be fired.”

The Themes in Relation to the Researcher’s Expectations
The researcher’s preliminary biases and expectations were largely confirmed. An
initial emphasis on risk assessment was broadened to an understanding of the larger
process of risk management.
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Initial Expectations
An initial expectation was that the Carston State University informants would
describe risk assessment as a positive element of both athletics and institutional
compliance. This expectation was confirmed. The informants at CSU and the SystemWide Compliance Office described risk assessment as valuable. It was commonly
expressed that every risk and rule cannot possibly be given equal attention, and,
therefore, risk areas have to be prioritized. The Mid-Central Conference compliance
director also described, from an outside perspective, the positive value of the risk-based
approach of CSU’s compliance program.
Another expectation was that the informants would share the procedural details of
implementing risk assessment. This expectation was confirmed. The informants were
forthcoming and candid and described the procedures of risk assessment and risk
management in detail.
The researcher also expected that as a result of an emphasis on risk assessment,
the informants would report that risk priorities, risk mitigation, and compliance resource
allocation were discussed in a more rational and above-board manner than perhaps occurs
at other institutions. This expectation was confirmed. Risks, plans for mitigating risks,
and reviews of operations were discussed openly in the CSU athletics program.
Interestingly, despite open communication about the volume, probability, and potential
impact of compliance risks, additional staff were not allocated to CSU’s athleticscompliance function. The compliance function remained staffed by one compliance
practitioner and an administrative assistant. However, additional resources for
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compliance monitoring were in effect obtained through the use of services of Athletics
Council members as reviewers.
The researcher expected that the risk-based institutional compliance culture of the
State University System had facilitated the use of risk management in athletics
compliance at Carston State University and that implementation of risk management at
other Division I institutions (without such cultural support) might be more challenging.
This expectation was confirmed. The system-mandated institutional compliance program
provided (a) top-down direction of compliance as a required activity; (b) a clearly defined
organization and process; (c) resources in the form of help from the System-Wide
Compliance Office and CSU’s Institutional Compliance Office; and (d) content
knowledge in the form of terminology, lists of risks, and templates of plans.
Initial Emphasis on Risk Assessment
The researcher’s preliminary view of risk was focused on risk assessment.
However, it became clear during the study that CSU’s risk approach included risk
assessment, risk management (mitigation), and risk assurance. Although risk assessment
is perhaps the most noticeable feature of a risk-based approach at first glance, risk
management and risk assurance are equally significant. The risk-management process
includes the key elements of a single responsible party and multiple levels of controls.
The risk-assurance process includes the key feature of regular monitoring of athletics
operations by parties outside the athletics department (at CSU, the Athletics Council
members and the Institutional Compliance Office).
In retrospect, the Crawford et al. (2004) description of risk-assessment
procedures, used as one of the study’s theoretical frameworks, was focused

183

(understandably) only on risk assessment. A broader process model of risk assessment,
risk management, and risk assurance evolved as a theoretical lens during the study.
Recommendations for Educational Leaders
The following recommendations are offered for educational leaders who wish to
consider adopting a risk-based approach to athletics compliance. The recommendations
include (a) possible misconceptions about risk assessment, (b) varying levels of risk
sophistication observed by the researcher, (c) elements that appeared essential for
effective implementation, (d) comments about the influence of institution-wide risk-based
compliance on athletics, (e) a possible role of conferences in risk-based compliance, and
(f) a comment on the issue of where athletics compliance should report.
Possible Misconceptions about Risk Management
It is possible that a natural first reaction to risk assessment by athleticscompliance practitioners could be something like “We do this already. We all make
decisions about where our programs are vulnerable, and we focus our energies there.”
Private subjective decisions about hot spots by compliance coordinators should not be
confused with the methodical process and group consensus of identifying, rating, and
prioritizing compliance risks. True risk assessment involves publicly acknowledging and
agreeing that energies are being focused in certain areas and not in others. This is the
opposite of a private decision made by a compliance officer about where to spend his or
her effort.
A second reaction to risk assessment by athletics-compliance practitioners could
be along the lines of “This sounds good. I don’t think our athletics director would go for
this, but I’ll just start doing it on my own.” Risk assessment should be seen as a group
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rather than an individual endeavor. The collective wisdom of the group is employed, and
the burden of risk management is shared. The risk assessment approach is the opposite of
a compliance coordinator’s making solo decisions about priorities and allocation of
effort.
A third reaction to risk assessment could be “We don’t need this because we’ve
never had a big problem here.” Paradoxically, although risk assessment is designed to
avoid crises, it seems to take a crisis to underline the need for risk management. The
experience of a crisis (or the awareness of a crisis elsewhere) seems to make the case for
risk assessment and create appreciation for the range of existing risks. Several of the
schools with active institution-wide compliance programs started them after eye-opening
negative experiences (Crawford et al., 2001; University of Washington, 2006).
Pamela (assistant director, system-wide compliance):
It’s having the vision, [not] “We’ve never had an incident, therefore, we’re never
going to have an incident.” I’ve watched people rate everything as medium-to-low
risk because it has never happened before. But it only takes one time. So,
sometimes the challenge for us is, are they thinking broadly enough and
anticipating enough?
Craig (system-wide compliance supervisor):
Institutions have limited resources. I can’t think of a single institution that says we
have too many resources. Maintenance of stairway lights might be low on the
totem pole of all the other things you could take care of, but an institution just got
fined a million dollars by the family of someone who was killed in a stairway
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because lights were burned out. Something you thought may be inconsequential-now we have precedence.
Levels of Risk Sophistication
A pattern of various degrees of understanding about risk and risk management
was observed during data collection. Five levels of risk sophistication became evident as
the informants described their experiences and observations. Some informants described
how their own thinking had developed, and some described how others’ perceptions had
evolved. These different levels of appreciation were so noticeable that a model regarding
how the views of participants develop during the adoption of risk management emerged.
This model could be used to predict reactions in other organizations as they implement
risk assessment (see Figure 9). The model shows five levels of risk sophistication.
Level 1: Adherence. The most basic level of understanding about risk
management was adherence to the required steps and procedures required. At this level,
risk management was seen as conversations to have, activities to complete, forms to
complete, and reports to submit. The sense was that individuals and groups need to
comply with a program that the institution is implementing.
Level 2: Awareness. The second level of understanding was an appreciation of the
range and magnitude of the risks faced by the organization. At this level, the number and
size of the risks were observed, the inadequacy of controls in some areas was seen, and
the general exposure of the organization was noticed. The sense was that risks are real,
that incidents have happened elsewhere and could happen here, and that the organization
should take steps to protect itself.
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Expansion
Judgment
Differentiation
Awareness
Adherence

Figure 9. Levels of risk sophistication as observed and drawn by the researcher. As
informants described the evolution of a risk mindset at CSU, the researcher noticed a
consistent pattern. The first reaction among staff tended to be adherence to the new
process, then awareness that significant risks existed, then appreciation that risks were
different at different institutions, then a focus on judging and prioritizing risks, and,
finally, interest in expanding the risk approach beyond compliance risks.
Level 3: Differentiation. The third level of understanding was a realization of the
particular risks of the individual institution as differentiated from other institutions, based
on its circumstances and constraints. At this level, comments were heard about “what we
face here” and “we’re in a different situation than that institution there.” The sense was
that all risks cannot be covered equally with limited resources, and thus, each institution
must make its local determinations about exposure and mitigation.

187

Level 4: Judgment. The next level of understanding was a sensitivity to the factors
that make one risk more serious and higher priority than another. At this level, the
comments were about being knowledgeable about the local environment and about being
conscious of severe consequences even if they were unlikely. The sense was that risks
could definitely be prioritized and that some were much higher than others.
Level 5: Expansion. The final level of sophistication was the application of risk
management beyond compliance risks to strategic, financial, and operational risks. At this
level, there was an interest in enterprise risk management and in using risk-management
concepts and practices as a normal part of executive management. The sense was that risk
management is a useful general mindset and that compliance risk is only one type of risk
that an institution faces.
Nine Essential Elements for Implementation
The following nine elements appeared to be critical to successful implementation
of risk management in athletics compliance.
1. Risk assessment should relate to the particular environment of the institution.
Risk assessment should be specific to an institution’s environment. New rules,
rules changes, new situations in individual sports, new student-athletes with
special circumstances (such as transfer or international students), and changes
in travel or facilities are just a few of the specific elements of the environment
that affect the identification and rating of risks.
2. All athletics risks, not just compliance risks, should be considered.
Considering all athletics risks garners the attention of all athletics stakeholders
and makes discussion accessible to those not expert in the rules. Physical
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safety and Title IX equity are examples of athletics risks that are not
specifically NCAA-rules related, but should be considered. Of the 74 specific
athletics risks identified by the State University System’s High-Risk Working
Group, 49 (66%) were related to NCAA rules, and the rest were related to (a)
gender equity; (b) certification; (c) conference rules; (d) student-athlete
welfare, safety, and health; (e) facilities safety and inclement weather; and (f)
fiscal management.
3. Risk assessment should start at a high conceptual level, but high-risk areas
must be reduced to specific, actionable risks. Initially, the discussion of risks
should be at a high level so that the full range of athletics risks can be scanned
and considered. But identified risk areas (such as eligibility, recruiting, and
benefits) must be broken down into specific risks so that risk mitigation plans
can be created. Otherwise, the initial discussion of risks can appear to be
merely an intellectual exercise or a big-picture overview for executives.
Drucker (1993) observed, “If objectives are only good intentions they are
worthless. They must degenerate into work” (p. 101). Similarly, risk
assessments must degenerate into specific decisions about areas of emphasis
for compliance activity.
4. In risk prioritization, careful attention should be paid to the consequence of a
risk if it were to occur. A risk with a catastrophic consequence should not be
ignored because it has never happened, its possibility seems remote, or
policies are in place. Otherwise, stakeholders could convince themselves that
their program faces no significant risks. Risks with catastrophic or major
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impact should be considered major even if their probability is deemed
unlikely or rare.
5. Some risk mitigation steps should be seen as stronger than others. When a
risk mitigation plan is created, common-sense questions should be asked
about its preventive power. A plan might include adding a policy to the policy
manual, but one should ask, “Do people actually look in the policy manual?”
Once a policy is stated, it is likely that defining an accompanying procedure
adds strength, providing training on the policy and procedure adds more
strength, and monitoring the actual operation of the procedure adds still more
strength.
6. A single responsible party should be assigned to each high-risk area.
Assigning a single responsible party to a risk area is a powerful mitigation
step. At CSU the single responsible party for all athletics risks is the athletics
director (not the athletics-compliance coordinator). The single responsible
party is then likely to (a) call for better information about steps and status, (b)
clarify others’ responsibilities, and (c) personally sign-off on decisions and
reports about the risk area.
7. Multiple levels of controls should be implemented. The principle that no one
should serve as the control on his or her own work should be adopted. Three
levels of control--operating controls, supervisory controls, and oversight
controls--should be built into risk mitigation plans. The purpose of multiple
controls is to prevent problems from being buried and to ensure that
mitigation plans operate as planned.

190

8. A commitment to openness and transparency should accompany the riskmanagement methodology. Rating athletics risks on a scale of 1 to 10 is not
likely to be helpful if the athletics program is not ready to discuss risks and
control procedures openly and to allow members of the campus to observe,
comment, and check on the risks. The athletics program should be open to
frank communication and outside review.
9. The athletics-compliance committee should be made a key party and partner
in risk management. Risk management gives the athletics-compliance
committee12 a critical (rather than merely symbolic) role. The committee
members can provide much-needed additional manpower for compliance
monitoring. By being deeply involved in a trusted role, the committee can also
be a positive connection between athletics and the rest of the campus.
Can Athletics Proceed Without an Institution-Wide Program?
Carston State University athletics implemented risk management in the context of
an institution-wide compliance program. The institution-wide program provided several
benefits: (a) a top-down mandate, (b) a compliance organization and process, (c)
resources and help, and (d) supporting tools and information. Can another athletics
program adopt risk management if its institution does not have an institution-wide
compliance program?
It seems that an athletic program could adopt a risk management approach on its
own. Even in the absence of an institutional program, (a) athletics risks could be
identified and prioritized, (b) risk-management plans could be developed for high-priority
risks, (c) a single responsible party could be assigned to each high-risk area, (d) multiple
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levels of control could be defined, and (e) an athletics compliance committee could be
given responsibility for monitoring. The athletics department could decide to be open and
transparent about its risks and risk-management plans, both to its compliance committee
and its administration.
Nonetheless, it seems intuitive that implementation in the context of an
institutional compliance program would be easier. Departments that touch athletics would
understand the language and concepts of risk management. The administration would
have a context for discussing athletics risks. Resources would be available to assist in
training, development of risk plans, and monitoring.
An Opportunity for Conferences
In adopting risk management, CSU athletics benefited from being part of the State
University System by sharing tools, ideas, and information with other institutions. How
can other schools obtain similar benefits? One idea is that athletics conferences could
sponsor the adoption of risk-based compliance among member institutions. Riskmanagement plans should not be considered confidential information or competitive
advantages. On the contrary, all of the schools (and the conference itself) would benefit
from enhanced compliance. The benefits of conference-coordinated risk management in
athletics compliance would include the following:
1. By definition, the schools in any conference are roughly similar with regard to
size, resources, and competitiveness and thus face similar athletics risks. This
similarity would provide a common context for sharing risk approaches.
2. Working as a conference on mutually beneficial plans would provide a
collegial environment for athletics-compliance coordinators. Athletics-
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compliance coordinators typically do not have an avenue for openly sharing
compliance-program details.
3. Conference-based discussions would produce a wider, more diverse set of
ideas about approaches to compliance risks. Compliance coordinators have
tended to have primarily only their own institutions’ perspectives on
compliance.
4. The schools in a conference could share all forms, templates, and training
materials as well as a common set of compliance and risk terminology. The
additional work associated with assessing risks and creating plans could be
offset by the sharing among the schools.
5. The schools in a conference could share their actual lists of prioritized risks
and risk-management plans. Schools could learn from each other, share
techniques, and test different mitigation plans.
6. Schools could conduct peer reviews of each other’s compliance programs.
This would provide an additional source of risk assurance.
Where Should Athletics Compliance Report?
A topic of some debate is whether athletics compliance should report inside or
outside of athletics. The two sides are fairly clearly drawn. The argument for athletics
compliance’s reporting inside athletics is that the athletics director is responsible for
compliance and thus should have control over the compliance function as the means of
fulfilling that responsibility. In addition, there is a daily, even hourly, need for customer
service as coaches and administrators ask for rules interpretations, help with waivers, and
advice about what is allowable under the rules. Finally, there is some sense that the
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compliance person should be on athletics’ side in terms of looking for ways to help teams
to be competitive and not just being a watchdog.
The argument for athletics compliance’s reporting outside of athletics is that if
athletics compliance is under the control of the athletics department, then athletics is
essentially monitoring itself. The athletic-compliance coordinator can be, intentionally or
unintentionally, pressured to look the other way. From this perspective, an athletics
director truly concerned about compliance should want the compliance function to be
outside the pressure of the athletics department.
A middle ground is dual reporting, in which the athletics-compliance coordinator
reports both inside the athletics department and outside (to the president or other senior
administrator).
The risk-management approach, as observed at CSU, offers yet another
alternative. At CSU, the athletics-compliance coordinator reports to the athletics director,
with a dotted-line reporting relationship to the president. However, there is not a sense
that athletics compliance is enclosed within athletics. Compliance risks are openly
discussed with the Athletics Council and the Institutional Compliance Office. Athletics
Council members serve as outside monitors on compliance activities. In this situation, it
is unlikely that the compliance coordinator, although reporting inside athletics, could be
pressured to ignore problems or would have no avenue to express concerns.
Recommendations for Future Research
The topics of athletics compliance and risk management in higher education are
rich areas for future research and deserve scholarly attention. Athletics compliance in
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particular has been virtually ignored as a research topic. This is ironic given the many
athletics-compliance risks that institutions face.
The Athletics-Compliance Function
Little is known about the athletics-compliance function beyond anecdotal
observations of practitioners and perhaps information sharing within conferences. Data
should be collected from institutions about the (a) resources, (b) reporting relationships,
(c) responsibilities, (d) qualifications, and (e) activities of athletics-compliance staffs.
These data should be analyzed by division (I-A, I, II, and III).
Data on resources devoted to athletics compliance should include (a) the number
of compliance staff members relative to the number of student-athletes, (b) compliance
budget relative to the number of student-athletes, and (c) compliance budget as a
percentage of the total athletics budget. Data on reporting relationships should include the
organizational reporting structures of athletics-compliance operations as well as physical
location relative to the athletics department. Data on the responsibilities of athleticscompliance staffs should include the responsibilities outside compliance (such as
academic support, certification, or sport management). Data on the qualifications of
athletics-compliance practitioners should include education level (such as legal degrees)
and previous experience. Data on compliance activities should include the amount of
time spent on various program elements (such as rules education and monitoring) and the
amount of time spent with various parties (such as the athletics director and coaches).
In addition, similar data related to the roles of faculty athletics representatives and
athletics academic counselors should be collected.
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Athletics-Compliance Programs
Athletics-compliance program effectiveness has received little research attention.
Most information about compliance-program effectiveness comes from outside reviews
of individual programs (the content of which is available only to the institution). Data
related to (a) views about compliance-program effectiveness, (b) compliance-program
elements in use, and (c) the characteristics of effective compliance programs should be
collected from institutions. These data should also be analyzed by division.
The views of presidents, athletics directors, and athletics-compliance coordinators
about compliance-program effectiveness should be measured and compared. Data should
be collected on their (a) views of athletics risks, (b) perceptions of preventive measures in
place, and (c) satisfaction with existing compliance efforts.
Data should be collected on the extent of implementation of various complianceprogram elements (such as policy manuals, rules education, and monitoring). Coaches’
perceptions of compliance-program elements, as well as their observations of actual
adherence (or nonadherence) to the rules, should be measured.
Athletics-compliance programs that are admired as effective should be studied in
order to identify their critical features and success factors. Both qualitative studies (in the
form of case studies and interviews) and quantitative studies (using numerically scored
tools that list program indicators) are warranted.
Additionally, the greater use of information technology to support compliance
should be studied. A huge volume of information must be collected, maintained,
reviewed, summarized, and reported. Ever-changing information about rules must be
digested and distributed to coaches and others. The use of software systems to facilitate

196

these activities should be studied. An example is web-based training. Because rules
change continually and just-in-time training is useful (such as refresher training on
recruiting rules just before recruiting trips), web-based training holds promise and should
be explored.
The Challenge of Dependent Measures in Compliance
It is natural and logical to ask “How does risk management affect the actual
number of infractions?” However, the number of infractions is inherently a problematic
dependent variable. In the NCAA, infractions are primarily self-reported. Thus, a higher
number of self-reported infractions may indicate an attentive, well-functioning
compliance operation, whereas a lower number of self-reported infractions may indicate a
lax, unaware operation. An analogy would be using the number of groundings of
teenagers as a dependent measure of parental effectiveness. A higher number of
groundings could indicate a troubled teen or observant, committed parents, whereas a
lower number of groundings could indicate a well-behaved teen or disengaged, oblivious
parents. Pickle (2003) quoted Chris Stroebel, director of enforcement at the NCAA,
regarding the possible underreporting of violations in Division II:
It’s sometimes a difficult concept to convey, but it reflects positively on the
institution if it self-reports any violations that it uncovers. It is important to
remember that the self-reporting of violations is required by the NCAA
Constitution as a key element of institutional control. . . . If an institution is doing
no self-reporting at all, that might be regarded as evidence that it does not have
efficient rules-compliance policies in place. (para. 12)
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Better dependent measures of compliance-program effectiveness would be ratings
by independent compliance reviewers on an objective lists of compliance-program
indicators, such as were used by Pelliccioni (2002) in her research on healthcare
compliance-program effectiveness.
Risk Management in Athletics Compliance
The present study appears to be the first in-depth case study of the use of risk
management in athletics compliance. Additional case studies of the use of risk
management would be valuable. Institutions both with and without institution-wide
compliance would be useful as research sites. Studies of athletics programs that
implement a subset of key features of risk management, such as the participation of
athletics-council members in monitoring, would also be helpful. Studies that examine the
viability of interinstitutional sharing of risk-related forms, templates, and other materials
would be important.
Institution-Wide Compliance and Risk Management
Some colleges and universities have implemented institution-wide compliance
programs (Sheldon & Hoffman, 2005; University of Washington, 2006). Data should be
collected about the approaches, elements, and implementation steps of such programs.
Enterprise-wide risk management is the application of risk-mitigation approaches
to all kinds of risk (strategic, financial, operational, and reputational, as well as
compliance). Whitfield (2003) studied enterprise-wide risk management at five
universities and several private-sector organizations and concluded that the corporate
sector’s enterprise-wide risk-management framework is transferable to higher education.
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Higher education institutions adopting enterprise-wide risk management should be
studied as cases in order to understand their approaches and elements.
Conclusion
Risk management is a widely used compliance tool outside higher education and
is being increasingly used in higher education. It has not been widely used in athletics
compliance.
The findings of this study indicate that risk management has a place in athletics
compliance. Risk management appeared to play a beneficial role in athletics compliance
at Carston State University, with no observable disadvantage other than the
implementation effort involved. It seemed to be a vehicle for open discussion about how
best to address the thousands of NCAA rules as well as other significant athletics risks
(such as student-athlete safety). The risk-based approach in athletics compliance at CSU
was characterized by (a) clear identification of top risks, (b) mitigation plans with
multiple levels of control, and (c) outside review. Risk management was a means of
communicating the importance and needs of compliance throughout the institution. It
established compliance as a shared responsibility among the athletics staff and its
athletics council, and the ultimate responsibility for compliance rested with the athletics
director.
Institutions face significant athletics-compliance risks. Operating in compliance
with thousands of rules is a formidable and daunting task. At their best, athletics
compliance programs are well-funded, well-respected, and well-connected; at their worst,
they are underfunded, easily pressured, and closed-off. Those involved in athletics
compliance (and certainly all of those participating in this study) acknowledge the
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challenge. However, risk management appears to be a beneficial approach for addressing
the challenge and protecting institutions.
Risk management is certainly no guarantee of zero compliance problems.
Nonetheless, incorporating risk management into athletics compliance offers to
educational leaders a new, more rational, and empowering approach to protecting
universities and student-athletes.
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Appendix A: Definitions
20-hour rule. The 20-hour rule, limiting practice and competition to 20 hours per
week, was passed in 1991.
Admonishment. A letter of admonishment is written to the personal responsible
for a rules violation to provide written notice that his or her actions resulted in a
violation; the letter usually conveys a warning or express disapproval of the individual's
actions or oversight. Writing a letter of admonishment to the involved party is a common
corrective action taken by institutions when self-reporting an institutional violation.
APR. The Academic Progress Rate (APR) is a real-time assessment of a team's
academic performance, which awards two points each term to scholarship studentathletes who meet academic eligibility standards and who remain with the institution. A
team's APR is the total points earned by the team at a given time divided by the total
points possible. Teams that do not score a cut-off point of 925 are subject to
contemporaneous penalties. For every student-athlete who is not eligible and does not
stay in school, the team that scored below 925 will lose one scholarship (up to a
maximum of 10% of the allowable number of scholarships).
Arms race. The term used to describe the continual rise of spending on athletics
by schools in an effort to be competitive and obtain revenue.
Auditors. Audit, compliance, and risk management are often separate functions.
Auditors identify, assess, and monitor risks. They do not manage or mitigate risks.
Auditors are typically certified accountants and information technology professionals
(University of Washington, 2006).
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BCS. The Bowl Championship Series (BCS) is a system which selects the college
football match-ups for four bowl games, called the BCS bowl games. The teams selected
include the conference champion from each of the six BCS conferences plus two others
(“at-large” selections). The BCS operates separately from the NCAA.
Bylaw. A bylaw is an individual rule contained within the NCAA rules manual.
Each bylaw is numbered. The Division I manual contains thousands of bylaws.
Censure. An official rebuke; a public reprimand. Institutions may be censured as a
result of serious (or less serious, but widespread or repeated) rules violations.
Certification. The NCAA requires that each member institution, once every 10
years, complete an institutional self-study, verified and evaluated through an external
peer review. The self-study must encompass operating principles in three areas:
governance and commitment to rules compliance, academic integrity, and equity and
student-athlete well-being.
Compliance review. An independent assessment of the athletics compliance
operation at an institution.
Community college transfer. A student-athlete who attends a two-year community
college and subsequently transfers to a four-year college. This student-athlete may
compete in the first year at the four-year college only if he or she meets the two-year
transfers requirements.
Compliance officers. Compliance, audit, and risk management are often separate
functions. Compliance officers cover the full risk cycle (identification, assessment,
mitigation, and monitoring). A compliance officer’s role may be advisory or it may
include decision making and enforcement. Compliance officers may address broad
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institutional compliance or a more narrow compliance area. Compliance officers often
have legal or auditing backgrounds (University of Washington, 2006).
Compliance program. The NCAA operating principle of rules compliance states
that an institution shall demonstrate (a) direct accountability for rules compliance by the
individual responsible for the athletics program; (b) regular participation of persons
outside of the athletics department; (c) ongoing education on rules compliance; (d) clear
and unambiguous commitment to rules compliance; and (e) at least once every four years,
its rules-compliance program must be the subject of evaluation by an authority outside of
the athletics department.
Compliance risk. Risk that affects compliance with laws and regulations as well
as with internal policies and procedures such as safety and conflict of interest.
Compliance risk is one of five types of risk (along with strategic risk, financial risk,
operational risk, and reputational risk) defined by the National Association of College
and University Business Officers (NACUBO) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (Cassidy et
al., 2001).
C.O.D.E. The NCAA’s acronym for the four elements of an effective compliance
program: (a) communication, (b) organization, (c) document, and (d) evaluation.
COIA. Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletics. COIA is a coalition of Division I-A
faculty senates formed to promote academic reform in college sports.
COSO. Committee of Sponsoring Organizations. COSO’s major objective is to
identify the factors that cause fraudulent financial reporting and to make
recommendations to reduce its incidence. COSO, initially through its Treadway
Commission and on an ongoing basis, has established a common definition of internal
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controls, standards, and criteria against which companies and organizations can assess
their control systems. COSO is sponsored and funded by five professional accounting
associations: (a) American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), (b)
American Accounting Association (AAA),(c) Financial Executives Institute (FEI), (d)
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) and (e) The Institute of Management Accountants
(IMA).
Death penalty. The harshest penalty assigned to an institution for NCAA rules
violations. The death penalty prohibits some or all outside sports competition at a school
and eliminates recruiting and scholarships for a designated period.
Division I. Division I member institutions must sponsor 14 sports (seven men’s
and seven women’s sports, or six men’s and eight women’s sports, with two team sports
for each gender). A Division I school must meet financial aid (athletics scholarships)
minimums, and there are maximum financial aid awards for each sport that a Division I
school cannot exceed. These minimums and maximums are in place to level the
competitive playing field.
Division I-A. Division I-A member institutions sponsor bowl-eligible football as
one of their sports. Division I-A schools must sponsor 16 sports (at least six men’s sports
and at least eight women’s sports, with two team sports for each gender). Division I-A
teams must also meet minimum football attendance requirements (average 15,000 people
in actual or paid attendance per home game, which must be met once in a two-year
period).
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Division I-AA. A Division I-AA schools are Division I schools that sponsor
football, although they are not bowl-eligible and have a lower maximum number of
allowed scholarships.
Division I-AAA. Division I-AAA schools are Division I schools that do not
sponsor football. Basketball is typically their high-profile sport. Division I-AAA schools
are often called simply “Division I.”
Eligibility. To be eligible to represent an institution in intercollegiate athletics
competition, the NCAA requires that a student-athlete be enrolled in at least a minimum
full-time program of studies, be in good academic standing, and maintain progress toward
a baccalaureate or equivalent degree.
Enterprise-wide risk management. As discussed by the National Association of
College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) and PricewaterhouseCoopers,
enterprise-wide risk management encompasses all of the strategic, financial, operational,
compliance, and reputational issues that an organization might encounter in its attempt to
achieve its objectives (Cassidy et al., 2001). (An enterprise-wide risk management
program focuses on all risks faced by an organization, while an institution-wide
compliance program focuses on an organization’s compliance risks.)
Extra benefits. Any special arrangement by either an institution or its
representatives to provide student-athletes or their friends or relatives with any benefits
not expressly authorized by the NCAA. An extra benefit is not considered a violation if it
is one that is generally available to all students or is received on a basis unrelated to
athletic ability or association.

220

Faculty Athletics Representative. The NCAA rules require a member institution to
designate an individual to serve as faculty athletics representative. This individual shall
be a member of the institution’s faculty or an administrator who holds faculty rank and
shall not hold an administrative or coaching position in the athletics department. Duties
of the faculty athletics representative shall be determined by the member institution.
Financial risk. Risk that may result in a loss of assets. Financial risk is one of five
types of risk (along with strategic risk, operational risk, compliance risk, and reputational
risk) defined by the National Association of College and University Business Officers
(NACUBO) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (Cassidy et al., 2001).
Flutie effect. The 12% increase in applications experienced by Boston College in
the year following quarterback Doug Flutie’s last-second touchdown pass to beat
University of Miami in 1984. The Flutie effect is one explanation for institutions’
investment in college sports, i.e., the belief that athletics success increases student
applications.
Impact of occurrence. The potential consequence of a risk if it were to occur. In
risk assessment, risks are rated on the potential impact, either on a scale of 1-10 or as
low, medium, or high.
Infraction. A rules violation.
Institutional control. It is the responsibility of each institution that is a member of
the NCAA to control its athletics program. The control and responsibility for the conduct
of intercollegiate athletics shall be exercised by the institution itself and by the
conference(s), if any, of which it is a member. Administrative control or faculty control,
or a combination of the two, shall constitute institutional control.
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Institution-wide compliance program. A mechanism for management to obtain
ongoing assurance regarding all compliance risks faced by an organization. (An
institution-wide compliance program focuses on an organization’s compliance risks,
while an enterprise-wide risk management program focuses on all risks – strategic ,
financial, operational, compliance, and reputational – faced by an organization.)
Investigation. The process by which an alleged rules violation is confirmed or
disconfirmed. The investigation can be conducted by the institution itself or by an outside
entity, such as the NCAA Enforcement staff.
Knight Commission. The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics was
created by the Knight Foundation in 1989 as an independent panel of leaders from
education, business, and sports to study college sports.
Lake Woebegone effect. An explanation for why so many schools invest so much
in college sports. They all believe that their chances of winning are “above average” and
that their investment in athletics will pay off.
NCAA. The National Collegiate Athletics Association is the national governing
body for intercollegiate athletics programs at the Division I, II and III levels. NCAA is
sometimes used to mean (a) the entire membership of colleges and universities, (b) the
headquarters staff, and (c) the committees that draft legislation or the staff that interprets
the rules. A practical definition is the combination of voluntary members plus the paid
headquarters staff who participate in legislation, certification, and enforcement of athletic
rules and policies.
NCAA Constitution. The NCAA’s constitution describes its (a) purposes and
fundamental policy, (b) principles for the conduct of intercollegiate athletics, (c)
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membership, (d) organization, (e) legislative authority and process, and (f) the concept of
institutional control. The NCAA Constitution is the first six sections of the NCAA
Division I Manual.
NCAA Division I Board of Directors. The Division I Board of Directors,
responsible for policy and rules changes, is composed of 11 Division I-A presidents (one
per conference) and seven Division I-AA or Division I-AAA presidents.
NCAA Division I Manual. The NCAA Division I manual contains the NCAA
constitution, operating bylaws, and administrative bylaws. The 2005-06 NCAA Division I
Manual is 464 pages long, includes 33 sections, and contains several thousand rules.
NCAA Division I Management Council. The Division I Management Council is
composed of 49 athletics administrators who vote on rules recommendations to the
Division I Board of Directors.
NCAA Executive Committee. The NCAA Executive Committee, responsible for
association strategy planning and oversight, is composed of the NCAA president, 12
Division I presidents, two Division II and two Division III presidents, and the chairs of
the Division I, II, and III management councils.
NCAA Operating Principles. In its certification process the NCAA requires a selfstudy in which an institution assesses itself against operating principles and requirements
in three areas: (a) Governance and Commitment to Rules Compliance (including
institutional control, presidential authority, and shared responsibilities, and rules
compliance); (b) Academic Integrity (including academic standards and academic
support); and (c) Equity and Student-Athlete Welfare (including gender issues, minority
issues, and student-athlete welfare).
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NCAA Principles of Institutional Control. The NCAA’s articulated principles of
institutional control are: (a) formal policies and procedures, (b) monitoring and
enforcement, (c) communication of procedures, (d) alterations of systems as needed, (e)
swift response to violations, (f) communication of disciplinary consequences, (g)
individual reporting without negative consequences, and (h) compliance education.
NCAA restructuring. The committee structure of the NCAA was reorganized in
1997 to make the members of the Executive Committee and the Division I Board of
Directors primarily university presidents.
OIG. Office of Inspector General. OIG issued Compliance Program Guidance for
Hospitals in 1998, based on the 1991 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
“One-plus-three” model. Presidential control, directed toward academic integrity,
financial integrity, and independent certification. The Knight Commission proposed the
“one-plus-three” model for reforming intercollegiate athletics in its 2001 report.
Operating controls. Procedures applied by operating staff during every
transaction in a process to ensure compliance with rules governing the process.
Operational risk. Risk that affects an ongoing management process. Operational
risk is one of five types of risk (along with strategic risk, financial risk, compliance risk,
and reputational risk) defined by the National Association of College and University
Business Officers (NACUBO) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (Cassidy et al., 2001).
Oversight controls. Procedures applied by senior managers (or others) on
completed transactions to ensure that operating or supervisory controls have been
applied.
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Presidents Commission. In 1984 the NCAA established a 44-member Presidents
Commission with advisory-only powers. The 1997 restructuring that put presidents on the
NCAA Executive Committee and Division I Board of Directors made the Presidents
Commission redundant.
Probability of occurrence. The likelihood of a risk happening. In risk assessment,
risks are rated on their probability of occurrence, either on a scale of 1-5 or 1-10 or as
low, medium, or high.
Probation. The conditions of probation are designed on a case-by-case basis and
may include written reports, in-person reviews by the NCAA Committee on Infractions,
implementation of educational or deterrent programs, and audits for specific programs or
teams.
Proposition 16. The NCAA requirements, passed in 1992 and implemented in
1996, which governed initial eligibility for student-athletes at Division I schools. To
qualify for full eligibility under Proposition 16, student-athletes were required to have a
2.0 grade-point average in 13 approved core courses and an SAT of 1010 or a combined
ACT of 86 (or a GPA of 2.5 and SAT of 820 or ACT of 68. (Proposition 16 succeeded
Proposition 48.)
Proposition 48. The NCAA requirements, passed in 1983 and implemented in
1986, that governed initial eligibility for student-athletes at Division I schools. To qualify
for full eligibility under Proposition 48, student-athletes were required to have a GPA of
2.0 in 11 core courses and an SAT score of 700 or an ACT score of 15.
Reprimand. A public or private admonishment of an individual or institution.
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Reputational risk. Risks that affect an organization’s reputation, brand, or both.
(Reputational risk may result from the failure to manage other types of risk.) Reputational
risk is one of five types of risk (along with strategic risk, financial risk, operational risk,
and compliance risk) defined by the National Association of College and University
Business Officers (NACUBO) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (Cassidy et al., 2001).
Risk. As defined by the National Association of College and University Business
Officers (NACUBO) and PricewaterhouseCoopers, a risk is any issue that impacts an
organization’s ability to meet its objectives. Five types of risk include strategic risk,
financial risk, operational risk, compliance risk, and reputational risk (Cassidy et al.,
2001). Risks are the uncertainties that may impact an institution’s ability to reach its
goals (University of Washington, 2006).
Risk area. A type of risk, such as extra benefits. Within the risk area of extra
benefits, a specific risk would be that a student-athlete could be provided a car by a
booster.
Risk assessment. The process of identifying, rating (on potential impact and
probability of occurrence), prioritizing, and reporting of risk areas.
Risk assurance. The review of the risk management process by individuals and
bodies outside the normal operating and management hierarchy to verify that controls are
in place and functioning.
Risk management. The process of identifying specific risks in risk areas, assigning
responsibility, determining risk strategies, developing risk mitigation plans (including
operational procedures, training, and monitoring), implementing the plans, and the use of
operating and supervisory controls as a standard part of operations.
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Risk managers. Risk management, audit, and compliance are often separate
functions. Risk managers cover the full risk cycle (identification, assessment, mitigation,
and monitoring). Risk managers rely on data and statistical analysis to inform their
mitigation plans. Risk managers often have legal or insurance backgrounds (University of
Washington, 2006).
Sanction. A penalty, particularly precluding participation. A sanction may
preclude an individual student-athlete from participating in competition, such as for
gambling, or a sanction may preclude a team from participating in post-season
competition, such as for a violation that indicates a lack of institutional control.
Sanity Code. The NCAA passed Article 3 of the NCAA Constitution, popularly
known as the “Sanity Code,” in 1948. An effort at reform, the Sanity Code defined
amateurism, required athletes to be held to the same academic standards as other
students, required that financial aid be awarded without consideration for athletic ability,
and prohibited the offering of financial aid as part of recruiting. The penalty was
expulsion from the NCAA. The Sanity Code was repealed in 1951 but it led the NCAA to
become an enforcement body.
Self-report. NCAA member institutions are expected to self-monitor their
compliance with NCAA rules and to self-report violations.
Senior woman administrator. The athletics senior woman administrator is the
most senior female administrator in an athletics department and is responsible for the
welfare and equitable treatment of female student-athletes and female coaches.
Specific risk. A risk within a risk area. For example, within the risk area of extra
benefits, a specific risk would be that student-athletes could practice or compete while
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enrolled in less than a full-time program of study. A specific risk is specific enough that
a risk management plan can be created for it.
Strategic risk. Risk that affects an organization’s ability to achieve its goals, such
as the risk associated with a university’s expanding into a new enrollment market.
Strategic risk is one of five types of risk (along with financial risk, operational risk,
compliance risk, and reputational risk) defined by the National Association of College
and University Business Officers (NACUBO) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (Cassidy et
al., 2001).
Supervisory controls. Procedures performed by first-line managers on completed
transactions to ensure that operating controls were applied.
Treadway Commission. COSO’s National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting (popularly named after its chairman, James C. Treadway, Jr.). The Treadway
Commission produced COSO’s Internal Control - Integrated Framework in 1992.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. The Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations were issued by the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 1991 to make
corporate punishment more uniform and severe and to promote voluntary compliance
programs. The guidelines for effective compliance programs were: (a) standards and
procedures; (b) high-level oversight; (c) careful hiring and delegation; (d) training and
education; (e) monitoring, auditing, and nonretaliatory reporting; (f) response to
violations; and (g) disciplinary action. The Sentencing Guidelines were revised in 2004.
Violation. A rules infraction. A secondary violation is a violation that is isolated
or inadvertent, provides minimal advantage, and does not include any significant
recruiting inducement or extra benefit. (Multiple or widespread secondary violations may
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be considered a major violation.) All violations other than secondary violations are major
violations, specifically those that provide an extensive recruiting or competitive
advantage.
.

229

Appendix B: Interview Protocol
Risk Assessment in Athletics Compliance
Interview Protocol

Time of interview:

_____________________________________

Date: ___________________________________________________

Place: ____________________________________________________

Informant: _________________________________________________

Position of informant: ________________________________________

1. Describe the project. Tell the informant about:
(a) The purpose of the study.
(b) The individuals and sources of the data being collected.
(c) What will be done with the data to protect the confidentiality of the informant.
(d) How long the interview will take.

2. Have the informant read and sign the consent form.

3. Turn on the recorder and test it.
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Appendix C: Consent Agreement
This study is being conducted by Melody Reifel Werner of Eastern Michigan University to
better understand the use of risk assessment in NCAA compliance.
The research method is an interview. The interview questions ask my thoughts about risk
assessment and athletics compliance at my institution. There are no right or wrong answers,
only my personal views and experiences.
The interview will take approximately an hour, and the overall study will be completed in
about six months. The interviews will be audio-recorded for accuracy. The recordings will be
kept confidential and secure. This will be accomplished by uploading the audio recordings to
a personal computer, which will be password protected. Immediately after uploading each
file recording to the computer, the audio file will be erased from the recorder. All audio data
will be destroyed at the completion of the oral defense of the dissertation.
I can ask questions at any time about the interview or the study in general.
If I wish to change any information after the interview has been conducted, or if I have any
questions, I can contact Melody Reifel Werner at 734-487-2327 or
melody.reifel@emich.edu, who is a dissertator at Eastern Michigan University. You may also
contact the Chair of Melody’s dissertation committee, Dr. James Berry, at 734-487-0255 or
jberry@emich.edu
The results will be reported in a dissertation, and possibly in other presentations or
professional publications. In any and all of these reports, the subjects and institution will
remain completely anonymous.
Participation is strictly voluntary. I am free to withdraw my participation at any time.
If I have any questions I may also contact Dr. Patrick Melia and Dr. Steve Pernecky at 734487-0379, who are Co-Chairs of the Eastern Michigan University Human Subjects Review
Committee.
I have read all of the above information regarding this study. The procedures and
requirements have been explained to me, and I understand them. I freely and voluntarily
consent to be a participant.
For my records, I have been provided with a copy of this consent form.
Signature: ______________________________________________________________
Print: __________________________________________________________________
Date: _______________________________
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Appendix D: List of Documents Reviewed
The following documents were collected and analyzed as data.
State University System risk management and compliance documents
1. Intercollegiate Athletics High-Risk Compliance Group:
a. Rules Education Monitoring Plan
b. Infractions Monitoring Plan
c. Departmental Management Monitoring Plan
d. Fiscal Management Monitoring Plan
e. Conference Operating Code Monitoring Plan
f. Recruiting Monitoring Plan
g. Student Eligibility Monitoring Plan
h. Financial Aid Monitoring Plan
i. Extra Benefits Monitoring Plan
j. Gender Equity Monitoring Plan
k. Student Welfare Monitoring Plan
l. Sport Camps Monitoring Plan
m. Facilities Safety Monitoring Plan
n. Inclement Weather Monitoring Plan
CSU institutional risk management and compliance documents
2. CSU Institutional Compliance Program Risk Assessment Methodology
3. CSU Risk Assessment and Implementation Plan
4. Institutional Compliance Monitoring Plan
5. Risk Assessment Summaries
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CSU athletics risk management documents
6. CSU Recruiting Monitoring Plan
7. CSU Quarterly Specialized Training Report
8. Intercollegiate Athletics Compliance Committee Bylaws
CSU athletics compliance documents
9. CSU Self-Reported secondary violations reports
10. CSU Student-Athlete Eligibility Forms
11. CSU Eligibility Verification Form
12. CSU Worksheet for Percent of Degree Completion
13. CSU Sample Degree Plan
14. CSU Certification Status Report
15. CSU Squad List
Oversight reports from entities outside the Athletics Department
16. Various reports from Student Eligibility Oversight Committee (with corresponding
written responses from the Compliance Coordinator)
17. Various reports of outside compliance reviews conducted by CSU’s Internal Audit
department (and corresponding written responses from the Compliance Coordinator).
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Appendix E: Risks Identified by the High-Risk Working Group
The Intercollegiate Athletics High-Risk Working Group identified 14 high-risk
areas in four categories.
Fourteen high-risk areas. In the category of Institutional Control, the high-risk
areas were (a) rules education and (b) infractions. In the category of Departmental
Management, the high-risk areas were (c) Athletics Department certification and annual
audit, (d) fiscal management, and (e) the conference’s Operating Code. In the category of
Student-Athlete Management, the high-risk areas were (f) recruiting, (g) student
eligibility, (h) financial aid, (i) extra benefits, (j) gender equity, and (k) student welfare.
In the category of Third Party Management, the high-risk areas were (l) sport camps, (m)
facilities safety, and (n) inclement weather.
Seventy-four specific risks. The working group members then identified 74
specific risks within the 14 high-risk areas that they rated as high impact (if they
occurred) and as high or medium probability (likelihood of occurring). The working
group developed monitoring plans for these specific high risks.
Rules education. In the high-risk area of rules education, the working group
identified five specific risks: (a) lack of a comprehensive rules education program, (b)
rules and regulations not disseminated to the appropriate individuals; (c) failure to
monitor rules education, (d) information not current, and (e) lack of effective delivery.
Infractions. In the high-risk area of infractions, the working group identified three
specific risks: (a) lack of procedures to handle infractions, (b) failure to implement
corrective actions for major violations, and (c) failure to implement corrective actions for
secondary violations.
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Certification and annual audit. In the high-risk area of Athletics Department
certification and annual audit, the working group identified three specific risks: (a) the
Athletic Department loses NCAA certification, (b) an annual financial audit report
jeopardizes NCAA certification, and (c) a conference certification review results in a bad
report.
Fiscal management. In the high-risk area of fiscal management, the working
group identified five specific risks: (a) failure to monitor departmental equipment
appropriately, (b) failure to perform account reconciliations, (c) failure to maintain
adequate segregation of duties over financial processes, (d) exceeding budgetary limits,
and (e) inappropriate purchases using a purchasing card.
Conference’s operating code. In the high-risk area of the conference’s operating
code, the working group identified one specific risk, which was that noncompliance with
conference rules can result in sanctions and penalties.
Recruiting. In the high-risk area of recruiting, the working group identified 11
specific risks: (a) failure to obtain necessary academic prerequisites, (b) official visit
length too long, (c) official visits and off-campus contacts conducted during a prohibited
time, (d) inappropriate lodging and transportation provided to prospect or family, (e) the
prospect not notified about the five-visit limitation and about the school’s graduation-rate
data, (f) too many official visits for a specific sport conducted, (g) inappropriate conduct
by the student-athlete host, (h) inadequate documentation kept related to off-campus
visits and evaluations, (i) too many off-campus visits and evaluations, (j) recruiting
activities by an ineligible coach, and (k) inappropriate contact or payment by a booster.

235

Student eligibility. In the high-risk area of student eligibility, the working group
identified 14 specific risk areas: (a) walk-ons not having proper admission status, (b) not
adhering to 5-year/10-semester rules, (c) inadequate monitoring of enrollment, (d)
inadequate documentation of Student-Athlete Statements and Drug Consent Forms, (d)
ineligible freshman student-athlete participating in sport practice or competition, (e)
inadequate documentation of freshmen, (f) incorrect classification of freshmen (i.e.,
partial or nonqualifier), (g) failure to determine transfer eligibility remaining, (h) failure
to meet requirement of passing 24 credit hours each year, (i) inappropriate number of
hours earned during the summer, (j) inadequate GPA, (k) inappropriate courses taken, (l)
failure to achieve degree plan percentage goals, and (m) failure to choose degree program
or declare a major.
Financial aid. In the high-risk area of financial aid, the working group identified
one specific risk, which was the over-awarding above team and individual maximums.
Extra benefits. In the high-risk area of extra benefits, the working group identified
five specific risks: (a) complimentary admission tickets; (b) awards exceeding limits; (c)
automobile or the use of an automobile; (d) per diems and or reimbursements for other
expenses, including academic support, medical, housing, meals, travel, practice, and
competition, that exceed limits; and (e) a representative of athletic interests could provide
extra benefits.
Gender equity. In the high-risk area of gender equity, the working group
identified four specific risks: (a) the gender equity plan does not comply with NCAA
rules; (b) gender bias in athletic scholarships and opportunities; (c) gender bias in
programs, services, and support for student-athletes; and (d) gender bias exists.
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Student welfare. In the high-risk area of student welfare, the high-risk working
group identified eight specific risks: (a) inappropriate means of team travel (such as 15person vans), (b) inappropriate drivers of vehicles, (c) violations related to gambling, (d)
failure to have drug testing consent forms on file, (e) failure to know or act appropriately
about a student-athlete’s medical history, (f) lack of a certified Life Skills Program, (g)
lack of an established grievance policy and process for discipline or financial-aid
setbacks, and (h) lack of a student-athlete advisory committee.
Sports camps. In the high-risk area of sports camps, the working group identified
eight specific risks: (a) lack of proper fiscal-management documentation, (b) no account
reconciliation, (c) camp conducted during a prohibited time period, (d) free or reduced
admissions, (e) selective invitees, (f) ineligible participation, (g) improper employment of
camp employees, and (h) inadequate health and safety procedures for the participants.
Facilities safety. In the high-risk area of facilities safety, the working group
identified four specific risks: (a) inadequate safety inspections, (b) antiquated facilities,
(c) improper maintenance, and (d) inadequate emergency plans.
Inclement weather. In the high-risk area of inclement weather, the working group
identified two specific risks: (a) lack of written lightning and inclement-weather safety
procedures, and (b) lack of plan or cost analysis on file for replacement or repairs to
athletics facilities or equipment damaged by inclement weather.
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Appendix F: Sample Monitoring Plan For One Specific Risk
Category/High-risk Area:
Responsible Party:
Source:
Risk:

Specific
Risk

Operating
Control

Inadequate
documentation
(yearly StudentAthlete
Statement and
Drug Consent
Form).

Initial team
meeting to
complete all
required NCAA
forms.

Student-athlete Management / Student Eligibility
Director of Athletics
NCAA Bylaw 14
Failure to monitor student-athlete eligibility status could result in an Athletics Department playing
ineligible student-athlete in practice or competitive events resulting in violations of Bylaw 14.

Evidence of
Control

Supervisory
Control

Signed and dated Director of
NCAA forms.
Compliance
reviews 100% of
the signed
NCAA forms
and matches to
team roster to
ensure
completion by
all studentathletes.

Evidence of
Control
Eligibility Grid
and Squad List.

Oversight
Controls

Evidence of
Control

Select sample of
student-athletes
from squad list
and verify that
NCAA forms are
completed.

Memorandum is
sent to the
Athletics
Director,
Athletic
Compliance
Office, and the
Institutional
Compliance
Office detailing
results of the
oversight
controls on a
quarterly basis.
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Appendix G: Potential High-Risk Areas In Athletics
Carston State University initially identified the following as potential high-risk
areas for Intercollegiate Athletics.
Student-Athlete Health Care Policies and Procedures
Intercollegiate Athletics Travel Policies and Procedures
NCAA Compliance and Rules Education
Student Financial Aid and Academic Regulations and Procedures
Conference Operating Code
Athletic Department Certification and Annual Audit
Employment Contracts and Conduct of Employees
Department Policies & Procedures Manual
Crisis Management
Student-Athlete Recruiting Regulations
Student-Athlete Eligibility
Student-Athlete Financial Aid
Student-Athlete Extra Benefits
Gender Equity
Student-Athlete Welfare
Institutional Control
Rules Education
Infractions – Reporting-Corrective Actions
Summer Camps Policies and Procedures
Facilities Safety
Inclement Weather
Travel Advances/Reimbursement Procedures
Drug Testing and Education Program
Employment Contracts per the State System’s Policies and Procedures
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FOOTNOTES

1

For purposes of confidentiality, Carston State University (CSU), State

University System, and Mid-Central Conference are pseudonyms.
2

The Presidents Commission, with advisory-only powers, was created in 1984.

Following a major restructuring in 1997, the top two NCAA committees, the Executive
Committee and the Division I Board of Directors, were composed primarily of university
presidents.
3

The State University System, Carston State University, and Mid-Central

Conference are pseudonyms for purposes of confidentiality.
4

The names Carston State University, State University System, and Mid-Central

Conference are pseudonyms.
5

All informants’ names are pseudonyms.

6

The Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of

1996 (HIPAA) addresses the use and disclosure of individuals’ health information.
7

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) is a federal law that

protects the privacy of students’ education records.
8

The Graham-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 has privacy provisions related to

consumers’ financial information.
9

The NCAA defines the institution’s chief executive officer as responsible for

institutional control. However, both the High-Risk Working Group and CSU identified
the athletics director as responsible at the operational level for athletics compliance.
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10

See the section entitled “The NCAA’s Approach to Compliance” in Chapter 2

for the listing of the NCAA’s Principles of Institutional Control.
11

State University System, Carston State University (CSU), and Mid-Central

Conference are pseudonyms.
12

Athletics compliance committees may go by different names at different

institutions. At CSU, the name Athletics Council was used.

